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ABSTRACT 
THE IDEA OF A REALISTIC UTOPIA 
COLLIN ANTHONY 
KOK-CHOR TAN 
The purpose of this dissertation is to articulate the proper aims and limits of political 
philosophy by expanding upon John Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia and applying it to 
various debates in contemporary political philosophy.  First, I defend the importance of 
ideal theory in constructing a theory of justice and respond to various critics, such as 
Amartya Sen and others, who argue that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for our work to advance justice in society.  Second, I argue that empirical facts must be 
included in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice, contrary to theorists 
such as G.A. Cohen who argues that political theorizing should proceed independently 
of such facts.  Finally, I conclude with some reflecting thoughts on the importance of 
articulating a conception of justice that avoids hopelessly utopian ideals.  In doing so, I 
defend the vision of a realistically utopian society as one that both answers our most 
fundamental interests and also provides us with the best chance of realizing justice in 
the world. 
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PREFACE 
 
This work in political philosophy explicates and defends Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia 
in order to respond to many debates that have arisen in the contemporary philosophical 
literature surrounding the nature of justice.  These debates include: the relevance of 
utopianism and realism, the relationship between principles of justice and empirical 
facts, and the importance of ideal theory in constructing a conception of justice.  Not 
surprisingly, new work is produced within these topics at a healthy pace and some of 
this material could not be fully explored in this dissertation.  One work that is worthy of 
note is Gerald Gaus’s book, The Tyranny of the Ideal, which was published after my 
chapter on ideal theory had already been drafted and completed.1  As such, despite its 
importance, my dissertation does not directly address its main arguments, and only 
refers to it in a limited capacity .  Nevertheless, many of the ideas advocated for here 
can be expanded upon and applied to his work, which I will leave for future research 
and exploration.
                                                          
1 Gaus, Gerald.  The Tyranny of the Ideal.  Princeton University Press, 2016. 
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Chapter 1:  Three Dichotomies in Political Philosophy2 
 
I.  The Purpose of the Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore three dichotomies that can be said 
to characterize several debates in political philosophy:  realism vs. utopianism, ideal vs. 
nonideal theory, and fact-sensitivity vs. fact-insensitivity.  Each of these dichotomies 
involves interrelated issues surrounding the methods of political philosophy, the nature 
of justice, and the proper goals and aspirations we should have when constructing a 
theory of justice.  The claim that I defend is as follows:  the idea of a realistic utopia—an 
important idea that appears in the work of John Rawls—is the most appropriate 
framework for resolving these three dichotomies and will yield important insights about 
the goals and methods of political philosophy.  In developing the idea, I argue that 
Rawls’s understanding of justice represents a position that (a) establishes the 
importance of ideal theory, (b) requires a sensitivity to empirical facts, and (c) provides 
a vision of society that is utopian, yet is still realistically achievable. 
Before turning to our explication of these dichotomies, let me illustrate the 
importance of these questions with an example.  Suppose a socialist egalitarian asserts 
that justice requires the complete equality of resources among all persons, and that we 
reply with the following:  “Your conception of justice is unachievable—human beings 
will never be able to act in ways to sustain perfect equality of resources due to human 
                                                          
2 All notes to Rawls’s work after the first citation will follow this notation:  Theory of Justice (TJ), Political 
Liberalism (PL), Justice as Fairness (JF), The Law of Peoples, (LP), “Kantian Constructivism,” (KC), and 
Collected Papers (CP). 
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motivational limitations and imperfect human institutions.  Consequently, your 
conception of justice must be false as it is clearly infeasible and incompatible with our 
human nature.”  Imagine that the socialist replies:  “That is no objection to my theory at 
all, for I am not making any background assumptions about human behavior, psychology 
or social institutions.  If we hold human psychology as an irrelevant variable, my theory 
is without flaw.  Justice mandates perfect equality.  If it turns out that human beings are 
hopelessly selfish, then so much the worse for humans.  The content of justice is not 
undermined by our imperfect nature and our inability to realize it.” 
These exchanges are not uncommon in debates surrounding the demands of 
justice, and they highlight important issues about some sources of disagreement 
between different schools of thought.  From this example, we can see that error, if there 
exists any, is much more likely to be the result of different underlying assumptions 
about what should and should not be taken for granted when theorizing about political 
philosophy in the first place, and not the result of logical flaws in conclusions drawn 
from the stated premises.  For, it may very well be true that if human psychology were 
irrelevant, perfect equality should be our target.  But is this really the most appropriate 
way to argue for this conclusion?  Should we really ignore features about humans when 
reasoning about justice?  Does it come at too high a cost, akin to a Pyrrhic victory?  To 
answer these questions, we must investigate the methodology and background 
assumptions about political philosophy itself.  Upon doing so, we may find that how we 
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answer these more fundamental questions shapes the principles we select as candidates 
for how best to live in society with one another. 
From our initial example between the socialist and her critic, we can expand 
upon it and parse out the multiple dichotomies where disagreements lie with respect to 
these more basic methodological questions about political theorizing.  They can be 
characterized in the following ways: 
(a)  Ideal and Nonideal Theory 
One such dichotomy we can use to characterize these disagreements is between 
ideal and nonideal theory. 3  For instance, we may choose to characterize the socialist as 
utilizing ideal theory to make her claim that perfect equality is required.  But what does 
it mean to say “ideal” theory?  One way to describe it is to say that ideal theory is a 
method of theorizing that “idealizes” away certain variables—such as human 
psychology—to either emphasize a normative point, or to simplify our reasoning about 
justice.  The general motivation to do so would be that the social world and human 
behavior are too complex to evaluate all at once, and that the best tactic would be to 
isolate features by holding others constant so that we can pinpoint something of 
normative importance. 
We are already used to this kind of tool in the empirical sciences—that is, we 
ignore friction in physics, or we assume the perfect competition of markets in 
                                                          
3 For an alternative account for how to capture the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, see 
Valentini, Laura.  “Ideal and Nonideal Theory:  A Conceptual Map.”  Philosophy Compass 17 (2009): 332-55, 
and Hamlin, Alan and Zofia Stemplowska. “Theory, Ideal Theory, and the Theory of Ideals.” Political 
Studies Review 10 (2012): 48-62. 
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economics.  We know that variables such as friction matter, but in order to make 
headway in determining more fundamental principles, we need to idealize away from 
them and then slowly add these variables in later as we come to better grasp the 
scientific principles at stake more clearly.4 
Similarly, some uses of ideal theory in political philosophy can be said to mirror 
some of these tactics.  We have already seen in our initial example how some 
egalitarians may choose to ignore features of human psychology when arguing for their 
claims.  Other instances can be described as well.  For example, in global justice, some 
theorists may choose to ignore the existence of borders when theorizing about the best 
principle to govern the distribution of resources in the world.  For these theorists, it is 
not that they completely disregard the importance of borders—just like physicists know 
that friction is important—it is rather that borders are not morally relevant for deciding 
fundamental principles.5  For these theorists, the existence of borders only confounds 
our thinking about justice; it is best if we ignore them and settle the fundamental 
principles of justice first before can we consider other variables, such as borders.  As this 
                                                          
4 Some philosophers of science argue for the distinction between “abstraction” on the one hand and 
“idealization” on the other.  The central idea is that abstraction ignores a feature of the world, whereas 
idealization assumes something that is false in order to simplify the world.  For example, a physicist may 
abstract from friction (since it is subtracted away from the world), and an economist may idealize a 
market (perfect competition is false as it does not exist).  See Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics 
Lie. Oxford University Press, 1983.  For a further discussion of this distinction see Weisberg, Michael.  
“Three Kinds of Idealization,” The Journal of Philosophy 104, no. 12 (2007): 639-659.  Also, to see how 
abstraction and idealization relates to ethics, see O’Neill, Onora.  Towards Justice and Virtue: A 
Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge University Press, 1996: 40-45.  Also see Gaus, 
Gerald. The Tyranny of the Ideal. Princeton University Press, 2016: 36-38. 
5 For an example of this kind of theorizing, see Beitz, Charles.  “Justice and International Relations,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 376.  He argues that “we should not view national 
boundaries as having fundamental moral significance,” and seeks to apply a principle of redistribution to 
the entire globe. 
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example illustrates, we can better see how theorists “idealize” away certain features of 
the world in order to theorize more fruitfully about principles by removing some of the 
complexity involved. 
Of course, the method of ideal theory—understood in this way—is not without 
challenges.  Many critics have voiced concerns about the danger of idealizing away 
central features of the world—such as borders—or of human capacities.  While these 
critics are typically labeled as proponents of “nonideal” theory, it is a bit of a misnomer 
to do so.  For what bothers many critics of ideal theory is not the engagement in 
idealization per se, but the variables being idealized away themselves.  For instance, a 
common objection to the global theorist who ignores the existence of borders is to say 
that borders are relevant at the fundamental level and should never be idealized away.6  
The objection is not that no idealization can ever occur.  Even the harshest critic of ideal 
theory would agree that it is acceptable to ignore some features of the world.  For 
instance, few would object to the idealizing away of individual differences about tastes 
and preferences, or of the variation of individual personality traits.7  Moreover, we can 
do so without denying the normative importance that some of those features may 
eventually have further downstream in our moral framework.  In other words, such 
features would simply operate at a later stage—similar to how friction may be added 
                                                          
6 Many theorists hold that borders matter for they define a normatively salient set of associations and 
relationships that exist among the members within the borders. See, for instance, Scheffler, Samuel.  
Boundaries and Allegiances.  Oxford University Press, 2002. 
7 We may acknowledge that there are individual differences, but we can idealize away from the specific 
sets of preferences—such as the preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate. 
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back into our consideration at a later point of our investigation after we have uncovered 
a more fundamental principle of physics. 
Consequently, when we describe a “nonideal” theorist, we should envision one 
who is highly critical of idealizing away a certain set of variables, namely ones that have 
been commonly discussed in the literature—features such as human selfishness, the 
workings of social institutions, the existence of borders, or the assumption of full 
compliance, to name a few.  Such theorists remind us to be extremely cautious when 
engaging in idealization and exhort us to be certain that we have adequate justification 
for ignoring certain features of ourselves and the world when theorizing about justice. 
(b)  Realism and Utopianism 
 Another dichotomy that can be described in debates surrounding the constraints 
and methods of political theorizing is the distinction between realism and utopianism.8  
Some interpret the task of political philosophy to mean that we should strive to describe 
the principles that would govern a utopia that is the best of all possible worlds.  In this 
sense, one might imagine that our theoretical task would be to “start from scratch” in 
the building of our world, using whatever normative guidance and reasoning we have in 
order to determine what kind of life we should live and what kind of beings we should 
become. 9  There would be, in a sense, no limits at all to our inquiry, with the exception 
of perhaps our capacity for imagination and of our rationality and moral intuitions.   
                                                          
8 The literature sometimes describes this dichotomy as part of the ideal/non-ideal distinction. See 
Valentini (2009).  However, for clarification purposes, I wish to distinguish them. 
9 Rawls describes Leibnitz’s philosophy as falling into this category:  “Another idea is that of moral 
philosophy as importantly a study of the ethics of creation, that is, of the principles of good and evil and 
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 Since there are relatively few contemporary examples of this approach, a more 
modest account of this dichotomy should be articulated.  According to this more limited 
approach, utopianism allows us to largely ignore concerns about feasibility and 
achievability when constructing a picture of what the perfect society is.  For instance, 
G.A. Cohen argues that a socialist society is desirable and the best we can envision for 
ourselves, even though he concedes that he is agnostic about whether or not it is 
achievable.10  For Cohen, feasibility is not a general constraint on our political principles, 
and the construction of the perfect utopian society is an exercise that is independent of 
the question of how to implement such a society in the actual world.   
 What value is there to such an approach?  After all, if we cannot achieve the 
perfect society—on what basis can we argue for it?  There are two replies we can offer 
here.  First, Cohen could argue that it is a mistake to assume that all value lies in 
implementation, and that there is value to be attained in discerning the very idea of a 
utopian society as a purely rational feat.  Mathematicians may rely upon similar 
justifications for their work when the possibility of applying any of it to the actual world 
may be limited.   
However, a second way to defend the irrelevance of feasibility and achievability 
is to illustrate it with the Kantian idea of a regulative ideal.  According to Kant, one of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of right and wrong that guide the divine will in the creation of the world.” See Rawls, John.  Lectures on 
the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. by Barbara Herman.  Harvard University Press, 2000: 107. 
10 See Cohen, G.A. Why not Socialism? Princeton University Press, 2009.  Also see Gilabert, Pablo.  
“Debate:  Feasibility and Socialism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 1 (2011): 52-63.  And 
Gheaus, Anca.  “The Feasibility Constraint on the Concept of Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 
252 (2013): 445-464. 
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our duties is that of self-perfection.  However, Kant believes that perfection is 
impossible for us to ever attain—it is instead “a rudder by which to steer oneself.”11  
Kant states:  “It is a human being’s duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach 
it . . . and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly consist only in continual 
progress.”12  Hence, a regulative ideal can be valuable irrespective of our ability to 
achieve it, for it can guide us toward correct actions and help us eradicate the ever-
deceptive and ubiquitous motive of self-love.13   
On this reading, utopian modes of thought—characterized by the irrelevance of 
feasibility or achievability—may allow us to construct perfect models that can direct the 
design of institutions in political philosophy, or guide our intentions in the domain of 
moral philosophy.   So, while it may be impossible to ever reach a utopia, the model can 
still provide us with guidance when attempting to improve our current state of affairs.  
On this account, without such guidance, our reformations would be aimless and without 
a clear goal.  Put simply, to improve the current state of affairs, one must have a 
blueprint to guide decision making. 
 Not surprisingly, realists object to these two strands of utopianism.  With respect 
to the notion of “starting from scratch” and building the best possible world, realists 
resist the broad and limitless explorations into what society could be like.  They assert 
that, while these musings may be appropriate as works of fiction within literature, they 
                                                          
11 See Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue.  
Cambridge University Press, 2005: 89. 
12 Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by M.J. Gregor, in The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University Press, 1991: 446. 
13 For a more detailed account of this see, Grenberg (2005): 89-95. 
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cannot have much philosophical value with respect to how we should organize society.  
At best, they could perhaps expand our imagination by enabling us to envision alternate 
realities.  But at worst, they can be dangerous fancies that lead us astray from what we 
can actually hope to achieve—forever tempting people with a vision that is impossible, 
leading to endless frustration and implacable resentment.14  For this reason, realists also 
reject the idea that we should ignore concerns of feasibility and achievability in our 
theories of justice.  They tend to appeal to the dictum that “ought implies can,” and 
argue that, if the perfect society cannot actually be attainable, then the normative force 
of the utopian vision should be blunted.   
In addition, other theorists argue that the fixation on determining what the 
perfect society is will not provide us with the necessary tools to make improvements in 
society.  Amartya Sen, for example, has argued that constructing a utopia that is 
perfectly just is “neither necessary nor sufficient” in aiding us in our choice to improve 
the current state affairs.15 
 In light of these worries, realists tend to highlight the “here and now” and 
emphasize the limitations that current political structures or individual motivational 
patterns pose for any attempts at change to society.  Consequently, realists will not 
devote much argumentative efforts in constructing the perfect or flawless society, but 
                                                          
14 See Galston, William.  “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 4 (2010): 
385-411, for a discussion on this point. 
15 See Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice.  Harvard University Press, 2009.  Also, Sen, Amartya.  “What do 
we want from a Theory of Justice?”  The Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 5 (2006): 215-238. 
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rather highlight feasible improvements that we can make to society, given what we 
already know and whatever limitations are in place.16 
(c)  Fact-Sensitivity vs Fact-Insensitivity 
 The final dichotomy that I explore relates to two separate issues:  first, whether 
or not our fundamental principles of justice are “fact-free” in the sense that they do not 
rely upon any facts to justify them, and second, whether or not it is permissible to allow 
any facts whatsoever into our justification of principles of justice.  According to G.A. 
Cohen, for a principle of justice to be truly fundamental, it must lie at the summit of our 
normative convictions and cannot express any reliance upon facts.17  If it does, as he 
believes Rawls’s conception of justice does, we should be able to unearth a fundamental 
principle by probing for the ultimate justification for it that explains why those facts are 
relevant. 
 If we return to our example of the socialist and her critic, the socialist could be 
asserting a “fact-free” commitment to equality in the sense that she believes that there 
are no facts required to justify her stance—it is simply the most fundamental belief she 
has:  “justice demands equality.”  We can test this by inquiring why she believes this.  If 
she does not need to appeal to a fact to do so, she has reached the summit of her 
beliefs.    
                                                          
16 See Wiens, David.  “Prescribing Institutions without Ideal Theory,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, 
no. 1 (2012): 45-70. 
17 Cohen, G.A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Harvard University Press, 2008. 
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We can now turn to the second element of the dichotomy, according to which 
facts should have no bearing whatsoever in our justification of justice.  The socialist, in 
defending her conception of equality, challenges her critic for invoking facts about 
human nature to counter her claim.  Philosophers such as Cohen would argue that such 
a move is unwarranted, as such considerations are irrelevant to justice.  Justice, on this 
account, is primarily a conceptual truth that is applied to factual circumstances.  What 
justice requires, in other words, can never be challenged by factual circumstances. 
Other philosophers, such as Rawls, deny this claim.  They argue that facts must 
be at the forefront of our theorizing about justice.  Otherwise, we are left with a 
conundrum as to how we should go about determining principles of justice that persons 
can agree upon.  For, if we cannot rely upon facts, it is unclear that people we have 
enough information to figure out what justice requires.   
In addition, Rawls believes that our reliance on facts makes justice applicable to 
us.  If we ignore factual constraints, our resultant theory of justice will be distant and 
detached from our own conception of ourselves.  As such, it could not serve the basis 
for a public criterion of justice that is capable of generating agreement. 
II.  Moving Forward 
Having laid out the three dichotomies with respect to the methods and aims of 
political philosophy, I am now in a position to outline the chapters of my dissertation:  In 
chapter 2, I briefly describe Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia, drawing upon textual 
support to provide a more detailed picture of his goals and methods for political 
12 
 
philosophy.  In chapter 3 and 4, I argue for the importance of ideal theory as defined by 
Rawls and defend it from various critics, including Amartya Sen who argue that it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing justice in the world.  In chapter 5, I argue 
for the importance of empirical facts in our understanding of justice, and show that we 
cannot abstract away from all such facts when articulating the requirements of justice.  
And finally, in chapter 6, I conclude by highlighting how Rawls’s methodology for 
determining principles of justice avoids hopelessly utopian ideals and argue for why 
Rawls’s vision of a realistic utopia is the proper orientation of political philosophy. 
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Chapter 2:  The Idea of a Realistic Utopia 
We view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing the limits 
of practicable political possibility.  Our hope for the future of our society rests 
on the belief that the social world allows at least a decent political order, so that 
a reasonably just, though not perfect, democratic regime is possible.  So we ask: 
What would a just democratic society be like under reasonably favorable but 
still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the tendencies of the 
social world?  What ideals and principles would such a society try to realize 
given the circumstances of justice in a democratic culture as we know them?18 
        
I.  Introduction 
At first glance, the idea of a realistic utopia appears contradictory—what 
conceptual clarity could be gained by juxtaposing two seemingly incompatible notions 
together in a single idea?  In order to answer this question, I must unpack the various 
components that inform Rawls’s understanding of it. 
Rawls first mentions the idea of a realistic utopia within the context of global 
justice in the Law of Peoples.19  While the idea initially refers to the capacity for liberal 
and non-liberal decent societies to achieve lasting peace, Rawls himself extends the 
application of the idea to a conception of justice more generally in Justice as Fairness.20 I 
will focus on that more general application here. 
According to Rawls, inherent in the notion of a realistic utopia is a commitment 
to two governing judgments about what a conception of justice should do:   
(1) “Extend what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practical 
political possibility;”21 and 
 
                                                          
18 Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness. Harvard University Press, 2001: 4. 
19 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press, 1999. 
20 JF, 4-5, 13.  
21 LP, 11 
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(2) “Depict an achievable social world….not a mere logical possibility, but 
one that connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations of the social 
world.”22 
 
Each of these judgments corresponds, respectively, to the utopian and realistic 
elements of justice.  I will discuss each of these elements below. 
(a)  A Realistic Utopia 
The first judgment gives voice to the utopian aspirations of a theory of justice.  In 
society as we experience it, we are regularly reminded of the obstacles that limit the 
foreseeable possibilities of social progress, such as the memory of our historical failures, 
the perpetual conflicts of interest, and the feelings of political estrangement.  Moreover, 
these obstacles tend to cement themselves into our normative attitudes towards the 
world, taking root in our considered judgments and coloring our view of what is 
ultimately possible for society.  To provide an illustration, Rawls states, “there are long 
periods in the history of any society during which certain basic questions lead to deep 
and sharp conflict and it seems difficult if not impossible to find any reasoned common 
ground for political agreement.”23  Rawls cites the brutal conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants during the Reformation, the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists during the drafting of the American Constitution, and the perennial debates 
regarding the balance of liberty and equality in modern societies as examples that 
influence our pessimism about the possibility for genuine agreement about principles 
for a just society.  From this history of disagreement, we may ultimately think that 
                                                          
22 LP, 128. 
23 JF, 1. 
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justice can only be an endless power struggle between different competing and 
irreconcilable interests, with the only hope for agreement being a mere modus vivendi.  
Or, we may come to accept as part of the natural order the necessity of deep social 
inequalities with little recourse available to those who are worst off.  As these 
illustrations show, the real danger, for Rawls, is that we may simply learn to respond to 
these intractable disputes by resigning ourselves to our existing situation, unable and 
unwilling to reach for the basis of a broader consensus or political agreement. 
In the face of these pessimistic tendencies, a conception of justice must be, in 
part, utopian; it must expand our worldview and enable us to imagine new possibilities 
for society that have been deemed infeasible by our hardened hearts through our daily 
confrontations with the world.  As Rawls states, “the limits of the possible are not given 
by the actual,” and it is therefore up to us to construct a framework for justice that 
extends beyond the actual by showing how social and political institutions may be 
arranged differently, giving rise to a new political reality that is more just than the 
current state of affairs.24 Without these aspirational elements of justice, we will 
perpetually be constrained by our actual circumstances and doomed to replicate our 
frustrations and disappointments without any reasonable hope for improvement. 
Described in this way, a theory of justice should be, in a sense, expansive and 
broadening.  It must give us reason to hope for an alternative arrangement of society 
that seeks to better respond to our fundamental interests as citizens. 
                                                          
24 LP, 12. 
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(b)  A Realistic Utopia 
The second governing judgment reflects the realistic dimensions of justice.  It 
urges us to temper our aspirations and ground them in the realities of human nature 
and the circumstances of society which pose limitations on what we can strive to 
achieve.  As Rawls insists, we are not interested in mere “logical possibilities” of 
perfectly just societies, but rather genuine options that can reliably connect with the 
general capacities of human beings and the indelible features that characterize liberal 
democratic societies.   
The reason for this is because we want to ensure that we have principles of 
justice “that we can understand and act on, approve, and endorse.”25  If our conception 
of justice fails to connect with our fundamental interests and our capacities, there is 
little assurance that humans will reliably act upon it over time.  In this sense, an 
important realistic thread of Rawls’s work is the importance of stability in our political 
theories.  It is of no use to us to produce a picture of the perfect society that can only 
have momentary success amidst very specific circumstances.  Instead, we require a 
society that answers to the general features of social life and of our psychological 
capacities.  It is only then will a stable and just society be possible for us. 
Failure to internalize these realistic elements will yield conceptions of justice 
that are inapplicable and even harmful to human societies.  Let us illustrate with an 
example from Hume:  
                                                          
25 LP, 7. 
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We shall suppose, that a creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted 
with human nature, deliberates with himself what RULES of justice or 
property would best promote public interest, and establish peace and 
security among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, to assign 
the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and give every one 
the power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination. In a perfect 
theocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular 
volitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the 
wisest purposes: But were mankind to execute such a law; so great is the 
uncertainty of merit, both from its natural obscurity, and from the self-
conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct would 
ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society must be the 
immediate consequence....A rule, which, in speculation, may seem the 
most advantageous to society, may yet be found, in practice, totally 
pernicious and destructive.26 
 
From this passage, we can see that Hume issues a serious warning to utopian modes of 
reasoning; if we were to speculate, while being “unacquainted with human nature,” or 
without regard to the effects of that rule on society, we would produce a “destructive” 
result.  In Hume’s example, if we ignore the limitations of human knowledge—if we do 
not acknowledge that we are not infinitely intelligent and are sometimes unaware of 
our own intentions, let alone the intentions of others—there would be no way to 
determine how to employ the rule “to each according to his virtue” without devolving 
into muddled and limited speculations.   As a result, it should be eliminated as a 
possibility for a principle of justice.  Hume ends his discussion by saying:  “We may 
conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the regulation of property, we 
must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man.”27   
                                                          
26 Hume, David.  Enquiry Concerning Principle of Morals, Section III, “Of Justice,” Part II.  
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm#2H_SECT3 (2010, January 12th).   
27 Ibid.   
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 Rawls echoes Hume’s conclusions here by quoting Rousseau, who famously 
claims that we must “take men as they are” when devising principles of justice.28  Rawls 
interprets this to mean that we must be aware of the limitations that human nature 
imposes upon us and that we must employ “workable” principles of justice.29  
“Workable” for Rawls means that they must be public conceptions of justice that are 
“openly observable” and amenable to “interpersonal comparisons” in society.30  The 
principle, “to each according to one’s virtue,” would fail this test for, as Hume points out, 
there is no easily accessible method by which public institutions could determine each 
person’s level of virtue and the requisite reward for it.31                       
So far then, the realistic elements of justice emphasize the following:  (1) human 
nature, (2) the general circumstances of society, (3) stability, and (4) workability.  Of 
course, significant debate lies in the much harder question regarding which features of 
human nature and of society are important, and how these relate to stability and 
workability.  I will discuss these in greater detail in later chapters. 
(c)  A Realistic Utopia 
So, how does Rawls combine these two different goals into one coherent vision?  
According to Rawls, there are several features that a realistic utopia as a whole must 
                                                          
28 LP, 13.  For the reference to Rousseau’s injunction, see Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.  The Social Contract, in 
Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy, 2nd edition, ed. by Steven Cahn.  Oxford University Press, 2012: 
561. 
29 LP, 13. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
31 Rawls himself argues that the principle of utility and the capability approach to justice would similarly 
fail as workable public conceptions of justice.  See Rawls, John. Political Liberalism.  Columbia University 
Press, 1993: 13 for this argument. 
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contain if it is to be an appropriate conception of justice.  First, a theory of justice must 
“use political (moral ideals), principles and concepts to specify a reasonable and just 
society.”32  While this may sound broad and more utopian in spirit, Rawls insists that 
these ideals must be completely contained “within the category of the political.”33  
What Rawls means is that the conception of society and of the concepts employed to 
articulate a conception of justice must be “available in the public political culture of a 
liberal constitutional regime” and “not [from] any comprehensive doctrine, which 
always extends beyond the category of the political.”34  In other words, the notion of, 
say, freedom and equality employed by many conceptions of justice cannot be 
understood solely from within a singular religious worldview or from a comprehensive 
philosophical doctrine about the nature of free will.  Instead, the freedom and equality 
of persons must be available in the language, structure and shared history of democratic 
institutions that citizens employ openly to one another.  In doing so, there is greater 
scope for agreement and consensus on principles of justice that are based on shared 
normative concepts that are available and accessible to all citizens. 
Other political norms that Rawls includes—in addition to the freedom and 
equality of citizens—is a set of political virtues such as the desire for “cooperation,” “a 
sense of fairness,” “tolerance,” and “a willingness to meet others half-way.”35  These 
guiding norms do not require us to appeal to a unique moral doctrine for their ultimate 
                                                          
32 LP, 14. 
33 LP, 15. 
34 LP, 15. 
35 LP, 15. 
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justification—they can be supported from a multitude of different conceptions of the 
good—and they can be assumed as a “given” within society in which people accept that 
social cooperation for mutual benefit is its defining feature.36  If we define society in any 
other way—say, as the joint endeavor to ensure the salvation of souls, or as a 
cooperative effort to produce perfect selfless individuals—our political ideals and 
virtues will extend into objectionable utopian standards that will unlikely yield 
agreement or attain stability over time. 
One important political norm to highlight on its own is that of reciprocity.  
According to Rawls:  
This criterion [of reciprocity] requires that, when terms are 
proposed…those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for 
others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated 
or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or social 
position.37   
 
In this sense, reciprocity works with other political norms to establish a standpoint of 
justice that transcends current political and social realities in which vast inequalities may 
generate an unequal bargaining position between citizens.  No conception of justice can 
be formulated if citizens cannot deliberate within a fair and reasonable standpoint from 
which citizens may decide upon principles of justice.  Otherwise, any agreements would 
be unstable compromises, easily undermined by shifts in power or changes in interests.  
The norm of reciprocity ensures that any agreement that is reached after deliberation is 
agreed to for the right reasons—not out of fear, intimidation or unfair bargaining 
                                                          
36 For a broader discussion of Rawls’s “overlapping consensus,” see PL, 133-172. 
37 LP, 14. 
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positions.  In other words, it imposes a limit on the circumstances under which 
deliberation may take place that all parties should be able to accept as fair and 
reasonable.  Such agreements will then be stable and at low risk of being undermined by 
changes in circumstances. 
The norm of reciprocity is in this sense utopian, for it requires that citizens move 
beyond their current interests and think normatively within a standpoint that answers 
to our more fundamental interests as citizens:  the ability to freely pursue a conception 
of the good, and to develop a sense of justice—or what Rawls calls the “two moral 
powers.”38   
And yet, at the same time, the criterion of reciprocity is realistic.  Rawls is not 
demanding that we cultivate a capacity that we do not have, or one that is unreliable 
and limited.  A concern for reciprocity, unlike say beneficence or altruism, is a reliable 
and stable human capacity that can be said to be at the heart of relations within a 
political society.  In Part III of a Theory of Justice, Rawls even develops an account which 
establishes how “reciprocity is the fundamental psychological mechanism implicated in 
the development of moral motivation” and that, because of this, principles based upon 
reciprocity would “develop naturally out of preexisting psychological materials.”39  By 
grounding the source of basic political norms in fundamental human psychology, Rawls 
believes that accepting his conception of justice will not be an insurmountable task 
                                                          
38 PL, 19. 
39 Scheffler, Samuel.  “Rawls and Utilitarianism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002: 435.  Also see Rawls, John.  A Theory of Justice.  Harvard University Press, 1999: 
433 where Rawls describes reciprocity as a “deep psychological fact,” without which “our nature would be 
very different and fruitful social cooperation fragile if not impossible.” 
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capable of only saints or the chosen few.  It will be available to all, and will answer to 
citizens’ deepest psychological tendencies, thereby ensuring stability and reliable 
acceptance over time.40 
By limiting our normative ideals to political concepts within the scope of human 
psychology and within the culture of democratic institutions, we can maintain the vision 
of a realistic utopia without contradiction.  A conception of justice is utopian in that it 
can expand the possibilities of social organization by appealing to normative goals that 
can be utilized to critically examine current social institutions. Yet, at the same time, this 
critical standpoint will be realistically grounded in what citizens qua citizens are already 
capable of accepting as it is compatible with their deepest psychology, their 
fundamental interests, as well as with the commitments within their social and political 
culture. 
A final feature of a realistic utopia is that there must be an acknowledgement 
and acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism.41  The fact of reasonable pluralism is 
the fact that citizens will naturally arrive at differing conclusions about fundamental 
values in life through the free use of their reason.  The explanation for this is that 
citizens are constrained by imperfect information and limited capacities to weigh and 
evaluate evidence, or what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment.”42  In other words, it 
                                                          
40 Rawls contrasts this approach with that of the demands of utilitarianism, which requires that all citizens 
develop an expansive sympathy for all, and demands that the worst off members act the for the sake of 
those more fortunate when aggregate utility would be increased. For Rawls, this is unacceptable and will 
not reliably develop and persist as part of the normal course of moral development.  See TJ, 437. 
41 JF, 4. 
42 JF, 35. 
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is unreasonable to expect citizens to converge on a particular conception of the good 
given the immense diversity of experiences and the differing responses to these 
experiences available to citizens.  On Rawls’s view then, the fact of reasonable pluralism 
must then be “permanent as it persists indefinitely under free democratic 
institutions.”43   
Given the indelible fact of reasonable pluralism, we would not do well in 
employing a principle of justice that ignored it—say, by instituting a principle of justice 
that required the unanimous agreement upon a comprehensive religious or 
philosophical doctrine.  Doing so would disrupt the stability of a conception of justice 
and would not garner reliable adherence to it, as the state would have to resort to 
coercive tactics to enforce agreement. Citizens who would endure such policies would 
garner resentment and hatred for the state, awaiting the chance to overthrow it and 
replace it.  This kind of inevitable vying for power would threaten to undermine and 
delegitimize the governing institutions in society.  As a result, persons would reject any 
comprehensive doctrines as suitable claims for political organization, and would assert 
the importance of reasonable pluralism as a guiding feature of society.  Otherwise, 
stability would not be realistically achievable, and persons would not be assured that 
their fundamental interests could be adequately safeguarded. 
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Given these considerations, Rawls states that “this fact of reasonable pluralism 
limits what is practicably possible.”44  While it may be an interesting philosophical 
exercise to provide a hypothetical picture of the perfectly just society that existed in a 
world in which humans were omniscient and did not suffer from the burdens of 
judgement—perhaps yielding a society in which everyone agreed upon a unique 
conception of the good—this would not be an acceptable guide for what justice actually 
requires of us.  The mere fact that we could theoretically perform that exercise would 
be irrelevant and utopian in the negative sense, for it would not provide us with an 
achievable conception of justice that can be attainable given reasonable limitations of 
human nature and of liberal democratic societies.  Hence, such imaginations should be 
met with skepticism and caution. 
Nevertheless, the commitment to reasonable pluralism is utopian in an 
important sense for it ensures that citizens will be safeguarded with the capacity to 
pursue a conception of the good of their own choosing.  While it would not be possible 
for an entire society to unite behind a common good, a fundamental interest of citizens 
would still be protected, along with the ability for citizens to associate with others who 
share similar values, as enumerated in the first principle of justice of any realistic 
utopia—Rawls’s principle that protects the basic liberties.45 
                                                          
44 LP, 12. 
45 LP, 14.  In addition to protecting the basic liberties found in a constitutional regime, Rawls argues that a 
realistic utopia will also ensure that the means to exercise these liberties will be provided for all (typically 
found in Rawls’s second principle of justice—the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity). 
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Ultimately, when we combine these various elements contained within a realistic 
utopia—namely, a recognition of the practical limitations of human nature and of social 
life, combined with political ideals that are accessible to all and capable of providing a 
critical standpoint from which to judge our principles—Rawls believes we will have 
grounds for the reasonable hope in the possibility of achieving a reasonable and just 
society that is stable across time.  Moreover, Rawls says, in his discussion of Hegel, that 
we will be able to reconcile ourselves to our society and its institutions, as opposed to 
merely “resigning” ourselves to them.46  In this sense, we misunderstand the notion of a 
realistic utopia if we view it as a form of tragic compromise between realism and 
utopianism.  Instead, a realistic utopia should illustrate a vision that can be supported by 
all citizens and accepted as reasonable, for it does not run contrary to—and actually 
supports—the fundamental interests of persons to pursue a conception of the good and 
develop a sense of justice, and aligns with the deepest psychological tendencies of 
human nature and of social cooperation.  This ensures that justice will be affirmed and 
endorsed across time.47 
Of course, there are some natural limitations to the idea of a realistic utopia.  
First, it assumes that there are favorable historical circumstances surrounding the 
                                                          
46 JF, 3. 
47 Rawls also argues, more controversially, that justice is aligned with or “congruent” with the human 
good in TJ, 450-514.  It is notable that the congruence argument is not mentioned in his discussion of the 
idea of a realistic utopia in the Law of Peoples and Justice as Fairness.  Scholars believe that the main 
reason Rawls withdrew from this argument is because it conflicts with his commitment to reasonable 
pluralism.  For a discussion, see Freeman, Samuel. “Congruence and the Good of Justice” in Justice and 
the Social Contract.  Oxford University Press, 2007: 143-172. 
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development of society.48  Conditions of extreme scarcity due to devastating natural 
disasters or economic collapse, or historically unfavorable events such as catastrophic 
war will preclude a realistic utopia from being realized.   In these more unfortunate 
circumstances, citizens may find it difficult to see society as a system of social 
cooperation for mutual benefit, or their concern for safety and security will be so stark 
as to preclude them from forming the requisite level of trust with one another for 
reciprocity to shape social relations.  In such conditions, an aim to restore favorable 
conditions will be paramount so as to ensure that justice can be possible in society once 
again. 
A second limitation is that the implementation of a realistic utopia will not solve 
all questions of meaning and purpose for individuals.  As Rawls remarks, “a realistic 
utopia…may be a social world whose many members may suffer considerable 
misfortune and anguish, and may be distraught by spiritual emptiness.”49  The reason 
for this is because Rawls does not understand political society as a “community” or 
“association,” if we mean by such terms the idea of living together under a single unified 
common good.50  While it may be imaginable that such a group of persons could exist—
united and deeply fulfilled in their communal endeavor with all persons—the limitations 
of reasonable pluralism cannot allow for its realization.  Instead, Rawls leaves questions 
of meaning and purpose to the freedom of individuals and their associations within 
                                                          
48 JF, 84.  Included in these favorable circumstances are the “circumstances of justice” which are 
moderate scarcity and limited benevolence, coupled with an acceptance of reasonable pluralism. 
49 LP, 127. 
50 JF, 21. 
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political society.51  Hence, while a realistic utopia does not guarantee complete 
fulfillment in life, it affords everyone the effective opportunity to pursue his or her final 
ends to the greatest extent allowable by a free society. 
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Chapter 3:  Justice and Ideal Theory 
If ideal theory is worthy of study, it must be because, as I have conjectured, it is 
the fundamental part of the theory of justice and essential for the nonideal part 
as well.52 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to affirm the value and necessity of ideal theory in 
political philosophy.  As discussed in the introduction, ideal theory involves a certain 
methodology for determining the correct principles of justice for society.  This 
methodology typically involves idealizing assumptions that ignore certain features of the 
world, or imagines hypothetical features that do not currently exist.  In addition to these 
methodological features, ideal theory is said to be important for our understanding of 
how we should proceed in “nonideal” conditions of society where justice is not met.  
The idea is that, unless have a full understanding of what justice requires in an ideal 
model, we cannot address the problems posed by the more complex circumstances of 
social life.  The task of this chapter is to evaluate these two different components of 
ideal theory. 
An inquiry of this kind is particularly apt given the growing chasm that has 
appeared between ideal theorists on the one hand, who assert the primacy of ideal 
theory for delineating the requirements of justice, and political realists on the other, 
who largely eschew ideal theory and warn of its irrelevance, and even its potentially 
dangerous effects.  To illustrate this deep disagreement, consider the following tableau 
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of the current debate:  In the realist camp, Amartya Sen argues that ideal theory is 
“neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing justice in society;”53 David Wiens argues 
that “we should abandon ideal theory in our attempts to address actual injustices;”54 
Charles Mills and Carol Pateman claim that there is an unjustified “hegemony of ‘ideal 
theory’ in political philosophy.”55  
In support of ideal theory, John Rawls states that “ideal theory is the only basis 
for the systematic grasp of…pressing problems [of injustice];”56 Allen Buchanan believes 
that “the task of ideal theory is to set the most important and most distant moral 
targets for a better future,” and serve as “the ultimate standards for evaluating law.”;57 
John Simmons argues that “the political philosopher’s first job…is to refine and argue for 
an ideal of justice;”58 Adam Swift argues that “we need fundamental, context-
independent, normative philosophical claims to guide political action even in nonideal 
circumstances.”59 
                                                          
53 Sen, Amartya.  “What do we want from a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 5, 
May (2006): 217. 
54 Wiens, David.  “Prescribing Institutions without Ideal Theory,” in The Journal of Political Philosophy: Vol. 
20, No. 1 (2012): 45–70. 
55 Pateman, Carol and Charles Mills.  Contract and Domination.  Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2007: 107. Also 
see Mills, Charles.  “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Hypatia (2005): 165-184.  For further criticisms, see Galston, 
William.  “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory, 9 (2010): 385; Geuss, 
Raymond.  Philosophy and Real Politics.  Oxford University Press, 2008; and Williams, Bernard. In the 
Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, Princeton University Press, 2005. 
56 TJ, 8. 
57 Buchanan, Allen. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004: 
60. 
58 Simmons, John.  “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, No. 1 (2010): 36. 
59 Swift, Adam.  “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 34, 
No. 3 (2008): 363.  Also see Dworkin, Ronald.  Sovereign Virtue.  Harvard University Press, 2000: 172 for a 
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The wide array of positions with respect to the role of ideal and nonideal theory 
in political philosophy reflects, on my view, not only a confusion about what exactly we 
mean when we say “ideal theory” and “non-ideal” theory, but also a lack of agreement 
about what the proper methodology for doing political philosophy is and what role a 
conception of justice is supposed to serve in our normative thinking.  It is only after we 
articulate a considered view of these questions can we begin to resolve the ideal vs. 
nonideal debate that has since emerged in the contemporary literature. 
 Given this diagnosis of the problem, this chapter will serve two aims:  (1) clarify 
the meaning of the ideal/non-ideal distinction, and (2) argue that ideal theory, properly 
understood, is necessary for theorizing about justice, and is intricately connected with 
our obligations in so called “non-ideal” circumstances.  The outline of this chapter is as 
follows:  First, I begin with a detailed account of Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory, 
as it is typically at the forefront of various debates.  In doing so, I highlight several 
misunderstandings of his view and offer my own attempt to correct them in the spirit of 
Rawls’s work.  Next, I consider various objections presented by realists, who attempt to 
undermine Rawls’s assumption that ideal theory is the proper method for theorizing 
about justice.  I argue that all of the objections to Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory 
fail.  In doing so, I argue that Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory is grounded in his 
understanding of a realistic utopia, an idea which governs the goals and aims of political 
philosophy itself. 
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II.  Rawls and the Ideal 
 The main impetus for the current debate between nonideal and ideal theory 
stems from various components of John Rawls’s work in political philosophy, so it is 
natural to begin our discussion of the topic with his account.  While some theorists 
regard Rawls’s treatment of the topic clear and straightforward, upon examining Rawls’s 
work carefully, we come across numerous difficulties when attempting to account for all 
the cases where Rawls employs the terms “ideal” and “nonideal.”60  A sampling of some 
of the key ideas of Rawls’s texts will suffice to demonstrate this complexity.  For 
instance, Rawls describes in the course of his work: the definition of “ideal theory” and 
“nonideal theory,”61 an “ideal conception of the person,”62 an “ideal of society as a fair 
system of social cooperation,”63 the “ideal of a well-ordered society,”64 an “ideal of the 
rational and reasonable,”65 and the “ideal of public reason,”66 among many others.67  
Those familiar with Rawls will recognize that these are some of the most important and 
central ideas that govern and structure Rawls’s work.  It is no coincidence, then, that 
debates surrounding the ideal/nonideal distinction cover such a vast terrain and require 
a deep engagement with Rawls’s underlying ideas.  Nevertheless, to provide some 
                                                          
60 Simmons (2010) makes this point clearly in one of the most thorough treatments of Rawls’s 
ideal/nonideal theory distinction.  However, even Simmons’s work is limited to one portion of Rawls’s 
theory and is thereby incomplete. 
61 JF, 13. 
62 TJ, 260. 
63 CP, 307. 
64 CP, 321. 
65 PL, 102. 
66 PL, 248. 
67 See “ideal regarding principles” (TJ, 291); a “social ideal” as opposed to an “ideal of justice” (TJ, 9); the 
“ideal of a social union,” (TJ, 450); the “ideal of democratic citizenship” (PL, 152).  We can also add 
“nonideal” to each of terms and generate new concepts.  
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structure to our inquiry, we will begin our discussion with what Rawls himself formally 
calls “ideal theory” proper and “nonideal theory.”   
(a) Rawls and Ideal Theory 
One purpose of ideal theory, for Rawls, is to provide us with the most 
appropriate methodology for establishing the correct principles of justice that would 
govern the perfectly just, or “well-ordered” society.68  The central components of 
Rawls’s ideal theory are the two following idealizing assumptions:  (1) an assumption of 
“full or strict compliance,” and (2) an assumption of “favorable circumstances.”  With 
respect to full compliance, Rawls means that “(nearly) everyone strictly complies with, 
and abides by, the principles of justice.”69  Regarding “favorable circumstances,” Rawls 
refers to the “historical, economic, and social conditions” that “make a constitutional 
regime possible.”70  There is much to unpack in these conditions, but for now, the 
general idea is that, when determining which principles of justice would be best, Rawls 
believes that we must begin our inquiry by assuming that everyone follows those 
principles of justice and that the social circumstances are favorable for justice to arise. 
In what sense are these assumptions ideal?  The first assumption is “idealized” in 
the sense that full compliance does not obtain in actual political societies.  No society, 
currently or historically, has ever ensured strict compliance with its rules among all 
                                                          
68 TJ, 213.  A well-ordered society, for Rawls, contains several elements.  First, it describes a society in 
which everyone agrees on the same principles of justice; second, it applies those principles to govern and 
order its institutions; third, it assumes that these principles are publicly acknowledged; forth, it assumes 
that citizens are willing and able to act upon a “sense of justice” in support of these institutions; and fifth, 
it describes a society that is stable for the right reasons.  See Freeman, 484. 
69 JF, 13. 
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citizens.  The second assumption is idealized in the sense that it asks us to discount 
abnormal conditions, such as the existence of war and famine, when determining which 
principles are best—even though these are real and genuine problems that societies 
must face. 
While it may appear strange to begin an inquiry of justice with these 
assumptions, it is helpful to remind ourselves that these techniques are not limited to 
normative theorizing, and are pervasive in the empirical sciences as well.  For instance, 
in economic theory, there are no actual markets in which perfect competition exists.  
Nevertheless, the assumption of perfect competition is used prominently as a formal 
model that simplifies our domain of inquiry to provide some traction in tackling the 
problem of understanding markets and prices.  Similarly, in chemistry, the ideal gas law 
proports to describe how ideal gases behave in “normal conditions” of standard 
pressure and temperature.  Chemists recognize that abnormal conditions can present us 
with complex problems.  Yet, they proceed to assume that they do not hold with the 
belief that uncovering an ideal gas law will ultimately shed light on how to deal with 
nonideal conditions when they arise. 
Given this comparison, the idea of idealization should not be immediately 
objectionable or unfamiliar to intellectual inquiry as such.  What generates significant 
debate, however, is what features should be idealized.  In the sciences, it is a choice that 
we must make—we choose to idealize away friction in physics, for instance, because we 
believe that doing so will aid us in our understanding of fundamental physical laws.  So, 
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we must ask in our investigation of Rawls’s work whether or not these idealizing 
assumptions actually aid us in our understanding of justice, or if they are merely 
hindrances that obscure its true nature. 
(b) What is Nonideal Theory? 
Given Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory, we can then contrast it with his 
account of nonideal theory.  The subject of nonideal theory, for Rawls, involves the 
unique problems that arise when conditions of (1) strict compliance or (2) favorable 
circumstances do not hold.  These are the conditions of “partial compliance” or 
“unfavorable circumstances.”  These conditions give rise to a new and distinct set of 
questions for us to answer.  Broadly, questions within nonideal theory address “topics 
as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the various 
ways of opposing unjust regimes,” including civil disobedience.71  Within the subject of 
global justice, nonideal theory consists of developing principles for how to deal with 
“outlaw states” or “burdened societies,” which correspond respectively to societies that 
fail to comply with the Law of Peoples (noncompliance), or those societies which lack 
sufficient resources or political will to establish a well-ordered or decent society 
(unfavorable circumstances).72 
As is well known, much of Rawls’s work is primarily concerned with ideal theory, 
with relatively little work done in nonideal theory.  However, the main reason for this 
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asymmetry is not because Rawls is insensitive or uninterested in problems of nonideal 
theory, but rather because he thinks that “ideal theory is…the only basis for the 
systematic grasp of these more pressing problems [within nonideal theory].”73 In other 
words, Rawls thinks that it would be difficult to attempt solutions to the problems of 
nonideal theory—war, punishment, weak and unstable institutions, or deeply corrupted 
government—without understanding the conclusions drawn from work within ideal 
theory where full compliance and favorable conditions are assumed from the start.  The 
goal for our exegesis is to establish just why these assumptions are necessary and how 
ideal theory can generate accurate guidance for the pressing problems that nonideal 
circumstances pose. 
(c) Why Full Compliance? 
The assumption of full compliance typically generates significant debate with 
respect to Rawls’s methodological assumptions of ideal theory.  And, on first glance, it 
seems like a puzzling assumption.  Why should we think that assuming full compliance is 
a reliable method for determining what principles of justice we should adopt to 
eventually guide us in nonideal circumstances?  Won’t this lead us astray? 
One reason to think that the full compliance assumption is problematic is that it 
appears to simply idealize the central problem of justice (noncompliance) away from the 
very start, rendering the exercise irrelevant.  Realists, for example, argue that the core 
problem that a conception of justice must address is the problem of order and stability, 
                                                          
73 Ibid., 8.  Also quoted in Valentini, 655. 
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of which noncompliance is an essential threat that must be solved.74  And so, the 
objection goes, if we abstract away from noncompliance, then whatever principles we 
come up with will not really be applicable in our world.  Instead, they will be for some 
other world that is vastly different from our own.  David Schmidtz presents this point as 
follows: “The trouble with ideas about what is fair in worlds without compliance 
problems is that they are ideas about an ideal problem, and not a real one.”75  Because 
of this, realists caution that any attempt to apply these ideally constructed principles 
framed under perfect compliance to the “nonideal” circumstances of the actual world 
will tend to have disastrous consequences—after all, if they were constructed by 
assuming that compliance was irrelevant from the very start, why should we think that 
they will solve problems rather than exacerbate them? 
Let us consider an example to help motivate the problem.  Suppose I am 
searching for the best principles of justice.  I start with the belief that I am permitted to 
idealize away problems of noncompliance and begin with the assumption that everyone 
will adhere to my principles.  Moreover, I am entitled to favorable circumstances to 
ensure that abnormal factors do not interfere with the realization of a society governed 
by these principles. I then proclaim: “Since I do not have to worry about compliance, I 
assert that the ideal principle of justice is one in which everyone should proclaim their 
faith in the Christian God and be rewarded according to the Christian understanding of 
                                                          
74 See Williams, Bernard.  In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.  
Princeton University Press, 2005.  Also, Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck. Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
75 Schmidtz, David.  “Ideal Theory: What it is and What it Needs to be,” Ethics vol. 121, no. 4 (2011): 778. 
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virtue and merit.”  To anyone who would object to my principle by claiming that not 
everyone is a Christian, I can merely say, “That is a problem for nonideal theory and not 
my concern here.  I am modelling the perfectly just society, and if compliance is not an 
obstacle, then everyone affirming one religious doctrine is ideal.”  To anyone who claims 
that Christian teachings are not always available to people, I can invoke the “favorable 
conditions” clause, and assume that everyone has reasonable access to Bibles, Christian 
Churches, and the willingness and aptness to put their faith in God.  And now, with the 
true principles of justice at hand constructed using ideal theory, I can move to nonideal 
theory and address the problem of heathens (partial compliance) or “barbaric” and 
“uncivilized” nations who have not heard the word of God (unfavorable conditions). 
Framed this way, the idealizing assumption of full compliance looks troubling.  It 
appears to have the power to render moot any number of barriers that may apply in the 
real world for complying with principles of justice.  As such, the results will be 
catastrophic when we attempt to implement them for society.  As William Galston 
warns, “if one supposes that a republic of virtue is within reach, then the failure to 
attain it reflects either inadequate effort or deliberate but remediable human perversity. 
Acting on this belief is bound to end in oppression, even terror.”76 The idea here is that 
tyranny is the inevitable conclusion to our attempts to apply an ideal theory of justice 
that is based on an implausible assumption of what humans are capable of achieving.  
And since the full compliance assumption conceals the obstacles and limits on human 
                                                          
76 Galston, 395. 
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capabilities, any attempt to approach that ideal will result in policies that may severely 
threaten liberty as trial upon trial is met with only the recalcitrance of human 
imperfections. 
We can describe this problem more expansively by postulating a vast array of 
principles of justice that would pass through the strict compliance assumption with little 
resistance or objection at the level of ideal theory:  (a) perfect equality of resources—by 
assuming everyone will comply with taxing their income to the point of equality; (b) 
theocratic/communitarian principles—by assuming that everyone will comply with the 
dictates of a religion or cultural standard, or (c) perfectionism—by assuming that 
everyone will acknowledge the same universal standard of goodness.  If these principles 
can ignore any problems of adherence in their formulation, the realists remind us that it 
is easy to see how a transition into nonideal circumstances armed with these principles 
could generate significant resistance.77 
So, the realists wonder, how can the full compliance assumption in Rawlsian 
ideal theory be useful?  It seems to be an inert exercise that cannot yield satisfactory 
conclusions about what we should do in the nonideal world since it idealizes away core 
problems of justice.78   
                                                          
77 See Galston, 405 for a broad attack on the full compliance test that presents some of these worries. 
78 While some philosophers, such as G.A. Cohen, would welcome the challenge to argue for or against 
principles of justice solely on their rational merits, absent any constraints of compliance, surely Rawls 
would not regard this as one of his goals. I will address Cohen’s position in a later chapter.  But, briefly, 
Cohen would argue that idealizing away noncompliance in the sense described would allow us to evaluate 
the merits of each principle of justice itself, without it being tainted by considerations of empirical 
limitations of feasibility.  Moreover, Cohen would claim that he could show that some principles in our 
proposed list—such as perfectionism or communitarianism—would fail on purely rational or intuitionist 
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To answer the realist objection, we must probe a bit more deeply into the 
justifying reasons Rawls provides for his assumption of full compliance.  In doing so, we 
will see how the aforementioned objections rest on a misunderstanding of Rawls’s view. 
(d) The Importance of Full Compliance: The Stability Condition 
For Rawls, one reason for assuming full compliance in ideal theory is to simplify 
our analysis of the stability condition that Rawls emphasizes for principles of justice.  It 
is not to be used as a formal model to construct a picture of what the perfect society 
would look like absent all constraints related to compliance whatsoever.  This is a 
significant source of error in criticisms of Rawls so it is worth explicating at length 
Rawls’s view of the stability condition and how the assumption of full compliance aids 
us in testing it.  
Rawls’s stability condition represents a substantive constraint—if not the most 
neglected substantive constraint—on our principles of justice.79  It is based on the idea 
that principles of justice must endure over time and gain reliable adherence by citizens 
if they are to be suitable candidates for the regulation of society.  This is because we are 
not interested in principles of justice that could only enjoy momentary success or those 
that would require miraculous fortune to achieve.  Nor are we interested in principles of 
justice that could only be adhered to with great difficulty through the disfigurement of 
our moral psychology.  Instead, for Rawls, we aim to discover principles of justice that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
grounds, ultimately yielding his favored principle of justice—luck egalitarianism--which requires 
inequalities due to luck to be neutralized.  See Cohen, G.A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
79 TJ, 397-404, 434-441. 
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reliably connect with the deep and internal psychological mechanisms of persons.  This 
ensures that citizens will adequately develop a sense of justice to adhere to its 
mandates over time.  Rawls states:  
It is evident that stability is a desirable feature of moral 
conceptions…However attractive a conception of justice might be on 
other grounds, it is seriously defective if the principles of moral 
psychology are such that it fails to engender in humans beings the 
requisite desire to act upon it.80  
 
Given that Rawls focuses on the compatibility of principles of justice with human 
motivational capacities, Rawls is actually in agreement with many realists who argue 
that we must be concerned with the compliance question with respect to justice as it 
relates to the reasons why citizens may or may not be able to comply with the 
requirements of justice. 
In addition to connecting the stability of justice to moral psychology and human 
nature, Rawls, more controversially, argues that the stability of justice can only be 
safeguarded if justice can be shown to be part of the human good—known in Rawlsian 
scholarship as the congruence argument.81  While I cannot fully explicate this argument 
here,82 I will briefly remark that the main impetus for this additional component is the 
hope that justice can be internally endorsed as a good for us, as opposed to merely 
being accepted instrumentally.  The worry is that, if it turns out that justice is 
detrimental or disconnected from our good, or if it cannot be endorsed from within, 
                                                          
80 TJ, 398. 
81 See TJ, Part III. 
82 For a more complete version of this argument, see Freeman, Samuel.  Justice and the Social Contract. 
Oxford University Press, 2007: 143-172. 
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then we can only be externally motivated into accepting its demands through fear and 
threats, or bargaining and compromise.83  Rawls rejects this basis for stability and 
attempts to show how acting for the sake of justice enables us to realize the more 
fundamental aspects of our moral personality, whatever conception of the good we 
happen to choose.  As such, it is central to the good of all rational and reasonable 
persons.  Rawls couples this with the “Aristotelian Principle,” according to which we 
derive pleasure and satisfaction from the development of our higher order capacities, 
including the sense of justice. Consequently, developing our capacity to act for the sake 
of justice can be experienced as a highest-order good by all.84 
We have now shown that Rawls’s stability condition consists of two limitations 
on principles of justice:  (1) they must be compatible with human nature and moral 
psychology, and (2) they must be capable of being affirmed within our good.  Taken 
together, the two elements of Rawls’s concern with stability has both an empirical and a 
normative component and corresponds directly to the realistic and utopian threads of 
Rawls’s project. 
 With the full idea of the stability condition in mind, we can now return to the 
importance of the full compliance assumption within Rawls’s ideal theory.  As we have 
already shown, it would be a mistake to claim that Rawls engages in the assumption of 
full compliance in order to conceal all the reasons why people fail to comply with a 
                                                          
83 Similar to, say, Hobbes’s conception of stability as based upon “compromise, coercion and a modus 
vivendi among essentially conflicting interests,” see Freeman (2006), 102. 
84 See TJ, 372-380 for a discussion of the Aristotelian Principle and its relationship to the sense of justice 
and the good of persons. 
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principle of justice.  Instead, Rawls utilizes ideal theory to help us evaluate methodically 
which principles, when strictly complied with, could be realistically stable, given features 
of human nature and our moral psychology.  If it turns out that our proposed principles 
would fail to be supported by citizens through reliable psychological mechanisms, they 
will be rejected.  As John Simmons puts it,  
The strict compliance assumption is designed only to allow us to imagine 
the results of getting ‘up and running’ the institutions embodying 
different conceptions of justice, which requires imagining that those 
subject to those institutions support and comply with them, at least 
initially. But it may turn out that some conceptions…’exceed the capacity 
of human nature,’ such that long-term support and compliance are 
unlikely or impossible.85  
 
In other words, the assumption of full compliance is a heuristic device to test whether 
our candidate principles of justice would endure through time, or if they would instead 
“exceed the capacity of human nature.”  Freeman corroborates:   
The stability problem for Rawls requires showing how a conception of 
justice is realistically possible given human nature and certain fixed 
conditions of social life.  To do so, Rawls assumes the ideal case of a well-
ordered society [in which strict compliance is a component].  If a 
conception of justice is not workable there, then it is not feasible under 
less than ideal conditions.86 
 
So, the full compliance condition enables us to test the workability and feasibility of our 
various principles of justice by modelling them in a well-ordered society.  If it turns out 
that the strains on our moral psychology are too great, or if justice cannot be secured 
                                                          
85 Simmons (2010), 9.   Simmons quotes Rawls at TJ, 176. 
86 Freeman, Samuel.  “Introduction:  John Rawls—An Overview,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003: 23. 
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through internal motivations that are connect with our good, then we should reject the 
principle. 
(e) The Importance of Full Compliance: Removal of Confounding Variables 
In addition to aiding us in assessing the stability of a principle of justice, the full 
compliance assumption of Rawls’s ideal theory enables us to isolate the relevant 
normative features of a principle when comparing it to another conception of justice.  
As Simmons points out,  
If we compare the operation of societies ordered by competing principles 
of justice while assuming strict compliance with those principles, the 
different effects we observe can reasonably be taken to be wholly the 
responsibility of the different ordering principles themselves.  If instead 
we try to evaluate principles in terms of how societies governed by them 
would operate with a ‘normal’ amount of noncompliance with them, we 
will likely find that our evaluations yield quite indeterminate results.87 
 
What Simmons has in mind here is that, by assuming full compliance, we can be 
confident that our acceptance or rejection of a principle is due to normative features of 
the principle itself, and not a confounding variable.  As such, the full compliance 
condition allows us to compare different conceptions of justice against one another on 
equal footing.   
By way of illustration, we can examine an analogy in the methodology of the 
sciences to demonstrate the importance of isolating variables.88  Suppose I wanted to 
test the effectiveness of two different social policies on educational outcomes in low-
income neighborhoods.  It is a basic methodological rule in the social sciences that, 
                                                          
87 Simmons (2010), 8-9. 
88 I thank Kok-Chor Tan for drawing my attention to this comparison with the sciences. 
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when we test the competing policies, we ensure that the relevant variables are the 
same in both cases.  So, if we test policy A on school system S, and test policy B on 
school system T, we would do well to ensure that the relevant variables in S and T are 
identical—say the level of income and test scores in each school district.89  Otherwise, it 
would be extremely difficult to measure the successfulness of the two policies in any 
reliable and convincing manner.   
Through this analogy, we can see that Rawls’s assumption of full compliance is 
one way of holding the relevant conditions in society constant so that we can more 
effectively gauge the outcomes of different principles of justice.  If we do not hold 
compliance constant, it will be difficult to disentangle all the various causes and factors 
that may explain noncompliance—some of which may have little to do with the 
normative content of the principles.  Noncompliance, for instance, might be the result 
of a lack of trust in institutions due to past political failures, or perhaps due to the 
prevalence of false information in society, or maybe corrupt politicians.  These problems 
of noncompliance are not relevant in the right way to our assessment of principles of 
justice.  We want to test for noncompliance that is due to the principles of justice 
themselves, and not these other reasons.  As such, we assume full compliance to isolate 
and better evaluate the normative content. 
  
 
                                                          
89 Of course, even these two variables are not sufficient to establish the preference of one policy over 
another, for there may still be other hidden or unknown variables that affected the results. 
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(f) The Importance of Assuming Favorable Circumstances 
We are now in a position to segue into Rawls’s second idealizing assumption in 
ideal theory: the assumption of “favorable circumstances.”  The rationale for assuming 
favorable circumstances is similar to the reasoning for the assumption of full compliance: 
we want to ensure that we are accurately evaluating our principles of justice without 
undue influence of irrelevant factors.  These irrelevant factors will become evident as 
we explicate what Rawls means by “favorable circumstances.”   
By “favorable circumstances,” Rawls means two different things.  First, Rawls 
includes what he calls the “circumstances of justice” which are “the normal conditions 
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.”90  Rawls focuses on 
the conditions of social cooperation because they are the conditions in which concerns 
of justice arise.  This requires the capacity for persons to view their cooperative 
endeavors as capable of being governed by fairness and reciprocity.  If we find ourselves 
in unfavorable circumstances—such as a brutal state of war, or a condition of resource 
scarcity due to catastrophic natural disaster, or any other destabilizing condition that 
makes social cooperation impossible—it will be difficult for persons to acquire the 
requisite motivation to act for the sake of justice at all.91  
To illustrate, in a longstanding condition of civil war, people may reject 
distributive principles that apply to their adversaries; or, in conditions of global 
                                                          
90 TJ, 109.  The circumstances of justice include “limited beneficence” and “moderate scarcity of 
resources.” 
91 TJ, 110. 
46 
 
catastrophe, people may refuse to give up resources to benefit others when they 
themselves have a tenuous possession of the goods necessary for their own livelihood.  
In these conditions, people will not generally be willing to act for the sake of upholding 
just institutions in society that govern the relations of social cooperation.  Instead, they 
will fall back on other norms for action such as simple prudence or self-preservation.92  
As a result, if we do not assume favorable conditions, it will be difficult to formulate 
what the best principle of justice is, given that people will not develop the requisite 
disposition to see their social activity as constrained by justice in the first place. 
Second, Rawls includes in “favorable circumstances,” the “historical, economic, 
and social conditions” that “make a constitutional regime possible.”93 These conditions 
include the “economics means…education, or the main skills needed to run an economic 
regime.”94  As such, unfavorable circumstances may include conditions in which citizens 
may not have a sufficient historical memory or historical precedent for newly erected 
democratic institutions;  or, societies may lack the economic resources to institute and 
implement a just intuitional regime; or, citizens may lack the background framework 
and skills necessary for citizens to reform and refine their institutions through the 
political process.   
                                                          
92 See Hume’s discussion of the circumstances of justice for a similar type of account in conditions of 
extreme scarcity.  Hume, David.  Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp. 
Oxford University Press, 1998: 3.12.   I will return to this idea in greater detail in later chapters.  Also see a 
discussion of the state of war in Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Chapter XIII: 86-90. 
93 JF, 47, 101. 
94 JF, 47. As quoted in Stemplowska, Zofia and Adam Swift. “Rawls on Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” in A 
Companion to Rawls, ed. By Jon Mandle and David Reidy. Wiley, Blackwell: 2014: 115. 
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In general, favorable circumstances are designed to mirror the general 
conditions most citizens in liberal democratic societies find themselves in already.  This 
elegantly corresponds to Rawls’s realistic elements of his project, for he views his task to 
find principles of justice that answer to our current political situation, and not for some 
foreign or unfortunate condition of society.  While “less happy conditions” would 
certainly be important problems for society to address, Rawls believes that we must 
work out principles of justice for the general case in ideal theory first before proceeding 
to handle these other cases.95 
This realistic strand in Rawls’s favorable conditions assumption also relates to 
another important limiting factor in Rawls’s project.  Rawls believes that constructing 
principles of justice that apply to “all possible circumstances” is a misguided approach, 
and will likely yield mistaken principles.  This is because, for Rawls, we are not interested 
in the question:  “What principles of justice apply universally across all contexts?” 
Instead, Rawls says:  
We focus on ideal theory because the current conflict in democratic 
thought is in good part a conflict about what conception of justice is most 
appropriate for a democratic society under reasonably favorable 
conditions.  This is clear from what, for our purposes, we called the 
fundamental question of political philosophy.96   
 
It would be a mistake, then, to understand principles of justice to be applicable 
everywhere and in all contexts—i.e. in times of famine, or in a previous historical era 
that does not have a template for democratic institutions.  Of course, this does not 
                                                          
95 TJ, 216. 
96 JF, 13 [emphasis added]. 
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mean that no principles can guide conduct in these circumstances—it is just that these 
principles will be different from the principles of justice that are applicable to 
democratic societies in favorable conditions.  In this sense, Rawls’s project is more 
limited in scope. 
 To summarize, Rawls’s two assumptions in ideal theory are designed to 
accomplish the following tasks:  (1) serve as a heuristic device for evaluating the stability 
condition on principles of justice, and (2) aid us in isolating the relevant variables and 
eliminating the confounding variables when testing and comparing principles of justice.  
In no way are Rawls’s idealizing assumptions designed to ignore problems of feasibility 
or problems of noncompliance.  Quite the contrary, by effectively testing and comparing 
principles of justice in the ideal case, we can establish whether or not it will be possible 
that such principles will be feasible and complied with in the actual world.  For if such 
principles fail the stability test even in favorable circumstances, then we have good 
reason to reject these proposed principles on the grounds that they will not be tolerable 
for us when we attempt to implement them in nonideal circumstances.  In this regard, 
Rawls’s ideal theory is grounded in a concern with the constraints of realism and serve 
to provide coherence to Rawls’s conception of justice as a realistic utopia. 
(g) An Illustration of Ideal Theory:  Rawls’s Rejection of Utilitarianism 
Let us provide an illustration to see how Rawls’s methodology of ideal theory is 
supposed to yield judgments on competing principles of justice.  Given the importance 
of utilitarianism, and of Rawls’s attempts to provide an alternative to it with his two 
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principles of justice, it is a good choice for evaluating the merits of Rawls’s 
methodology.97  When assessing utilitarianism as a candidate for a principle of justice, 
we begin by assuming strict compliance with its principles in a well-ordered society with 
favorable conditions.  Next, we then test the stability requirement by evaluating 
whether or not citizens can develop the requisite sense of justice and motivational 
capacities to adhere to and endorse such principles over time.  To aid us in this test, we 
can ask ourselves the following questions: 
(1) Is it feasible for persons to reliably comply with utilitarian principles? 
(2) What are the primary reasons for why citizens are able to comply with it? 
(3) It utilitarianism compatible with moral psychology and human nature? 
(4) Is utilitarianism compatible with the human good or does it frustrate it? 98 
 
With respect to the first question, Rawls does not believe that the principle of utility is 
feasible for citizens to reliably accept.99  In a society in which everyone strictly complies 
with utilitarian principles, Rawls believes there will be circumstances in which persons 
will be required to sacrifice some of their rights, liberties, or opportunities if doing so 
would be in the interests of the greater good.  Rawls couples this premise with an 
appeal to what he calls the “strains of commitment,” which is a recognition by 
individuals that there will be certain outcomes that are unacceptable to them given 
                                                          
97 Rawls believes that one of the main goals of his Theory of Justice is to provide a systematic alternative 
to utilitarianism.  See TJ, xvii.  While Rawls’s main apparatus is the use of the original position and the veil 
of ignorance to establish his main argument against utilitarianism, the components of ideal theory and 
stability are an important corollary to this argument and will be the focus of this section.  For a more 
complete account of this relationship, see Scheffler, Samuel.  “Rawls and Utilitarianism,” in A Companion 
to Rawls, ed. by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
98 There are, of course, other questions that deliberators must ask when considering which principles of 
justice are superior.  However, the questions above are distinctly related to the stability condition and the 
purposes of strict compliance, so I have highlighted these.   
99 TJ, 137-139.  See Freeman (2006): 98-102 for a more complete version of this argument. 
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their commitment to their own rational plan of life, and their sense of self-respect.100  
Requiring individuals to forgo core opportunities to advance their conception of the 
good for the sake of those who may already have a greater share violates these strains 
of commitment—it would be difficult for citizens who view society as a system of fair 
cooperation to accept such a sacrifice as it does not adequately respect their own 
contribution to it, and nor does it offer enough protection to the fundamental interests 
in pursuing a rational plan of life.  As such, Rawls believes that persons would reject 
utilitarianism, for “having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life 
for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others,” would be unacceptable.101 
 One common objection to Rawls’s criticism of utilitarianism here is that the 
principle of utility will not require the sacrifices imagined by Rawls.  That is, utilitarians 
hold that it is generally the case that our basic liberties and rights will be respected in 
the normal conditions of political society, and citizens will not be asked to forgo them or 
an adequate share of resources and opportunities for the sake of others, let alone the 
already better-off.102  It would only be through imagined or drastic scenarios in which 
these undue sacrifices would ever be required and so are not relevant for our purposes.   
                                                          
100 TJ, 153-160.  Rawls says persons “cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they 
cannot accept.  They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty….given knowledge 
of human psychology,” TJ, 153. 
101 TJ, 154. 
102 In fact, on Peter Singer’s account of utilitarianism, it is far more likely to be the reverse—that citizens 
who are well-off are much more likely to be asked to give significant portions of their resources to the 
worst-off.  See Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 1, no. 3, 
(1972): 229-243.  However, this may only appear to be the case given significant departures from justice 
in our current society.  In a well-ordered society governed by utilitarianism in which strict compliance was 
held, the sacrifices would not be as stark. 
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This is an important objection because we are working within ideal theory and 
with the assumption of favorable circumstances.  As such, it would be inappropriate to 
reject utilitarianism if we only tested it using contrived counterexamples that would not 
likely emerge in the normal course of political society.103  Instead, we must aim to show 
how the endorsement of utilitarianism by citizens would generate problems of stability 
given the general facts of human beings and their social world.  A simple 
counterexample in an extreme scenario will not suffice. 
Given this condition, how does Rawls demonstrate that utilitarianism requires 
the sacrifice of some rights, liberties and opportunities for the sake of others within 
ideal theory?  Rawls accomplishes this task, not by presenting us with specific 
hypothetical counterexamples—they would not be sufficiently general for the purposes 
of ideal theory—but by describing the decision-making model of utilitarianism itself and 
the conception of the person that underlies the methodology.  Upon doing so, we end 
up with a portrait of an ideal legislator who will not be represented as having the 
requisite concerns to safeguard our basic liberties, rights and opportunities and to 
                                                          
103 It is doubtful that Rawls had much interest in hypothetical counterexamples designed to probe the 
limits of utilitarianism—examples such as the dangers of hospital patients being killed for their organs, or 
the dilemma of Jim and the Indians.  While such counterexamples may be appropriate in other contexts, 
they are not particularly illuminating for the establishment of principles of justice to govern our 
institutions.  By the same token, it would also be inappropriate to reject deontological accounts of rights 
through the same kinds of examples.  For instance, Amartya Sen has sought to undercut deontological 
protections of rights by pointing out a potential hypocrisy in Rawls who endorses the “supreme 
emergency exception” to the rights of innocent persons in his Law of Peoples.  See LP, 98-99.  Sen argues:  
“Once such an exception is made, it is not clear what remains of the basic priorities in his theory of justice.”  
See Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press, 2009: 85.  While Sen is referring to Robert 
Nozick’s own moral catastrophe exception, Sen also raises the same question for Rawls. Also mentioned 
in Freeman, Samuel.  “A New Theory of Justice,” New York Review of Books, October 14th, 2010.  The reply 
here is that ideal theory assumes strict compliance and favorable circumstances first, and then is utilized 
at a later stage to address extreme cases. 
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respect our fundamental interests in pursuing our own rational life plan.  In other words, 
Rawls aims to show that utilitarianism’s unacceptability and unreasonableness to us is 
endemic to the theory itself as it is understood in its ideal conditions. 
The dominant method for understanding how utilitarianism is to be applied for 
the purposes of justice and the organization of social institutions is through the 
“impartial spectator” model, whereby we imagine one perfectly rational and 
sympathetic person who experiences the desires of everyone and makes decisions that 
accurately incorporate the desires of all.104  On this model, “many persons are fused 
into one,” and the impartial spectator represents “the desires of all persons into one 
coherent system of desire.”105  What results is the “conflating of all persons into one 
through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator.”106 Rawls asserts 
that this model obliterates the “distinction between persons,” and later argues that this 
model of the ideal legislator only represents “the ethic of perfect altruists.”107   
Why might Rawls assert that it is only perfect altruists that utilitarianism would 
be best suited for?  It is because the only social organization that would endorse and 
accept such a model would be an association of bees or ants, which regularly requires 
the sacrifice of the good of the individual for the sake of the hive with little regard to the 
final ends of the singular ant or bee.  But since bees and ants are much more prosocial 
in nature—perhaps not perfect altruists in the strict sense, but far closer than we are—
                                                          
104 This is primarily with respect to “classical utilitarianism.”  See Smith, Adam.  Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford University Press, 1976. 
105 TJ, 24.  Quoted and discussed by Scheffler (2003): 429-430. 
106 TJ, 24. 
107 TJ, 25, 164. 
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the impartial spectator model would be appropriate and applicable to them.  In contrast, 
this “hive mind” approach to the organization of our institutions and policies would be 
wholly unacceptable to us, even if we acknowledged that it would maximize overall 
happiness.  This is because, unlike ants, we do care about how our individual lives turn 
out, and we do not completely regard our good as merely a part of the whole.  This, of 
course, does not mean that we are entirely selfish, but rather that we care enough 
about our own lives such that we require special protections to ensure that great 
sacrifices are not genuine and expected possibilities of our social life.   
It is in this sense that Rawls believes that persons would reject utilitarianism, for 
the ideal model of the impartial spectator does not provide any assurances to persons 
that their rational plan of life will be safeguarded.  As such, persons will have great 
difficulty endorsing and adhering to the principle of utility over time, and the stability of 
the system will be threatened.108 
Utilitarians will likely reply to Rawls’s argument here in one of two ways.  First, 
they may reiterate that in the normal circumstances of political life, these sacrifices will 
not be required, and so the idealizing assumption of favorable circumstances should 
exclude it from consideration.  Or, they may argue that, since there are few cases in 
                                                          
108 The example illustrated here is applicable only to “classical utilitarianism” and not modern utilitarians 
who adopt the principle of average utility as the fundamental principle of justice.  Rawls’s argument in the 
second case is that persons would only accept the principle of average utility if we adopted a conception 
of the person who had “no aversion to risk,” TJ, 165.   This is because Rawls believes that the principle of 
average utility entails that citizens gamble with their conception of the good and their life prospects with 
the hope that they do not end up on the losing end.  But, according to Rawls, this would be unacceptable 
to us, as we are not wanton enough to gamble with something of such fundamental importance to us.  As 
such, the modern brand of utilitarianism would only be fitting for an agent who did not care very much for 
his own rational life plan—an agent quite unlike ourselves.  TJ, 137-139.  Also see Scheffler (2003): 434. 
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which citizens will be asked to sacrifice their good for the sake of others, it will not upset 
the overall stability of society—that is, there would be strong enough mechanisms to 
ensure the endorsement of utilitarian principles over time despite these sacrifices that 
citizens must occasionally make. 
With respect to the first reply, this obscures the importance of the favorable 
circumstances clause.  Suppose we compare utilitarianism with Rawls’s first principle of 
justice, whereby the basic liberties and their priority are established right from the start 
as a primary safeguard.  Many utilitarians object to these prioritarian systems for being 
insensitive to empirical circumstances where we would surely do better to sacrifice one 
person’s rights in order to avoid great catastrophe to political society.109  Yet, by parity 
of reasoning, what prevents Rawls from invoking the favorable conditions clause in this 
circumstance in order to deflect this criticism in the same way?  To avoid this stalemate, 
we should strive to evaluate the core mechanisms within each normative framework 
and see which conception best coheres with our conception of ourselves and of our 
moral psychology.  We have already demonstrated how utilitarianism is most fit for 
perfect altruists given its model of the ideal spectator, and that there is a disconnect 
between it and our own conception of ourselves.  This dissonance generates some 
difficulty in our expectation that citizens would reliably develop the relevant motives to 
endorse and support it over time.  After all, human beings are not bees or ants, so why 
should we be confident in a conception of justice that does not “take men are they 
                                                          
109 As mentioned in fn. 53, see Sen (2009): 85. 
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are?”110 and instead requires us to be governed by institutions that are designed to 
aggregate our ends without regard to which ends are sacrificed and which are preserved? 
We can now address the second possible reply by utilitarians—the argument 
that it is possible for stability to be maintained in a society governed by utilitarian 
principles, even if it requires persons to sometimes sacrifice their own rights and 
liberties for the sake of others.  The basis for this objection is rooted in the observation 
that people regularly comply with principles that require great sacrifices for the sake of 
others in a variety of contexts.111  For example, the worst-off members across most 
societies throughout history have been asked to sacrifice for the sake of those with 
more power and wealth in society.  So, the objection goes, is stability truly undermined 
by utilitarian principles?112 
Rawls’s reply here involves the idea of “stability for the right reasons.”113  As we 
have explored, a major undercurrent in Rawls’s thought is to show how stability based 
on internal endorsement and a compatibility with the human good and moral 
psychology will be stronger than stability based on external force, threats or other 
                                                          
110 This is a reference to Rousseau’s suggestion to “take men as they are.”  See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 
The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge 
University Press, 1997: 41.  
111 See Freeman (2006): 98 for this possible objection made by utilitarians. 
112 Other possibilities include hiding the true utilitarian principles from public view.  As Freeman notes, 
Sidgwick and Parfit both employ a form of “indirect” utilitarianism whereby only the elite few understand 
the true principles, but the rest of society is governed by rules that protect liberty.  However, this would 
violate the publicity condition on our principles of justice, which requires our principles to be publicly 
justifiable and full view for citizens.  See Freeman (2010): 47-48. 
113 PL, xxxix. 
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instrumental reasons.  The question for utilitarianism is, then, would the motives for its 
acceptance be internal or external?114 
There are a variety of strategies for attempting to establish an internal 
mechanism for its endorsement.  First, we might hypothesize that there are sufficient 
levels of altruism in society such that people could learn to accept to sacrifice their own 
good for the greater good of all.  However, the level of altruism we find in humans is not 
strong enough to be relied upon to serve as the foundation of our compliance with 
principles of justice.  Altruism is typically limited to specific partial groups, such as 
friends and family members, and is only sometimes realized for the sake of strangers—
only some will be selfless as a saint, but others will be severely guarded in their 
affections.  As such, altruism is not sufficiently generalized across all persons in society 
to ensure adequate compliance with utilitarian institutions.   
Second, some utilitarians might argue that the primary internal motive for 
complying with a utilitarian principle would not be something like altruism, but 
something more akin to duty.  On this account, a utilitarian could argue that it is the 
understanding of the moral correctness from an impartial point of view of the utilitarian 
principle that should itself serve as the primary motivator.  Once citizens come to 
occupy the purely impartial point of view, they will recognize the normative force of the 
principle and will acknowledge and accept its bindingness upon them, despite their 
other motives to act in opposition to its mandates.  To the extent that citizens fail to 
                                                          
114 For further discussion of this distinction, see “Weithman, Paul.  Why Political Liberalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2012: 43-51. 
57 
 
appreciate the correctness of these principles, we should do the best we can through 
education and tutelage to both strengthen the altruistic sentiments and expand their 
capacity for impartiality to better equip citizens to accept and affirm utilitarian 
principles. 
In response, I believe that Rawls would argue that, while the motive to “do the 
right thing”—which Rawls includes within his “sense of justice”—is certainly part of our 
deepest human tendencies and important for stability, we cannot simply attach this 
motive to a conception of justice without also outlining the process by which persons 
come to acquire the motive itself.115  The task for the utilitarian is to show how the 
moral motive to act in accordance with the principle of utility could reliably be acquired 
in citizens without undue difficulty.  We have already discussed how there are 
significant obstacles related to the conception of the person that utilitarians endorse as 
a model for their theory.  The tension between the requirements for altruism and the 
mixed motives that citizens act upon will create some conflicts in the realization of the 
utilitarian motive.  Hence, it is not clear how successful our efforts at inculcation and 
education will have on our capacity to expand our sympathies to include all citizens 
within society. 
In addition, it will be difficult to reconcile how the utilitarian system could be 
compatible with the human good—another important feature of stability for Rawls.  If 
citizens will be asked to set aside their fundamental interests for the sake of others, we 
                                                          
115 See TJ, Part III, esp. 429-434. 
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must ask how society will ensure that persons endorse this requirement.  It seems likely 
that a utilitarian society will solve the stability problem by relying upon bargaining, 
compromise, or powerlessness by the minority to press their claims.  For Rawls, these 
are not reasonable forms of motivations to ensure compliance as they entail the 
willingness of citizens to give up what is most important to them, whatever their 
rational plan of life turns out to be, for the sake of justice.116  While such a society might 
be achievable for a brief period, it would not be stable for the right reasons. 
Rawls’s principles of justice, by comparison, do not require sacrifices of us that 
are deeply at odds with our own account of moral psychology and our most 
fundamental aims.  By safeguarding our rights and liberties, and securing the 
opportunities and all-purpose means to exercising them through fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle, Rawls presents us with a conception of justice 
that secures our capacity to pursue our rational plan of life.  This is not to suggest that 
Rawls’s principles will never require sacrifices from us for the sake of others.  What is 
important is that these sacrifices are not based on altruism, acquiescence, or fear in the 
ideal well-ordered society.  Instead, they are based upon reciprocity, which is included in 
a fuller account of Rawls’s sense of justice.  
                                                          
116 We can illustrate this in the following way:  if conditions changed and the powers were shifted, such 
burdened members would willingly alter their institutions and restructure them to better safeguard their 
interests.  Hence, the fact that such citizens have an orientation to disrupt or destroy such institutions 
should indicate that the stability currently enjoyed by such a society would not be strong, even if it 
manages to persist.  The idea would be that the stability of such a society would be “accidental” or “lucky,” 
which are not suitable bases for endurance over time. 
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 As we have seen, one part of the sense of justice is related to the moral 
sensibilities to act upon one’s considered convictions about what is right to do.117  
However, there is also a more specialized sense in which Rawls employs the term.118  
Rawls also includes within it the notion of reciprocity, which involves the desire to act in 
accordance with the rules of fair social cooperation.  Rawls states:  “The sense of justice 
leads us to promote just schemes and to do our share in them when we believe that 
others, or sufficiently many of them will do theirs.”119  Rawls believes that his two 
principles of justice adequately express reciprocity between all citizens—requiring 
sacrifices of them without compromising their fundamental aims.  As such, 
citizens will be sufficiently motivated to act upon justice in the well-ordered society. 
Much more can be said about Rawls and his relationship with utilitarianism, and 
whether Rawls’s arguments succeed.120  However, this would divert us from the main 
issue at hand.  The purpose of this illustration is to establish with greater clarity the 
purpose of the full compliance requirement in Rawls’s ideal theory with respect to the 
stability requirement.  And what it has shown is that it enables us to see with greater 
clarity the strength or weakness of a given principle of justice by examining whether a 
principle can reliably generate the basis for its own support.  By assuming full 
                                                          
117 TJ, 46, 489. 
118 For a discussion of this distinction see Sabl, Andrew.  “Looking Forward to Justice: Rawlsian Civil 
Disobedience and its Non-Rawlsian Lessons,” Journal of Political Philosophy vol. 9, no. 3 (2001).  Also see 
Weithman (2012): 46. 
119 TJ, 236. 
120 See Scheffler (2003). 
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compliance, we are better able to test the compatibility of our principles with the limits 
of human nature and of the considered judgments of persons.   
In this sense, Rawls’s methodology comports with his commitment to a realistic 
utopia, for he uses ideal theory to generate the most reasonable and feasible principles 
of justice that are compatible with the judgments of citizens and their deepest 
psychological capacities and tendencies. 
 (h) Ideal Theory as Necessary for Nonideal Theory 
We have thus far explored the first purpose of ideal theory for Rawls, which is to 
provide us with an adequate measure to test normative principles against one another.  
We are now in a position to examine the second purpose, which is to enable us to set a 
clear target or goal for society should unfavorable circumstances or injustice arise.  
Without this ideal target, we are left without a reliable guide as to what we should strive 
for as we make improvements in our nonideal circumstances.  As Rawls states:  “Until 
the ideal is identified…nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which 
its queries can be answered.”121  In this sense, ideal theory provides us with a 
conception of justice that determines what our goals and priorities should be.  For this 
reason, Rawls states that “ideal theory is the only basis for the systematic grasp 
of…pressing problems [of nonideal theory].”122 
It is here that we see the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory more 
clearly spelled out.  Not only does ideal theory provide a framework that informs us 
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what we should aim at generally, but it will “also help to identify which wrongs are more 
grievous and hence more urgent to correct.”123  In this sense, ideal theory can generate 
a series of recommendations for which problems we should attempt to solve first.  For 
instance, for utilitarians, dealing with nonideal circumstances would be relatively 
straightforward:  those circumstances which produce the greatest amount of 
unhappiness should be addressed first.  On the other hand, Rawlsians will assert that 
injustices that deprive citizens of equal liberties should be addressed first, before 
moving to equality of opportunity or the difference principle.  Rawls states: 
The lexical ranking of the principles specifies which elements of the ideal 
are relatively more urgent, and the priority rules this ordering suggests 
are to be applied to nonideal cases as well.  Thus as far as circumstances 
permit, we have a natural duty to remove any injustices, beginning with 
the most grievous as identified by the extent of the deviation from 
perfect justice.  Of course, this idea is extremely rough.  The measure of 
departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition.124 
 
To provide an illustration, Rawls applies this framework to his discussion of civil 
disobedience.125  This example is a good choice to explore, since Rawls says that “the 
discussion of civil disobedience…depends upon it [ideal theory]….a deeper 
understanding can be gained in no other way.”126 
There are two ways in which ideal theory can aid us in addressing the problem of 
civil disobedience.  First, it can determine whether or not civil disobedience is justified.  
Since civil disobedience is a “political act,” it must be “guided and justified by political 
                                                          
123 JF, 13. 
124 TJ, 216. 
125 TJ, 319-343. 
126 TJ, 8.  Also quoted in Celikates, Robin.  “Civil Disobedience as a Practice of Civic Freedom,” in On Global 
Citizenship, by James Tully. Bloomsbury, 2014: 212. 
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principles….not principles of morality or to religious doctrines.”127  In addition, when 
engaging in civil disobedience, “one intends to address the sense of justice of the 
majority” and to declare that “the conditions of free cooperation are being violated.”128  
For Rawls, the political principles we should draw upon are precisely those that 
determine the conditions of free cooperation—his two principles of justice.  Hence, 
Rawls states:  “there is a presumption in favor of restricting civil disobedience to serious 
infringements of the first principle of justice, the principle of equal liberty, and to 
blatant violations of the second principle, the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity.”129  So, for Rawls, in order to be justified in engaging in civil disobedience, 
one ought to press one’s claims by appeal to the sense of justice of the political 
community through one of the principles of justice. 
To contrast, without the framework of ideal theory, it would be difficult to 
determine the purpose and shape of a protestor’s claims—is it someone who is acting 
selfishly by refusing to pay her taxes, or is it someone who is in good faith objecting to 
her disenfranchisement?  On Rawls’s view, the capacity for citizens to state their case 
through political principles that are part of our shared conception of justice aids us in 
categorizing acts of disobedience and what the proper response to it ought to be—
should we punish a citizen with the maximum sentence, or exhibit leniency, and 
                                                          
127 TJ, 321. 
128 TJ, 335. 
129 TJ, 326.  Rawls argues that it is difficult to determine whether or not the difference principle is satisfied 
in society, and so focuses more on the egregious violations of our basic rights and liberties.  See TJ, 327. 
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“suspend legal sanction?”130  We require an ideal shared conception of justice to 
address these questions. 
 Second, ideal theory enables us to determine whether or not civil disobedience 
is possible.  For Rawls, civil disobedience can only occur in a society that is “nearly just,” 
which “implies that there exists a constitutional regime and a publicly recognized 
conception of justice.”131  However, this conception of justice need not be precisely 
Rawls’s justice as fairness, but instead an “overlapping rather than strict consensus” 
between different political conceptions, so long as “these conceptions lead to similar 
political judgments.”132  So, while Rawls does employ the lexical priority to establish 
which violations are more urgent to address, he does allow that multiple conceptions of 
justice may be appealed to, so long as they invoke the sense of justice and to a political 
conception that admits special protections for liberty.  However, if any of these 
conditions do not hold—the lack of an overlapping consensus, the inability to appeal to 
a sense of justice of the majority, or a seriously unjust society—then the conditions for 
civil disobedience will no longer obtain.133  In such cases, “the wisdom of civil 
disobedience is highly problematic.  For unless one can appeal to the sense of justice of 
the larger society, the majority may simply be aroused to more repressive measures.”134  
In this sense, Rawls believes that ideal theory allows us to determine whether or not a 
                                                          
130 TJ, 339. Rawls cites Dworkin, Ronald.  “On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience,” The New York Review of 
Books, June 6, 1968. 
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given act of disobedience will likely backfire, or if it will potentially serve its intended 
ends. 
Some theorists have been critical of Rawls’s attempt to move from ideal theory 
to address nonideal circumstances with respect to civil disobedience.  For instance, 
Robin Celikates argues that, instead of aiding our discussions of civil disobedience, “the 
opposite is the case: ideal theory, far from being the only available route to a deeper 
understanding, undermines the very attempt.”135  According to Celikates, it is unlikely 
that the conditions for civil disobedience will ever satisfactorily be met given Rawls’s 
more constrained definition, and that many actual cases of civil disobedience in society 
do not align with the framework outlined by Rawls.  For instance, the paradigmatic acts 
of disobedience of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Ghandi, and Henry David 
Thoreau do not, on Celikates’s view, neatly fit into Rawls’s system, for it requires us to 
see these acts as occurring within “nearly just” societies in which a shared conception of 
justice of the majority can legitimately be appealed to.  But this seems at odds with the 
public understanding of these acts—that society was manifestly unjust, and that there 
was no recourse to a shared conception of justice of the majority.136  Hence, Rawls’s 
account leads us to a puzzling dilemma:  either the acts of King and others were not 
                                                          
135 Celikates (2014): 212. 
136 Celikates states:  “It seems something of a stretch to claim that what are usually considered to be 
paradigm cases of civil disobedience – Thoreau, Gandhi and King – took place in societies that should be 
regarded as ‘reasonably’ or ‘nearly just,’” p. 222.  David Lyons makes a similar point when he notes that 
King, Ghandi and Thoreau did not themselves take their societies to be nearly just at all, and that because 
of this fact, civil disobedience was especially justified.  See Lyons, David.  “Moral Judgement, Historical 
Reality, and Civil Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 27, no. 1 (1998): 31–49. 
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wise as they would likely backfire and cause greater resistance, or that other forms of 
resistance—more violent or disruptive—would be justified.137 
 As a result, Celikates rejects our reliance on ideal theory to aid us in handling 
cases of civil disobedience and that we are much better off with a ground-up approach 
that is “resolutely non-ideal – ‘practical, critical and historical.’”138  On this approach, 
civil disobedience is not best understood nor justified from our ideal conception of 
justice—in fact it is of little relevance to cases of civil disobedience.  This is because the 
most challenging cases of civil disobedience arise when there is little agreement on 
what this ideal shared conception of justice is in the first place.  As a result, we do better 
to work from within the current realities of society in which dissidents press contentious 
claims that may not neatly fit into the categories of Rawls’s principles of justice.  For 
instance, how would Rawls respond to the acts of civil disobedience for the sake of 
animal rights?  On this point, Peter Singer argues that, on Rawls’s view, since animals 
are not owed justice, there can be no legitimate civil disobedience.139   
For critics of Rawls, it is not the role of the theorist to attempt to justify or 
condone acts of civil disobedience by first descending from a limited ideal standpoint; 
we run the risk of being myopic in our proclamations on nonideal circumstances.  
Instead, it is best to work from the bottom and begin with current instances of civil 
                                                          
137 Celikates (2014): 222. 
138 Ibid., 225.  Celikates quotes James Tully in Tully, James. Public Philosophy in a New Key, Two Volumes, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 16. 
139 Peter Singer states: “It is, he [Rawls] says, wrong to be cruel to animals, although we do not owe them 
justice. If we combine this view with the idea that the justification of civil disobedience must be in terms 
of justice, we can see that Rawls is committed to holding that no amount of cruelty to animals can justify 
disobedience.”  Singer, Peter, Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973: 90. 
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disobedience and how they are understood by a political community—usually different 
factions of the community will understand them differently—and seek to find the best 
way to reconcile them with the pluralist and disparate aims of society. 
There are a variety of responses we can make to these criticisms of Rawls’s 
application of ideal theory to nonideal circumstances.  First of all, more generally, Rawls 
recognizes that there are limitations to our inquiry within nonideal theory, and that we 
must be particularly careful when executing our recommendations.  Rawls says the 
following: 
We should not expect too much of a theory of civil disobedience, even 
one framed for special circumstances.  Precise principles that 
straightaway decide actual cases are clearly out of the question.  Instead 
a useful theory defines a perspective within which the problem of civil 
disobedience can be approached; it identifies the relevant considerations 
and helps us to assign them their correct weights in the more important 
instances.  If a theory about these matters appear to us, on reflection, to 
have cleared our vision and to have made our considered judgements 
more coherent, then it has been worthwhile.140 
 
Additionally, while it would have been a great asset to us if Rawls had continued to 
develop his ideas to address the wide variety of special cases that may arise within 
nonideal theory, we should not hold his entire framework hostage for his failure to 
address all problems.  In this regard, I will only attempt to defend Rawls given his own 
defined limits of his approach. 
For Rawls, the purpose of ideal theory with respect to the problem of civil 
disobedience is to frame and isolate the relative normative issues that are at stake when 
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a problem of injustice confronts the political community and is responded to by 
violations of the law.  It does not seek to prejudge any given act of civil disobedience by 
descending from above and determining its legitimacy straight away.  Instead, the 
framework directs us to attempt a good faith effort to understand a dissenter’s claims 
within the broader sense of justice within a community and to be attentive to whether 
those claims can be recast, first, as a response to violations of basic liberties. 
Celikates takes issue with this approach because it requires there to be a defined 
sense of justice already within a community—an unlikely state of affairs—and that the 
community is already “nearly just.”  With respect to the latter point, Rawls’s language 
may perhaps be infelicitous on this matter.141  Rawls does not mean by “nearly just” a 
society without significant violations of basic liberties or without suppressed minorities.  
If he did mean this, it would be very curious as to why he would think civil disobedience 
would ever pose a special problem in these “nearly just” societies—a problem he saw 
important enough to devote a portion of A Theory of Justice toward addressing.  As such, 
we should understand Rawls’s claim here differently.   
Rawls means by “nearly just” that there is an institutional framework in society 
that can adjudicate constitutional disputes, and that persons within society are 
motivated by a sense of reciprocity among its members.  This need not include all 
members of society, however.  So long as there is a sufficient majority of persons who 
do regard each other in this way can appeals by the minority begin to take hold.  
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Andrew Sabl calls such societies “piecewise just” societies, in which there is a dominant 
“in group” toward which the sense of reciprocity is the dominant attitude toward each 
member, and an “out group” which is excluded and subjugated.142  A society thus 
characterized would be “nearly just” on Rawls’s account, for there still would be a 
substantive sense of justice among its members that could be appealed to by 
subjugated minorities. 
It is based upon this understanding of “nearly just” that we should evaluate 
Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience.  And in this context, Rawls’s theory is very strong, 
for many of the common illustrations of civil disobedience—Dr. King in particular—fall 
within its bounds and can be justified as an oppressed minority appealing to the sense 
of justice of the broader political community.143 
We can now respond to Celikates’s second objection that there is rarely enough 
agreement on a conception of justice for Rawls’s theory to be applicable to current 
conditions.  But this is to overstate the degree of convergence that is necessary for 
appeals to gain traction.  Rawls already admits that an overlapping consensus among 
different political conceptions is sufficient to comprehend and legitimize the claims of 
an oppressed minority within an otherwise fragmented society.144  So long as we have 
an institutional framework that guarantees and enforces the importance of the basic 
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liberties and the all-purpose means to realize them, we have largely satisfied Rawls’s 
requirements.145  These broad prerequisites are not meant to swiftly delegitimize or 
condemn acts of civil disobedience in the nonideal world, and nor are they meant to 
obscure and reify them.  Instead, they serve as important and genuine constraints on 
what we can hope to achieve through the practice.  If, for instance, there were a wholly 
divided society in which appeals to a common sense of justice would be truly impossible, 
this should serve as an indicator that a theory of civil disobedience is not going to be the 
appropriate framework to employ in these circumstances.146  Instead, we may consider 
turning to a theory of violent resistance, revolution, or even succession. 
Now, Rawls does not address the justification or legitimacy of these other forms 
of social disruptions.  However, this should not be interpreted as a failure of Rawls’s 
ideal theorizing.  Instead, ideal theory can be used to demonstrate how these conditions 
are going to require new tools for thinking about them, as they lie outside the 
conditions that frame the standard conditions of justice.  Indeed, one of the main 
benefits of ideal theory is that it represents our best attempt to isolate those features 
that are central to our understanding of ourselves, our society, and how they impact the 
requirements of justice—features such as the sense of justice, the conception of the 
person, an account of our fundamental aims, our basic moral motivations, and so forth.  
                                                          
145 While Rawls does recognize that it will be more difficult to address elements of economic injustice, it is 
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If any of these pieces are completely absent or are radically altered in society, ideal 
theory will direct us to seek out new frameworks until these conditions reemerge.  
Applied to the problem of truly drastic nonideal circumstances, the only 
recommendation that ideal theory may provide to us is to re-establish the conditions 
that are necessary for justice to regulate our society once again.147 
 These considerations should serve to largely assuage the worries that Rawls’s 
ideal theory is too limited, shortsighted, or ineffectual in addressing problems of civil 
disobedience as part of nonideal theory.  Even in the somewhat limited context in which 
Rawls outlines his theory of civil disobedience, we do not find ideal theory inert. 
(i) Recap of Two Purposes of Ideal Theory 
Let us pause for a moment to provide a brief recap of Rawls’s conception of ideal 
theory before turning to more comprehensive objections to his view. Rawls can best be 
understood as utilizing ideal theory for both methodological and goal-setting or 
orienting purposes.  It is methodological in the sense that he uses two “idealizing” 
assumptions—favorable circumstances and full compliance—in order to accurately test 
and evaluate principles of justice for stability in the normal course of social life.   These 
methodological assumptions are not intended to condone the irrelevance of feasibility 
                                                          
147 For instance, Rawls argues that ideal theory can even apply in such “unfavorable” circumstances in 
which the establishment of just institutions is severely limited.  In such conditions, the lexical priority of 
the principles may “no longer hold,” and that we may even be justified in holding prisoners of war as 
slaves if, for instance, countries were previously executing them, TJ, 215-16.  Of course, this would not 
justify slavery per se; it would be viewed as a temporary permissible transition with the eventual aim of 
abolishing the practice itself (assuming, say, the institutions were so weak as to only be capable of this 
gradual form of change). Hence, Rawls says: “there may be transition cases where enslavement is better 
than current practice,” TJ, 218. 
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or achievability conditions on the principles of justice.  Quite the contrary, they enable 
us to better test precisely those limitations by eliminating confounding variables and 
isolating normative content. 
On the other hand, Rawls’s ideal theory is goal-setting in the sense that, once the 
principles of justice are chosen using this idealized methodology, we now have an “ideal” 
that sets the target for a society.  We can then compare our current society with the 
ideal to gauge whether or not it is fully just.  If it is not, then we are provided with a 
broad framework for determining how to get there by establishing which corrections 
are more urgent or pressing.  Of course, ideal theory cannot by itself establish what we 
should do.  We will need to consult the empirical sciences to eventually determine the 
best course of action.  However, by using the ideal as a benchmark, we are better able 
to see the relationship between ideal and nonideal circumstances—the ideal will serve 
as the “end target” for these transitional periods in the nonideal circumstances of 
society as it eventually aims towards justice. 
When we put these two purposes together—the methodological and the goal-
setting—we can see how Rawls’s conception of ideal theory incorporates both elements 
of his idea of a “realistic utopia.”  It is realistic in the sense that he takes seriously the 
goal of stability for principles of justice, which, in turn, influences his choice of idealizing 
assumptions.  He wants to ensure that we accurately test these realistic constraints 
appropriately and ensure that persons can develop the requisite motives to act upon 
the selected principles of justice.  It is utopian in the sense that it provides a goal or 
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target that society should aim to achieve.  Moreover, this goal extends beyond the 
status quo and “probes the limits of the realistically practicable.”148  The goal of 
achieving the well-ordered society is assuredly difficult, but not out of reach for us, in 
the sense that there is nothing in human nature or in the normal conditions of social life 
that can prevent us from ultimately achieving the ideally just society that is stable across 
time and affirms our good. 
III.  Objections to Rawls’s Ideal Theory 
Now that we have a general picture of Rawls’s understanding of ideal and 
nonideal theory, I wish to address several broader objections that have been made 
against his view.  First, I will respond to objections by political realists who reject Rawls’s 
methodological assumption of full compliance.  While we have discussed some of these 
objections in our exposition of Rawls’s view, the ones presented here will be more fully 
developed.  Second, in the next chapter, I will address objections by Amartya Sen who 
rejects the usefulness of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory that Rawls 
articulates. 
 (a) Realist Objection: The Impossibility of Full Compliance 
Many realists are familiar with Rawls’s non-utopian elements of his theory, and 
agree with Rawls that principles of justice need to be constrained by features about 
human nature and concerns for stability.  Nonetheless, realists persist in their objection 
                                                          
148 JF, 13. 
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to Rawls by highlighting several ways in which he does not take the realistic constraints 
and goals of stability seriously enough. 
First, with respect to Rawls’s methodology, realists strongly reject the 
assumption of full compliance.  Their claim is that full compliance with the requirements 
of justice will never obtain, even in the best of circumstances.  William Galston, for 
instance, asserts that “realists deny that this assumption [of full compliance] is anything 
close to feasible, and they contend that this fact affects the way we should think about 
justice”.149  Noncompliance, in essence, is a permanent feature of society that cannot be 
overcome, even if we hold “favorable conditions” constant and take seriously the 
tendencies of human nature.  For this reason, realists argue that noncompliance should 
not be idealized away. 
Why do realists believe that full compliance is impossible?  It cannot simply be 
the result of an acknowledgement that human beings are imperfect and are liable to 
falter in their commitments.  Rawls can certainly accommodate this fact in his 
methodology.  If Rawls’s assumption of full compliance required the idealization of all 
imperfections, it would most likely be too idealistic—there are simply too many minor 
deviations from justice that occur over the course of normal social and political life.  
Rawls himself states as follows:   
Strict compliance means that (nearly) everyone strictly complies with, 
and abides by, the principles of justice.  We ask in effect what a perfectly 
just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like, and whether it 
may come about and be made stable under the circumstances of justice, 
                                                          
149 Galston (2010): 395. 
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and so under realistic, through reasonably favorable, conditions.150 
 
On my interpretation of “nearly,” Rawls allows for some departures from justice within 
the well-ordered society in which the assumption of full compliance holds.   The reason 
this does not cause problems for Rawls is that these minor disruptions will not 
destabilize the basic structure and institutions of society.  Society has internal 
mechanisms for returning to an equilibrium state when faced with offsetting conditions.  
Indeed, if the structure of society could be so easily dislodged by a few departures from 
justice, it would be miraculous that society itself could even be formed.  As such, the 
assumption of full compliance need not idealize away these imperfections—they are 
inconsequential in our ability to evaluate the stability of society when we test our 
principles of justice.  Given this caveat in Rawls, we should understand the realist 
objection differently. 
Instead, realists object to the full compliance condition due to a much more 
substantive reason that is related to the necessity of conflict that characterizes 
democratic life.  As Jeremy Waldron argues, Rawls is not sensitive enough to the fact of 
deep disagreement—not just about what the good life consists in, but also about the 
nature and demands of justice itself.151  In other words, the problem with the full 
compliance condition is that, even in the best of circumstances, citizens will not agree 
on the basic principles of justice to govern society.  Moreover, it will not simply be an 
                                                          
150 JF, 13, emphasis added. 
151 See Waldron, Jeremy.  Law and Disagreement.  Oxford: Clarendon, 1999: 102.  Also see Mason, 
Andrew.  “Rawlsian Theory and the Circumstances of Politics,” Political Theory 38, no. 5 (2010): 658-683. 
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inconsequential minority.  The scope of disagreement will be significant such that the 
institutions of society will ebb and flow between various mixed conceptions of justice 
depending upon various circumstances in society. 
What are some of these reasons for this deeper skepticism about convergence 
on principles of justice?  Steve Elkin, building upon Jeremy Waldron’s idea of the 
“circumstances of politics,” argues the following:   
[The circumstances of politics consists in] states of affairs in which there 
is a large aggregation of people who (1) have conflicting purposes that 
engender more or less serious conflict; (2) are given to attempts to use 
political power to further their own purposes and those of people with 
whom they identify; (3) are inclined to use political power to subordinate 
others; and (4) are sometimes given to words and actions that suggest 
that they value limiting the use of political power by law and harnessing it 
to public purposes.152 
 
In other words, realists tend to highlight the partial and self-serving aspects of human 
nature, and how the political process magnifies and exacerbates these tendencies that 
inhibit the possibility for agreement.  Consequently, they reject Rawls’s project to seek 
principles of justice that can garner unanimous support, and instead propose alternative 
solutions given the problem of deep disagreement. 
What are some of these alternatives?  Bernard Williams and William Galston, for 
instance, have indicated that for liberal societies perhaps the best we can hope for is a 
modus vivendi, which is a contingent agreement based on the mutual interests of 
                                                          
152Elkin, Stephen. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design after Madison, 
University of Chicago Press, 2006:  254-55.  Cited in Galston (2010): 391. 
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conflicting parties, typically in the form of a compromise or political bargain.153  Rawls 
certainly rejects these kinds of agreements, as they represent inherently unstable 
arrangements—if circumstances were to change, and interests shift, parties would 
break the agreement and instability would ensue.154 Nevertheless, Galston claims:  
“When conjoined to pessimism about the possibility of purely rational consensus, the 
need to abate conflict implies a more favorable stance toward coordination through 
modus vivendi.”155  And Williams echoes: “The very phrase ‘a mere modus vivendi’ 
suggests a certain distance from the political; experience suggests that those who enjoy 
such a thing are already lucky.”156  
Realists’ pessimism about agreement also spills over into the second purpose of 
ideal theory for Rawls—that of setting a goal for reform in nonideal circumstances.  
After all, if consensus is not possible, even in the best of circumstances, then it is unclear 
how fruitful the methodology is in generating a roadmap for how to proceed in nonideal 
circumstances.  At best, Rawls’s ideal theory might allow us to better appreciate how 
each conception of justice faces its own unique set of challenges for adherence; but at 
worst, it will yield false or illusory targets that cannot ever be attained, no matter what 
the circumstances.  As a result, Rawls’s ideal theory could potentially be dangerous, 
                                                          
153 See also McCabe, David. Modus Vivendi Liberalism: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
2014. 
154 PL, 147. 
155 Galston (2010): 397. 
156 Williams, Bernard.  In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. 
Princeton University Press, 2005: 2, fn. 2. 
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perpetually tempting us with a vision that is forever out of reach and providing us with 
mistaken tasks for reform. 
Given these charges against Rawls, Steve Elkin concludes the following: 
We do not best grasp the nub of partial compliance theory [nonideal 
theory] by focusing on ideal theory. Rather, we can best understand 
partial compliance when we understand just why there can only be 
partial compliance, and what we need to do to achieve even this modest 
state of affairs.157   
 
Hence, for realists, the problems unique to nonideal theory can only be worked out 
from within nonideal theory itself, by examining why noncompliance is endemic to 
human life and figuring out how we can best structure institutions so that stability and 
order can be maintained in civil society in the face of persistent disagreement.  
To briefly summarize, implicit in the realist objection is the view that incorrigible 
disagreement must disqualify Rawls’s ideal theory of justice—both in methodology and 
in goal-setting.  The methodology is faulty for it idealizes away a feature of society, 
namely noncompliance, which is central to the problem of justice.  It would be akin to 
idealizing away features of human nature or the circumstances of justice.  As a result, 
when we test Rawls’s favored principles of justice for stability when we assume strict 
compliance, stability would not, in fact, be possible.  In turn, realists then reject Rawls’s 
aspirational role or goal-setting aim of his ideal theory; they assert that it will only cause 
harm and chaos to insist upon an ideal that is unachievable for us.  As a result, they 
                                                          
157 Elkin (2006): 255, cited by Galston (2010): 395. 
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advocate more realistic achievements such as a modus vivendi as a suitable goal for 
political life. 
(b) Reply to Realists: The Transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism 
What should we make of this critique?  Should the persistence of deep 
disagreement affect our method for theorizing about principles of justice?  Does it 
tarnish Rawls’s goal to provide us with an ideal to guide our action in nonideal 
circumstances?  The basis for my reply here will be one that relates to Rawls’s transition 
from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism and the strategies Rawls employs to cope 
with the problem of disagreement in society.158 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls sought to address a substantial problem faced in 
liberal democratic societies.  Rawls states the problem as such:   
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society 
of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?159   
 
In asking this question, Rawls affirms what he calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” 
which is an inevitable feature of democratic societies that results from citizens’ free use 
of their practical reason.160  However, instead of merely postulating or asserting this fact 
of reasonable pluralism, he also believed it important to seek an explanation for this 
feature about social life.  He asks:  “Why would free institutions with their basic rights 
and liberties lead to diversity?  Why doesn’t our sincere and conscientious attempt to 
                                                          
158 For a comprehensive treatment of this transition, see Weithman (2012).  Also see Freeman, Samuel.  
“Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution,” in Justice and the Social 
Contract, Oxford University, 2007: 175-214. 
159 PL, xx. 
160 PL, xiv.   
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reason with one another lead us to agreement?”161 These two questions “call for 
explanation.”162  
In answering these questions, Rawls first provides a few answers that are 
ultimately dismissed.  He speculates that perhaps people are only motivated to hold 
views that “advance their own more narrow interests,” and that because people have 
different interests, there would be different comprehensive views.163  Next, he 
considers whether people are perhaps just too “irrational and not very bright,” leading 
them to hopelessly confused thinking, creating multiple doctrines as a result.164  Now, 
realists such as Elkins or Williams would presumably accept these explanations as 
sufficient to demonstrate the fact of disagreement—after all, people manifest these 
traits in various circumstances in politics in society all the time, so what is the problem?  
Aren’t these traits widespread enough to base our political theories upon them?  And 
yet, interestingly, Rawls rejects these explanations for reasonable pluralism, and it is 
important to examine the language that he uses in doing so.  He says: 
These explanations are too easy, and not the kind we want.  We want to 
know how reasonable disagreement is possible, for we always begin work 
within ideal theory.  Thus, we ask: how might reasonable disagreement 
come about?165 
 
Now, at first glance, this might sound like Rawls is just repeating the question without 
really clarifying what is wrong with the previous explanations of irrationality or narrowly 
                                                          
161 JF, 35. 
162 Ibid., 35. 
163 Ibid., 35. 
164 Ibid., 35. 
165 Ibid., 35. 
80 
 
self-interested thinking.   Yet, if we take his claim about ideal theory as providing a hint, 
we can construct a solution. 
The main motivation for rejecting these kinds of explanations—and why we need 
ideal theory—is that such explanations do not represent a suitably general account of 
the person – they are, in a sense, based on a “nonideal” conception of the person.  
When Elkins describes persons as driven to subordinate others and to use political 
power to do so for their own narrow ends, there is no reason to believe, on Rawls’s view, 
that such motives and impulses are the central motives of our political lives.  They may, 
instead, simply be the result of disfigured and corrupted institutions in society; or, even 
if they may be genuine motives for us, they are not representative of our fundamental 
aims and pursuits.166  As such, they cannot be used to explain the problem of 
disagreement in society.  Hence, to avoid this problem, Rawls relies upon an “ideal 
conception of the person”167 in order to isolate the core features of our moral 
personality and the central aspects of our political character.168  We can then use this 
conception to demonstrate how disagreement is possible in a more fundamental way. 
The essential components of the ideal conception of the person (later called the 
“political conception of the person” in PL) are related to how citizens in democratic life 
conceive of themselves, namely, as “free and equal,” and having an interest in 
                                                          
166 Rawls says:  “We do not deny that vanity and greed, the will to dominate and the desire for glory are 
prominent in politics and affect the rise and fall of nations.”  Nevertheless, “we look for a political 
conception of justice that can gain the support of a reasonable overlapping consensus to serve as a public 
basis of justification,” JF, 36-37. 
167 TJ, 231-232, later termed, the “political conception of the person,” PL, 29-35. 
168 See Freeman, Samuel. Rawls. Routledge, 2007: 331. 
81 
 
developing the “two moral powers,” which consist of (1) the capacity for a sense of 
justice—to recognize the constraints that fairness and reciprocity require—and (2) the 
capacity to revise and formulate a conception of the good.169  These two capacities are 
directly related to what Rawls calls the “rational” and the “reasonable.”170  These 
notions all coalesce to provide a picture of a citizen who (1) has an interest in 
formulating and revising a conception of the good, (2) aims to advance her good in 
society while acknowledging that she must take responsibility for the ends she sets, and 
(3) strives to cooperate with others on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity.171 
By providing an ideal conception of the person that represents our fundamental 
political aims, Rawls provides us with a conception of the person that is suitably ideal 
and general in the sense that “the deliberations of any one person are typical of all.”172  
In basing the conception of the person on our liberal democratic culture, we can be 
                                                          
169 See PL, 30-35. 
170 PL, 48-54. 
171 This is the interpretation advanced in Political Liberalism for the “political conception of the person.”  
The alternative understanding of the “ideal conception of the person” as advanced in a Theory of Justice 
and “Kantian Constructivism” is based on the Kantian notion of full autonomy.  Under that interpretation, 
we view ourselves as both morally and rationally autonomous.  Our moral autonomy would be based 
upon the fact that humans can distinguish themselves as acting for reasons as opposed to merely 
following one’s inclinations, and that these reasons must be justified to one another.  The rational aspect 
of autonomy would be the fact that persons are not merely provided with ends—instead, persons 
formulate and critically evaluate their ends which determine their conception of the good and that they 
take whatever means they can to achieve it.  Taken together, these capacities express the fundamental 
nature of practical reasoning itself.  Rawls, in PL, gave up this more comprehensive justification for the 
reasonable and the rational aspects of the person and instead shifted to concepts that are politically 
available in democratic culture.  See Freeman (2007): 284-323 for a further discussion of this transition. 
172 TJ, 232.  However, “all” should be interpreted to mean “all persons in liberal democratic societies,” not 
to all persons as such.  On the Kantian interpretation of the conception of the person, Rawls would have 
argued that the “all” was much broader as the conception of the person was based on our fundamental 
practical reasoning, rather than simply a conception that is shared in liberal democratic societies. 
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assured that we are appealing to features of persons that are truly representative of 
citizens qua citizens.173 
Broadly realist conceptions of the person, in contrast, do not accurately reflect 
our deepest aims and do not express our political personality.  They are either too 
desolate and myopic—as reflected in the purely rational and self-interested person as 
represented by Hobbes—or they are too circumstantial—as reflected in the pessimistic 
realist who highlights the tendency for persons to use political power to subordinate 
others.  Instead, Rawls believes that we conceive of ourselves as more than simply homo 
economicus, and that we have a far richer set of motives that enable us to cooperate 
with one another in liberal democratic life.  
With the ideal conception of the person at hand, we can now return to our initial 
explanation of the fact of reasonable pluralism.  Given that Rawls starts with an ideal 
conception of the person as free and equal with an interest in developing the two moral 
powers, we can now see how the normal activity of these persons in the course of 
democratic life will invariably generate a diversity of views that are permanent.  In 
exercising the free use of their reason, citizens will come to recognize what Rawls calls 
the “burdens of judgement,” which are the inherent limitations that citizens have in 
making judgments in conditions where there is incomplete information, complex 
                                                          
173 Moreover, the ideal conception of the person is formulated in such a way such that we avoid a 
conception of the person that is grounded in a perfectionist ideal.  Rawls believes that his task is “to 
define an ideal of the person without invoking a prior standard of human excellence”, TJ, 287. Rawls does 
not believe that citizens acknowledging themselves as free and equal, or as having the two moral powers, 
is something that requires citizens to commit themselves to a unique comprehensive doctrine about the 
good, but is rather compatible with a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good.   
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evidence, and differing methods for weighing values.174  When citizens encounter these 
burdens over the course of their lives, they will naturally develop competing views 
about what should count as the good.  More importantly, Rawls believes that our 
understanding of ourselves as free and equal—and as reasonable and rational—will 
prevent us from condoning the use of coercive state power to quash this pluralism.  As 
Rawls states:  “A continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state 
power.”175  It is “oppressive,” for there would be no feasible way to remove 
disagreement about conceptions of the good from society without running afoul of our 
fundamental political aims that are central to the ideal conception of the person.176 
We are now in a position to put all the pieces of the argument together and 
respond to the realist criticisms of Rawls.  Rawls clearly recognizes the force of the 
objection by the realists that there cannot be unanimous (or near unanimous) 
agreement in a society characterized by deep disagreement.  Rawls’s account of the 
burdens of judgment and the ideal conception of the person guarantee that such 
disagreement will be a permanent feature of society.  Moreover, Rawls believed that his 
understanding of reasonable pluralism caused him to revise his argument made in A 
Theory of Justice. Rawls states: 
                                                          
174 For a complete account of the burdens of judgement, see PL, 54-58.  Also JF, 35-36. 
175 PL, 37. 
176 In other words, we would not sacrifice our capacity to formulate a conception of the good with the 
hope that perhaps our own conception would be the one favored in our institutions.  It is too great a risk 
to take and the cost of damaging one’s fundamental powers would be too high. 
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The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines…shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered 
society of justice as fairness is unrealistic.  This is because it is 
inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the best of 
foreseeable conditions.  The account of the stability of a well-ordered 
society is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast.177 
 
From this statement, we can see that Rawls rejects the idea that it is feasible to expect 
citizens to converge on his unique conception of justice as fairness in society.  
Nevertheless, Rawls did not conclude that the best we could hope for was a modus 
vivendi, as realists would have us suppose.178  Instead, in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
argues for the possibility of an “overlapping consensus” to emerge among a series of 
reasonable conceptions of the good that could find justification of political principles 
from within their own doctrines.179  What would emerge is a “free-standing” political 
conception of justice that was independent of controversial metaphysical claims about 
the good, and could be endorsed from reasonable comprehensive views separately.  
Framed in this way, a Catholic, for instance, could accept justice as fairness by 
connecting it to God’s notion of equality for all his creation; a Millian could endorse 
justice as fairness as the best way to promote individual autonomy; and a Kantian could 
accept it as the expression of ourselves as free and autonomous beings.   
 However, Rawls recognized the limits of this overlapping consensus, and 
eventually came to realize that an overlapping consensus on a single conception of 
justice—justice as fairness—was unlikely, and that it was only “a family of reasonable 
                                                          
177 PL, xix. 
178 Rawls states that “it is not sufficient that [we] accept a democratic regime merely as a modus vivendi,” 
PL, xxxix. 
179 PL, 133-168. 
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though differing liberal political conceptions” of justice that would be subject to an 
overlapping consensus (provided that such conceptions guaranteed the priority to the 
set of basic liberties and provided some guaranteed minimum all-purpose means).180  
Nevertheless, despite Rawls’s own revisions to his theory, it is important to note that 
these were not concessions to the external criticisms of realists.  This is evident in the 
fact that (1) Rawls never endorses modus vivendi liberalism and, that (2) Rawls offers a 
deep explanation for disagreement that does not rely upon a pessimistic or narrowly 
self-interested account of personhood.  Instead, Rawls constructs an idealized 
conception of the person and proceeds to demonstrate how reasonable pluralism is 
possible from within that conception.   
This should serve as a vindication of Rawls’s ideal theory, for Rawls has 
established in the most general way possible that disagreement is both possible and 
necessary in democratic life by linking it with our most fundamental aims and the 
limiting facts of social life.  Disagreement is not based upon a conception of human 
desires that is foreign to our considered judgments about ourselves and our aims.  
While Rawls undoubtedly recognizes our tendencies to dominate or subjugate others, 
he does not believe that these are the most representative of our own considered 
convictions about who we are as citizens in democracies.  As such, any political 
conception of justice based upon a combative or domineering portrait of human agency 
                                                          
180 PL, xxxviii.  Rawls states that “the definition of liberal conceptions is given by three conditions:  first, a 
specification of certain rights, liberties, and opportunities; second, a special priority for these freedoms; 
and third, measures assuring all citizens, whatever their social position, adequate all-purpose means to 
make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities, PL, xlviii.  Rawls did hold, however, 
that justice as fairness was still the most reasonable. 
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will be unreasonable and unacceptable to us.  In other words, a strongly realist 
conception of the person will not frame our understanding of the root causes of 
disagreement in society.  If it did, we would have little reason to believe that stable 
agreements upon broadly liberal conceptions of justice could be possible.  Any stability 
would be of momentary success and could only be maintained at great cost to our moral 
personality and our deepest aims.  For Rawls, this would be a tragic outcome—one that 
is strongly at odds with his vision of a realistic utopia, for it would entail that the best we 
could hope for in society was a political conception of justice based largely upon 
external threats or mechanisms to keep our combative or self-serving desires in check.  
While Rawls does not disavow these sources of stability as impossible, Rawls’s project is 
based upon the notion that we can internally accept and regard as reasonable our 
conception of justice.  Otherwise, justice must be viewed as a foreign and oppressive 
force in our lives and not ultimately compatible with who we are as citizens.  It would be 
difficult to “reconcile” ourselves to such a world in which justice could not be endorsed 
by citizens from within.181   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
181 Rawls believes that one of the purposes of a realistic utopia is to “reconcile” ourselves to our social 
world.  LP, 128.  While Williams (2005) would object to this type of moralistic assessment of what persons 
are and what their fundamental aims should be, Rawls does not regard his theory as imposing a moral 
view upon persons at all, for Rawls believes that these features of ourselves can be represented to us in 
our deepest convictions in political society. 
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Chapter 4:  A Reply to Amartya Sen 
I.  Introduction 
We have already examined some realist criticisms of Rawls’s methodology of 
ideal theory related to his assumption of full compliance and examined the problem of 
deep disagreement in society.  However, other realists, such as Amartya Sen, have 
targeted different aspects of Rawls’s ideal theory for criticism.182  In particular, Sen has 
challenged the usefulness of the goal or target setting aspects of Rawls’s ideal theory.  
Recall that, in addition to providing a methodology to test principles of justice against 
one another, Rawls aims to articulate an ideal of the perfectly just society—what Rawls 
calls the “well-ordered society”—in order to provide a formal model of what we should 
strive to achieve or aim for in our transition from nonideal circumstances to more ideal 
ones.  The idea is that, by constructing a picture of the ideally just society, we can then 
make principled recommendations for improvement when faced with injustice by 
highlighting more urgent problems to address.  For Rawls, it is only after we formulate 
the ideal can we can make genuine headway toward addressing injustice. 
Sen rejects this model of the relationship between ideal theory and nonideal 
circumstances and advances the following thesis:  an ideal theory of justice is neither 
                                                          
182 Sen, Amartya.  “What do we Want from a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy vol. 53, no. 5 
(2006): 215-238. Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice.  Harvard University Press, 2009.  For a sympathetic 
review of Sen’s critique, see Schmidtz, David. “Nonideal Theory: What it is and What it Needs to Be,” 
Ethics vol. 121, no. 4 (2011): 772-796.  For an application and expansion of Sen’s approach, see Wiens, 
David.  “Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy vol. 20, no. 1 (2012): 45-
70.  For a criticism of Sen within a Rawlsian perspective, see Freeman, Samuel. “A New Theory of Justice,” 
The New York Review of Books, October, 2010.  For an expanded version of this criticism, see Freeman, 
Samuel.  “Ideal Theory and the Justice of Institutions vs. Comprehensive Outcomes,” Rutgers Law Journal, 
vol. 43, issue 2: 169-209. 
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necessary nor sufficient for addressing cases of actual injustice in the world.183  While it 
may have other merits, providing us with guidance for correcting injustice is not one of 
them.184  As such, Sen believes that political philosophers since Rawls have spent too 
much time articulating a vision of what the ‘perfect,’ ‘pristine,’ and ‘spotlessly’ just 
society would look like.  Instead, Sen argues that a new way of thinking about justice is 
required for us to be able to address problems of the nonideal world. 
Before we can address Sen’s argument, we should provide a bit of vocabulary 
that Sen employs to characterize his objections.  Sen characterizes theories of justice 
that focus on articulating the ideally organized society as “transcendental theories of 
justice.”185  These top-down approaches descend to the nonideal world only after fully 
articulating what the ideal society ought to be.  That is, transcendental approaches do 
not begin to address the problems of the nonideal world—oppression, poverty, or lack 
of healthcare—until a full and complete conception of justice is outlined that relates all 
of the parts of justice together into one coherent whole. 
In contrast, Sen’s articulates an alternative approach to theorizing about justice, 
which he calls the “comparative” approach.186  Central to this method is the idea that 
we are better off comparing two possible remedies of injustice against one another and 
evaluating which one enhances citizens’ functionings better using tools from social 
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choice theory and the capabilities approach to justice.187  For instance, if our problem is 
poverty, we should select two concrete feasible proposals and do a pairwise analysis of 
the effects of these different systems on income and wealth distribution across society.  
Whichever model can produce better outcomes across the broad metric of the 
capabilities approach should be favored over the other.  The aim of a comparative 
approach, then, is to outline the best method to rank and compare these alternatives in 
the real world, rather than wait until a total picture of justice is complete before we can 
begin to address injustice. 
For Sen, the comparative model is superior to the transcendental model for 
several reasons, notably because it accurately reflects how we deliberate and argue for 
remedies to injustice in the actual political world.  Sen’s puts the point as such:   
The answers that a transcendental approach to justice gives—or can 
give—are quite distinct from the type of concerns that engage people in 
discussions on justice and injustice in the world, for example, iniquities of 
hunger, illiteracy, torture, arbitrary incarceration, or medical exclusion as 
particular social features that need remedying.  The focus of these 
engagements tends to be on the ways and means of advancing justice—
or reducing injustice—in the world by remedying these inequities, rather 
than on looking only for the simultaneous fulfilment of the entire cluster 
of perfectly just societal arrangements demanded by a particular 
transcendental theory.188 
 
The problem, then, is that the transcendental approach is largely detached from the 
clamors for justice in the actual world and is largely powerless and inert in its efforts to 
address them.  In essence, those who suffer from injustice must wait in abeyance until 
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these timeless disputes about pristine justice are resolved once and for all before they 
can receive guidance about how to remedy the iniquities of the world.  This model for 
thinking and theorizing about justice, according to Sen, should be unacceptable to us.  
Rather than devote precious intellectual capital constructing the ideal society, we 
should instead expend our efforts towards creating tools to evaluate proposals that 
offer incremental advantages over their predecessors.  It is through this piecemeal 
approach to rectifying injustice can we genuinely impact the world and correct its 
numerous and diverse failures. 
With this brief sketch of Sen’s project in place, we can now outline the purposes 
of this section.  First, I reconstruct Sen’s argument that ideal theory is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for addressing problems of injustice.  In doing so, I further buttress Sen’s 
argument with a discussion of a well-known problem in economics known as the 
“problem of the second best.”  Next, I discuss in greater detail Sen’s alternative 
“comparative approach” to justice.  Finally, I respond to Sen’s criticisms on behalf of 
Rawls, highlighting the importance of ideal theory for our thinking about justice even in 
nonideal circumstances. 
II.  Sen’s Criticism of Rawls’s Ideal Theory 
Let us begin with Sen’s statement of his thesis: “A transcendental approach is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for answering questions on the advancement of justice 
that urgently demand our attention, which call for a robustly comparative approach.”189  
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The core of Sen’s argument rests on a sufficiency claim and a necessity claim, which we 
will address in turn. 
(a) Transcendental Justice is not Sufficient for Advancing Justice 
 According to Sen, a perfect theory of justice is not sufficient for enabling us to 
make successful judgements regarding the urgency or priority of injustices to be 
remedied.  He states:  “The identification of transcendence does not yield any means of 
addressing these problems to arrive at a relational ranking of departures from 
transcendence.”190 Sen provides an illuminating analogy to highlight this point:  “The 
fact that a person regards the Mona Lisa as the best picture in the world does not reveal 
how she would rank a Gauguin against a Van Gogh.”191  She may think that it is the 
technique, color, and thematic ambiguity that, when combined, produce the ideal 
painting.  However, given this information, we have little reason to think that we are 
now equipped with the tools that would be sufficient to compare other works of art 
against one another.  Sure, we might be able to claim that all other works of art are 
“imperfect” for the simple reason that they are not the Mona Lisa, but we generally 
want more than this from a theory of aesthetics if we are going to make judgements 
between two imperfect works of art. 
We can apply this analogy to the evaluation of societies with respect to justice. 
Sen argues that, just like our account of the perfect painting tells us nothing about how 
to rank and compare alternative paintings against one another, an account of the 
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perfect society is inert with respect to our capacity to rank the desirability of feasible 
pairwise alternatives.  We may, for instance, be able to describe the perfect society as 
one that realizes Rawls’s two principles of justice, but this information is insufficient to 
provide guidance for how to rank nonideal alternatives that will vary in their failures 
across multiple dimensions with respect to their departures from the two principles of 
justice.   
Suppose we have a society that violates multiple dimensions of the principle of 
liberty—citizens suffer, say, from both limited free speech and restricted freedom of 
religion.  Or, citizens are both starving and do not have equal access to vote.  In these 
cases, how are we to weigh these different competing concerns against one another? 
“Should we,” Sen asks, “regard hunger, starvation and medical neglect to be invariably 
less important than the violation of any kind of personal liberty?”192  Rawls’s system, on 
Sen’s account, simply labels these circumstances as “unjust.”193    As such, Sen argues 
that Rawls’s theory is not helpful for addressing problems of actual injustice that 
societies face.  We need a framework that is better equipped to handle the weighing of 
costs against one another.  For these kinds of problems—those that involve weighing 
different alternatives— we require a “comparative” approach to thinking about justice 
that is designed specifically with a system for evaluating these kinds of trade-offs. 
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93 
 
(b) An Illustration of the Sufficiency Objection: The Problem of the Second Best 
One way to expand upon Sen’s general objection to the transcendental approach 
is to compare it with a well-known problem in economics which has received some 
attention: the problem of the second best.194  First introduced by economists R.G. Lipsey 
and Kelvin Lancaster, the central problem contains two logically related claims.  The first 
asserts that: 
The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is 
introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents 
the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian 
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer 
desirable.195 
 
The second, corollary claim is as follows: 
 
There is no a priori way to judge as between various situations in which 
some of the Paretian optimum conditions are fulfilled while others are 
not.  Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which more, but not all, 
of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to 
be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.196 
 
The general idea is that, if we have a list of conditions that are part of the ideal, it is not 
necessarily the case that, if one those features is missing, the other features will still be 
desirable.  We can illustrate the problem using a familiar example.  Suppose I believe 
that the ideal cookie is a cookie that has chocolate chips and pecans.  Now, we can ask 
the question, do we have sufficient information to be able to determine what the 
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second-best, third-best, and fourth-best cookies are?  In other words, are we able to 
rank cookies that are nonideal?  The general tendency is to assume that the second-best 
cookie should have some of the elements of the ideal cookie—surely it will have 
chocolate chips!  However, according to this theorem—and Sen’s sufficiency objection—
this is not necessarily true.  In fact, the second-best cookie may simply be a macadamia 
nut cookie, and may have nothing to do with chocolate chips or pecans.197   
 Using this analogy, Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik invoked the general theory 
of the second best to criticize proponents of laissez-faire capitalism and to argue in 
favor of government-controlled markets.198  Adherents to the laissez-faire approach 
would generally condemn any form of governmental market regulation.  The rationale 
was that, since unrestricted free markets were the ideal and most efficient model, any 
governmental regulation would take us further away from our realization of it and must 
therefore be worse. 
However, Rodrik’s reply to these economists was to invoke the problem of the second 
best.  He argued that the second-best solution for us may have little in common with 
the unrestricted market, and instead, rigorously controlled markets by the government 
could be second-best. 
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 Bringing the analogy to bear on our current topic, we can apply this reasoning to 
the limitations of transcendental theories of justice.  The argument would be that 
Rawls’s ideal of the well-ordered society governed by the two principles of justice is not 
sufficient to inform us how to rank alternatives that are nonideal.  For, while it may be 
tempting to think that the second-best society would be a kind of gradual and mixed 
realization of Rawls’s two principles of justice, it may be the case that it is actually a 
utilitarian society, while the third best would be a libertarian society. 
Moreover, this can have important implications when attempting to determine 
how we should improve our current state of affairs.  After all, if it turns out that the next 
best thing for us is a utilitarian society, then it would be a serious mistake to employ 
Rawls’s ideal of a well-ordered society to instantly condemn proposals aimed at 
maximizing average utility in society if the ideal was not currently a feasible alternative 
for us.  If we return to the cookie analogy, we might say that it would be improper to 
condemn the chef for buying macadamia nuts instead of chocolate chips, if it turned out 
there were no pecans. 
 Of course, these are mere speculations regarding what the second-best or third-
best societies would be for us.  The important point, however, is that the problem of the 
second best cannot be solved “a priori,” as Lipsey and Lancaster claim.  We cannot read 
off from the well-ordered society how to determine the next best course of action when 
the ideal is unavailable.  Instead, we require an additional framework to handle these 
kinds of assessments. 
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To put it back in Sen’s terminology, the ideal of transcendental justice would not 
be sufficient to provide us guidance in nonideal circumstances.  We require a 
“comparative” approach to justice in order to identify proposals that would enhance 
justice in society from a worse state of affairs to a better one. 
(c) Transcendental Theories are not Necessary for Advancing Justice 
 In addition to claiming that transcendental theories of justice are not sufficient 
for correcting injustice, Sen also argues that they are not necessary for it either.  Sen 
illustrates this objection with a compelling example:   
Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, completely 
unbeatable in terms of stature by any other peak, but that understanding 
is neither needed, nor particularly helpful, in comparing the peak heights 
of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley.  There would be 
something very deeply odd in a general belief that a comparison of any 
two alternatives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of 
a supreme alternative.  There is no analytical connection there at all.199 
 
Here, Sen illustrates that we do not require an ideal model—Mount Everest is the 
highest mountain—in order to make pairwise comparisons between two alternatives—
Mount Kilimanjaro is taller than Mount McKinley.  If we apply this analogy to the case of 
justice, the claim would be that we do not require a picture of Rawls’s perfect well-
ordered society in order to assert the injustice of, say, global poverty and widespread 
illiteracy and advocate for concrete, piecemeal improvements in any of these metrics.  
Indeed, on Sen’s reasoning, it would be absurd to claim that, unless we knew what 
perfect justice required, we could not advocate for health policies designed to alleviate 
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serious global illnesses, or proposals to provide education to women in developing 
countries.  For Sen, we already have agreement about these problems in order to 
establish a priority in addressing them.  There is no necessity to search for the perfect 
society to make progress in these initiatives. 
Framed in this way, Sen is highlighting the irrelevance of ideal theory if we are 
interested in advancing justice and eliminating injustice in society.  There is no 
“analytical connection” between recognizing the benefits of providing healthcare to 
poor families and the picture of the perfect society governed by Rawls’s two principles 
of justice.  As such, we would be wasting our efforts debating the intricacies of Rawls’s 
pristine theory of justice when real work could be done employing a comparative 
approach to justice that would be designed to better implement and justify workable 
improvements to our deeply unjust world. 
(d) Do Comparative Theories entail Transcendental Theories? 
Sen immediately foresees a potential counterargument to his position, namely, 
that the ability to make pairwise comparisons must entail the ability to identify a 
transcendental ideal.  Or, as Sen puts it, “if comparative assessments can be 
systematically made, then that discipline must also be able to identify the very best.”200  
The intuition here is that, surely if we can compare the height of two mountains, we 
have enough information to be able to determine what the highest mountain is.  
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However, Sen argues that this is a “non sequitur.”201  It does not follow that “a sequence 
of pairwise comparisons invariably leads us to the very best.”202  Instead, the exercise 
only permits the identification of better alternatives, as the very best may not exist at all.   
For instance, in the case of mountains, just because we can compare the relative heights 
of two peaks does not tell us anything about Mount Everest—its height, its location, or 
whether it even exists.  To emphasize this point, Sen points out that our set comparisons 
will inevitably be incomplete—it is impossible that we will be able to generate a total set 
of all possibilities to compare.  So there is no reason to think that our ability to make 
comparisons in one—or any finite number of situations—will entail our capacity to 
identify or locate the very best. 
In this regard, Sen’s account of justice is fundamentally open-ended—a never-
ending task of incremental improvements with the hope that our gravest injustices in 
the world will eventually be eliminated.  Whether or not we ultimately converge on 
some perfect society is neither here nor there for these purposes.   In fact, to attempt 
such a task would be an irrelevant distraction that would hamper our capacity to solve 
concrete and identifiable problems that demand rectification. 
(e) Judgments of Justice are Always Incomplete 
  In addition to being more open-ended, Sen admits that the comparative 
method he advances may not always yield definitive judgments to questions about 
which proposal would be better than another.  There will always be an essential 
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“incompleteness” regarding a proposal’s effectiveness in advancing justice.  The reasons 
for this, according to Sen, are as follows:  “Incompleteness may be of the lasting kind for 
several reasons, including unbridgeable gaps in information, and judgmental 
unresolvability involving disparate considerations that cannot be entirely eliminated, 
even with full information.203  Given these problems that are endemic to practical 
judgement, he admits that the comparative approach will never produce full or “totalist” 
principles that provide “complete” answers.204   
However, Sen does not view this as a fault within comparative theories.  Instead, 
Sen believes that we can still arrive at reasonable decisions that will eliminate injustice, 
even in the face of indeterminacy.  For example, using the comparative approach, we 
could strongly denounce “endemic hunger or exclusion from medical access” despite 
“durable incompleteness” regarding the inability to determine whether or not the ideal 
tax rate in the highest bracket is 45% or 46%.205  We could easily set that question aside 
while still making headway in advancing justice in society.  Put more starkly in contrast 
to Rawls, we need not determine which given tax scheme best comports with the 
difference principle if we have sufficient data and evidence to increase taxes to address 
major violations of justice.  To get bogged down by that indeterminacy would paralyze 
us, rendering our theory of justice inert.206  In contrast to Rawls, Sen claims:  “The 
challenge of assessing advancement, or identifying regression, will very often be not 
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compromised at all by the presence of substantial incompleteness in the rankings of 
justice.”207 
(f) What do we Want from a Theory of Justice? 
Given these various objections to transcendental approaches, Sen asks us to 
reframe our thinking of the very idea of justice:   
The question “What is a just society?” is not a good starting point for a 
useful theory of justice.  To that has to be added the further conclusion 
that it may not be a plausible end point either.  A systematic theory of 
comparative justice does not need, nor does it necessarily yield, an 
answer to the question “What is a just society?208 
 
For Sen, asking “What is a just society?” will never yield answers on its own to what we 
should do to promote justice in our world.  Instead, Sen believes that we would be 
better off asking a different kind of question, perhaps such as, “How can we reasonably 
advance justice in society?”  This would involve assessing the current state of affairs, 
and comparing it with a feasible alternative. So long as it produces an improvement 
from the previous state, we can be assured that we have eliminated injustice and done 
the best we can in improving our world. 
(g) Sen’s Comparative Approach 
Through Sen’s criticisms of Rawls, we have briefly suggested at some of the goals 
that the comparative approach to justice should accomplish.  Most importantly, it 
should enable us to weigh alternatives in a clearer and more precise manner than 
Rawls’s transcendental approach without requiring us to provide a complete answer to 
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the question: “what is the just society?”  Sen develops this proposal in greater detail 
through his more extensive work, The Idea of Justice.209   
Briefly, Sen advocates for an approach that combines elements of social choice 
theory, a capabilities approach as the relevant metric of justice, consequentialism, 
public reasoning, and a theory of impartiality that is related to Adam Smith’s account of 
an impartial spectator.210  The general idea is this:  When deliberating about various 
social policies in the public forum, we should imagine ourselves as an impartial 
spectator who is charged with adopting the preferences of all.  Our aim should be to 
maximize the capabilities for functioning for citizens, suitably constrained by 
considerations of individual rights and fairness.211  We are then to assess which proposal 
would best satisfy these considerations. 
As Sen warns, the comparative approach outlined requires a great deal of 
knowledge about social choice theory, mathematical modelling, and empirical analysis—
tools that philosophers have little expertise in.212  Social choice theory generally 
specializes in determining what the best choice for society should be when preferences 
and values among people are vastly different.  A great deal of literature spans this 
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subject regarding the best model to use, especially given the influential results of 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that we cannot have a choice procedure 
that is both rational and democratic that successfully translates individual preferences 
of citizens into a clear social preference.213  Nevertheless, Sen believes that his 
comparative approach is best equipped to address these interdisciplinary problems. 
III. Reply to Sen 
 While Sen provides some powerful points regarding the limitations of ideal 
theory, and presents an interesting alternative to thinking about justice in a 
comparative framework, many of his criticisms fail to adequately establish the claim 
that we should abandon ideal theory and transcendental theories of justice.  In this 
reply, I will first address Sen’s claim that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for advancing justice in society.  Next, I will evaluate Sen’s own comparative approach to 
justice and argue that his own proposal does not adequately solve the problems he 
believes beset Rawls’s own model.  Finally, I will respond to Sen’s claim that ideal theory 
is a distraction form more pressing concerns of injustice. 
(a) Is the Ideal Sufficient? 
According to Sen’s sufficiency argument, Rawls’s principles of justice cannot, by 
themselves, accurately assess varying departures from the ideal model, nor provide a 
rank ordering between alternatives.  Only a comparative approach to justice can do this.  
Now, strictly speaking, Rawls denies this, for he believes that the lexical priority of the 
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principles establishes which departures from the ideal are more urgent to address.214  
For instance, when faced with a situation in which we must choose between protecting 
liberty or promoting equality of opportunity, we should favor establishing the equal 
basic liberties.  However, Sen rejects this reply and argues that such recommendations 
can lead to a form of “extremism” that can be at odds with the empirical realities of the 
world.215   
However, Rawls does recognize that the lexical priority rule can admit exceptions, 
so the accusation of “rule-worship” is misplaced.  Rawls states:  “To accept the lexical 
ordering of the two principles, we are not forced to deny that the feasibility of the basic 
liberties depends upon circumstances.”216  For instance, a situation in which people 
lacked sufficient resources to even exercise the basic liberties would clearly be a case 
where the lexical priority would not hold.  Rawls says:   
This principle [of liberty] may be preceded by a lexically prior principle 
requiring that basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is a 
necessary condition for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to 
exercise the basic rights and liberties.217   
 
So, to answer Sen’s supposedly rhetorical question, “Why should we regard hunger, 
starvation and medical neglect to be invariably less important than the violation of any 
kind of personal liberty?,” our answer is that we shouldn’t, and Rawls does not commit 
us to the view that we should.218  If the basic needs of citizens are not met—if citizens 
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are facing starvation—the relief of such circumstances will be lexically prior the basic 
liberties insofar as rectifying those problems ensures that the basic needs can eventually 
be restored. 
Sen is still critical, however, that Rawls’s theory does not do more than this.  It 
does not, for instance, provide us with precise ways of weighing different basic liberties 
against one another, other than to ensure that we have “a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties.”219  But Rawls thinks that it is inappropriate for fundamental 
principles of justice to admit of such precision.  Rawls says that it is a mistake to “think a 
political conception should be framed to cover all logically possible cases, or all 
conceivable cases.”220  This is because these basic principles of justice require 
interpretation as part of the “four-stage sequence” of application for principles to 
society.221  For instance, according to Rawls, the principle of liberty “applies not only to 
the basic structure but more specifically to what we think of as the constitution.”222  As 
is well known, constitutional principles such as the Equal Protection Clause or the 
freedom of the press can develop into a numerous array of implications for citizens that 
are not known a priori from Rawls’s first principle of justice.  As such, it would be too 
demanding and unrealistic to expect constitutional principles to settle all disputes 
without any further interpretation at a later stage in application of those principles—
either judicial or legislative.  Sen, in other words, is simply asking for too much for our 
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most abstract expressions of the standards of justice for society.  These principles will 
eventually be applied to address the concerns that Sen is rightfully concerned about 
during the application stage of these principles. 
Given Rawls’s more limited aims, it is doubtful that Rawls believed that his ideal 
theory on its own could accomplish any more than a general structure of our priorities 
and our goals.  Rawls plainly admits that much needs to be filled in when applying an 
ideal theory of justice to the circumstances of the real world:  
As far as circumstances permit, we have a natural duty to remove any 
injustices, beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent of 
the deviation from perfect justice.  Of course, this idea is extremely rough.  
The measure of departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition. 
223 
 
While Rawls says that “intuition” will be required to supply additional normative tools to 
the analysis, he does not mean that we will not be required to consult the social 
sciences to determine the costs and consequences of various proposals, or to determine 
the feasibility and likelihood of success for each correction of injustice.  As Simmons 
points out in his explication of Rawls, “nonideal theory will require judgments of both 
philosophical and social-scientific sorts.”224  So Rawls is actually in agreement with Sen 
regarding the insufficiency for ideal theory to provide us with a complete roadmap with 
respect to addressing departures from the ideal.  
However, where Rawls and Sen differ is with respect to whether Rawls’s picture 
is sufficiently able to provide any guidance with respect to assessing and correcting 
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injustice.  As we have just explored, an odd implication of Sen’s criticism here is that it 
calls into question the purpose of all constitutional documents that contain general 
abstract principles, as Samuel Freeman notes.225  Sen’s position appears to lead to the 
striking conclusion that foundational documents that outline broad principles for society 
are pointless for advancing justice.  As such, Sen’s criticisms are too strong and lead to 
an unwarranted suspicion of the relevance of the background principles that structure 
our own society.   
Let us now return to Sen’s analogy comparing famous works of art which he 
relies upon to illustrate his criticisms.  Recall that Sen asserts that our knowledge that 
the Mona Lisa is the best painting cannot provide us with any information regarding 
how to rank a Van Gogh versus a Gauguin.  However, this simplified analogy is 
misleading, and, upon further examination, it misses crucial aspects of our identification 
of the ideal.  To illustrate, if we are only provided with the minimal claim that “The 
Mona Lisa is the best painting,” we will of course not have learned much.  However, 
once we probe more deeply into the reasons why we believe the Mona Lisa is the best 
painting, we will certainly have a basis for evaluating other nonideal paintings.226  For 
instance, if asked to justify the preference for the Mona Lisa, we will presumably 
uncover something about the importance of theme, style, and technique and how those 
elements shape our understanding of art.  It would be quite strange indeed if these 
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values had no relevance to our evaluation of other imperfect paintings.  After all, how 
would it make sense for our judgements about style or technique to simply disappear 
from our assessments of other paintings?  It is simply not possible for these evaluative 
elements to drop out of our comparison of nonideal paintings. 
Similarly, we can apply this reasoning to address the “problem of the second 
best” illustrated by economists.  If we return to the analogy with the cookie, it is clear 
that, once we uncover the reasons why we believe the chocolate chip and pecan cookie 
to be the best, we can draw upon those explanations to see why the macadamia cookie 
would be second-best.  The lesson of the “problem of the second best” is, therefore, 
only the following:  We should not rely on surface attributes for determining which 
properties the second or third-best solutions will have.227  Of course the second-best 
cookie might not have chocolate chips.  The chocolate chips are just a façade for the 
deeper rationale for why that cookie is best.  Once we shift to our knowledge of the 
value judgments and evaluative comparisons, the problem disappears.  Our intimate 
knowledge of these more fundamental elements will always be applicable to whatever 
nonideal element we are analyzing. 
Let us provide a more dramatic example to illustrate this point.  Suppose you 
knew which cookie was the ideal cookie and you knew why.  What follows from this?  
You would have to know everything important about cooking and about all the 
ingredients, and all the values associated with weighing different styles of cooking.    
                                                          
227 Goodin (1995): 45 uses the language of “surface attributes.” 
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Otherwise, how could you have identified the ideal?   Surely, if you could do this, you 
would know how to rank nonideal cookies against one another, as well as identify the 
second and third best.  In fact, pace Sen, you would be able to establish a complete rank 
ordering of them. 
Now, we might object and say that I have proved too much with this example.  
For we then may wonder, how can Rawls truly establish the ideally just society?  Does 
Rawls know everything about all possible societies and all possible elements?  Surely not.  
However, this does not weaken my argument, for two main reasons:  (1) Rawls limits 
the scope of his investigation and (2) Rawls does not view the “ideal society” in the 
same way we might think of an ideal cookie. 
With respect to (1), Rawls is not interested in the ideally just society for all 
possible worlds and all possible people.228  Instead, Rawls limits his inquiry to liberal 
democratic societies under the circumstances of justice and favorable conditions, and to 
human beings who regard themselves as free and equal and are subject to human 
constraints.  Nor does Rawls allow deliberators all possible conceptions of justice when 
determining which principles should govern society.  Rather, he presents them a list of 
various conceptions that have currency in the political culture.229  This should already 
simplify a great deal the conditions under which an ideal is identified. 
With respect to (2), Rawls does not think that identifying an ideal society is about 
maximizing something in the way we might think that an ideal cookie somehow 
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229 TJ, 105-106. 
109 
 
maximizes pleasure, or how an ideal form of travel maximizes speed.  We greatly 
misunderstand Rawls if we think his vision of an ideally just society somehow mirrors 
these other kinds of ‘ideal’ conceptions that aim to maximize.  Instead, Rawls believes 
that an ideal society is one that is identified by principles that we believe to be the most 
reasonable for us given certain specified conditions.  They are most reasonable not 
because they are shown to maximize something or abide by some comprehensive 
doctrine of perfection, but rather because they answer to our deepest considered 
convictions implicit in our liberal democratic culture and are capable of being agreed 
upon by citizens who regard themselves as free and equal.   
It is within this defined context that Rawls identifies an ideally just society.  And 
within this context, Rawls does believe to have best incorporated all the different 
considered convictions (the “cooking ingredients”) into one ideal vision that each citizen 
can individually acknowledge to be the ideal.  What follows is that, given our intimate 
understanding of the various components that determine our selection of the principles 
of justice, we should be able to have sufficient knowledge to judge at least the broad 
framework for ranking nonideal alternatives and identifying second or third best 
societies.  Put in another way, through the process of identifying the ideally just society, 
each citizen would know much more than just the two principles of justice.  In fact, each 
citizen would understand the deep reasons that inform the basis for them—the social 
basis of self-respect, the importance of reciprocity, the importance of our conception of 
the good and having the primary goods to pursue it, and the relevance of justification to 
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others that can be seen as reasonable.  Each of these elements will be deeply connected 
in the normative outlook of persons in society, and it would be shocking if these 
substantive commitments could not serve as a wellspring of ideas for how to assess 
nonideal conditions in the world.  Yes, we will be left with “intuition” in some cases as 
Rawls reminds us,230 but this is not because his ideal theory is silent with respect to the 
nonideal world, but rather because no one can work out a theory for each and every 
possible circumstance.  This is not possible given the nature and complexity of the world.  
And yet, the tools that have been gained through the process of identifying the ideal will 
be invaluable and will greatly aid citizens in providing solutions and navigating us toward 
justice.231 
(b) Is the Ideal Necessary? 
Next, we can move to the claim that transcendental theories of justice are not 
necessary for advancing justice in nonideal circumstances.  Recall that Sen employs the 
analogy with Mount Everest and denies its relevance for making pairwise comparisons 
between two other mountains in terms of their height.  He then applies this reasoning 
to ideal theories of justice, denying that they are necessary to identify and compare the 
injustices of global malnutrition, gender discrimination in education, and other urgent 
problems of our world.  On the surface, this makes intuitive sense.  It seems odd to 
require the identification of the ideal to be able to make a judgement between two 
                                                          
230 TJ, 216. 
231 This exposition also nicely illustrates the importance and benefits of the publicity condition for a theory 
of justice.  If principles and their full justification are available to citizens, then the citizens will be better 
equipped to handle nonideal theory, for they will have individual access to the deep connections between 
their own considered convictions and the world around them. 
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societies with varying degrees of illiteracy.  Nevertheless, the analogy has significant 
limitations when we examine its implications more carefully. 
To begin, Simmons offers a response to Sen, arguing that we require the 
identification of the ideal so as to provide a broader viewpoint from which to gauge our 
piecemeal improvements.  Simmons states:  “To dive into nonideal theory without an 
ideal theory in hand is simply to drive blind, to allow irrational free rein to the mere 
conviction of injustice and to eagerness for change of any sort.”232  Simmons warns us 
that, under Sen’s approach, using a comparative approach is short-sighted and may only 
lead to a temporary improvement to a situation, without actually leading us toward the 
peak of justice.  To illustrate, if I am trying to build a better car, I can make several 
piecemeal improvements to the interior before realizing that, all along, I was making it 
harder and harder to leave enough room for the engine.  As such, we need a broader 
picture of the blueprint before making improvements, which is what ideal theory seeks 
to achieve. 
Of course, Sen can reply that all considerations should be taken into account 
when making improvements, so it would be unlikely that we would ever fail to leave 
enough room for an engine.  However, the objection still stands:  there is no reason to 
think that we are properly weighing all the considerations until we have a long-term 
plan or goal.  For instance, without a broader picture of the goals of car-building, we 
might never accurately weigh the consideration for energy efficiency—it might simply 
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be dropped out or dwarfed by other considerations of car design and so never get 
implemented.  Moreover, this outcome is compatible with making constant piecemeal 
improvements to the car every year. 
However, I believe we can strengthen Simmons’s point in a more robust manner 
than he has presented.  It is not simply the danger that we are “driving blind” without 
ideal theory.  Even more importantly, it is not clear that any piecemeal improvements 
we make will last without ideal theory.  Recall the importance of the stability condition 
that Rawls builds into his theory of justice, which requires that our principles gain the 
internal support of citizens through reliable psychological mechanisms.  By utilizing ideal 
theory, we are better able to test for which kinds of principles will genuinely garner the 
support of citizens so that they carry well into the future.  Without ideal theory, it is not 
clear whether a given short-term improvement we make will not simply vanish in vain.  
This can be a very costly oversight, for we may be directed on a comparative approach 
to justice to make small improvements to literacy or poverty with no basis upon which 
to think that such incremental advantages will pass on to future generations.  Without 
the lasting institutional structural changes regulated by principles of justice that can be 
endorsed by citizens, we run the risk of sabotaging our noble, but short-sighted efforts.  
As such, the stability condition that is offered by ideal theory should be viewed as 
necessary for our work in nonideal theory.  Sen’s comparative approach, by contrast, 
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does not adequately incorporate the stability condition on proposed solutions, and so 
there is no reliable method to make lasting change.233 
(c) Does the Ideal Even Exist? 
We can now turn to a more radical objection to what I have proposed in defense 
of ideal theory.  According to David Schmidtz, these kinds of responses miss an 
important element of Sen’s objections.234  According to Schmidtz, “justice has no peak 
form.  For thousands of years we postulated that it did, but we never had any reason, 
and we were wrong….Justice is not a place we need to get to.”235  For Schmidtz, there is 
no transcendental ideal theory of justice, so there is no reason to attempt to describe it 
or assume it would be helpful to us.  Instead, the most important task for us is to get out 
of “pits” of injustice and avoid them in the future as best we can.236  Hence, the only 
model available to us is the comparative approach to justice. 
Schmitdz’s more skeptical conclusion about justice demands a fuller treatment 
than I can provide here, but I will provide one major point to consider.  We should 
remember that, for Rawls, when he describes an ideal theory of justice, he is not 
describing something like the tallest mountain, the perfect car, or a society governed by 
a comprehensive doctrine of the good.  Rawls would agree that this kind of ideally just 
                                                          
233 We might object and say that stability can simply be added into the calculus to be maximized with all 
the other considerations.  But this misses the force of this objection.  A comparative approach to justice 
cannot truly identify what counts as a genuinely stable solution.  Ideal theory is the best tool to determine 
which kinds of solutions will ultimately last. 
234 Schmidtz (2011): 775. 
235 Ibid., 774. 
236 Ibid., 774.  Schmidtz of course does not mean that justice does not exist; rather, he means that there is 
no perfectly just society for us to describe.  Justice simply identifies wrongs and tells us to steer clear from 
them when making improvements. 
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society would be impossible.  In contrast, however, Rawls is articulating a society that is 
governed by the most reasonable principles given certain limitations and circumstances 
in political life that Rawls believes can be subject to an overlapping consensus. 
Framed in this manner, we must understand Schmidtz’s objection as amounting 
to the claim that there simply are no principles of justice that all reasonable persons can 
accept.  However, this might seem to leave us with a bit of a puzzle then, for what is the 
status of Sen’s comparative theory of justice?  Surely, it advocates for principles that 
people should agree upon.  For instance, the comparative approach says the following:  
“We ought to adopt an impartial spectator to rank-order different states of affairs by 
aggregating all considerations of capabilities, rights, liberties, well-being, costs, etc.”  All 
societies that fail to do this would be unjust.  Doesn’t Schmidtz’s skepticism apply to 
Sen’s approach as well? 
However, this would mischaracterize the comparative approach to justice, for 
the recommendation to adopt the perspective of an impartial spectator, coupled with a 
pluralistic account of goods to be maximized, is not justice, but is the method for best 
realizing justice.  For Sen, justice is about realizing states-of-affairs in society that we can 
construct methods to help us achieve.  In this sense, justice would be identified with a 
concrete outcome such as achieving certain capabilities for freedom, literacy, health, 
opportunity and a level of income.  Anyone in society would be able to see and witness 
justice being done, for they would be able to assess the freedoms and capabilities of 
citizens increasing around them. 
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In reply, this is not how Rawls conceives of justice, and it highlights the deep 
chasm that exists between “contractarian deontological”237 and consequentialist 
approaches to political theorizing.  Rawls does not think justice is fundamentally about 
maximizing or aggregating anything, or evaluating states of affairs independent of social 
institutions, even if those states of affairs involve thriving and flourishing persons.  Such 
states-of-affairs may realize other values that are important, but we cannot evaluate 
justice from merely looking at how people’s lives are going. 
Instead, for Rawls, justice is about selecting principles to govern social 
institutions that reasonable persons who regard themselves as free and equal can agree 
upon, provided that these principles take their higher-order interests seriously and 
attempt to fairly distribute the goods that they jointly produce.  Absent these deeply 
social conditions between persons, justice cannot have any application or render any 
verdict. 
Of course, it is this very understanding of justice that Schmidtz and Sen seek to 
reject and replace, as they believe that it is too limited in scope and unnecessarily 
complicates our commonsense judgments about justice.  After all, why can’t we simply 
regard the malnourishment of persons in the world as a grave injustice that demands 
rectification?  Why isn’t the widespread subjection of women simply a fact of injustice, 
regardless of its social origins?   
                                                          
237 Rawls’s view can be characterized as “contractarian deontological.”  See Alexander, Larry. 
“Deontological Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-
deontological/#ConDeoThe [2016, Oct. 17th]. 
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Rawls’s response here of course would be to admit that these are deep problems 
with the world, and that many of them are, in fact, injustices.  However, Rawls would 
also urge us to separate humanitarian urgencies from grave injustices.238  The duties to 
rectify these problems will take a different shape and fall on different agents who are 
responsible for correcting them depending upon the ultimate source of these horrible 
states-of-affairs.  This will involve a complex set of considerations involving capability to 
aid, responsibility for harm, and institutional failings, etc.  I cannot develop a 
comprehensive account of these considerations here, but it is important to emphasize 
that distributive justice is a unique responsibility that is owed to persons in virtue of the 
institutional and social relationships that exist between them, and that a 
consequentialist or comparative approach to justice will fail to capture this important 
normative difference in their proposed solutions to these problems. 
Returning to the challenge at hand, even if Schmidtz and Sen agreed that Rawls’s 
understanding of justice offered an important insight on the relevance of social 
relationships for justice, it still would not settle the deeper objection that agreement is 
not ultimately possible in Rawls’s model, despite all its other virtues.  However, I believe 
that this is mistaken.  To be sure, Rawls recognizes at the later stages of his life that 
agreement would only be possible on a family of liberal conceptions of justice, so Rawls 
only needs to defend the weaker objection that even a more modest overlapping 
                                                          
238 He would also urge us to make a distinction between the duties of global justice which include the duty 
to aid “burdened societies” from the duties of distributive justice.  See LP, 37. 
117 
 
consensus would be impossible.239  However, as I do not have the space to address that 
more fundamental challenge here, I will instead end this section with a different reply to 
Schmidtz’s challenge. 
To deny, as Schmidtz does, that there is an ideal of justice at all is really to say 
that there are no ideal conceptions that are possible at all in our thinking—only 
recommendations that tell us of better or worse ways of doing things.  It would be akin 
to saying, there is no ideal of friendship—no principles that describe its ultimate shape.  
Instead, there are only better or worse ways of being a friend.  Or, it would amount to 
claiming that truth is not a governing principle for the relations between persons.  
Instead, there would only be better or worse ways of conveying information with each 
other. 
This more radical approach to our normative theorizing demands a more 
comprehensive reply than I can provide here, but it is important nonetheless to see how 
significantly it departs from our normative thinking in these matters. 
(d)   Sen’s Comparative Approach 
 Setting aside Schmidtz’s criticisms of ideal theory, we can now evaluate the 
success of Sen’s comparative approach to justice on its own merits.  Recall that Sen 
believes the comparative approach to justice is better equipped to remedy injustice in 
the world for it allows us to rank states of affairs against one another and suggests 
immediate correction of an injustice.  It does so by recommending that we adopt an 
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impartial spectator that asks us to aggregate capabilities for functioning, along with 
rights and liberties and concerns for fairness. These capabilities for functioning are the 
resources, opportunities and tools necessary for citizens to achieve the conditions of 
freedom.240  However, what makes Sen’s approach distinct is his bundling together of 
deontological considerations with consequentialist ones.  He does so because he 
recognizes the plurality of goods that people seek, and wants to safeguard the rights 
and liberties of others if maximization of another metric threatens them. 
 However, according to Freeman, this kind of reformulation is “ad hoc” and “risks 
sacrificing traditional strengths of utilitarianism by obscuring the practical consequences 
of his view.”241 One of the virtues of traditional utilitarianism is that it is able to provide 
a clear metric for weighing conflicts against one another.  But once we attempt to factor 
in deontological elements such as rights and fairness, it will be more difficult to resolve 
the tensions between the different components.242  It is unclear, for instance, how we 
are to weigh the capabilities for freedom for some at the expense of procedural fairness 
for others.   
In reply, Sen admits that there is some invariable “incompleteness” to his 
account.  However, he argues that it is not problematic, for we can sometimes sidestep 
a concern with completeness for the sake of correcting an obvious injustice such as 
                                                          
240 Sen (2009): 18-19, 231-235. 
241 Freeman (2010): 10. 
242 Moreover, Sen would also need to provide a theory regarding what these deontological considerations 
amount to. 
119 
 
“torture.”243  On Sen’s account, despite our inability to make precise determinations as 
to how to weigh personal liberties against other concerns, we can nevertheless 
condemn torture and call for its elimination immediately.244  Rawls’s theory, on Sen’s 
account, does not have this luxury—it must provide a solution to the weighing problem 
before it recommends a solution.  That is, after all, the curse of transcendental theories 
of justice. 
However, there are two problems with this reply.  First of all, it is a 
mischaracterization of Rawls’s position to assume that Rawls’s theory of justice requires 
a precise weighing of the basic liberties against one another at the level of his two 
principles of justice.  Instead, Rawls offers the general requirement that “liberty can be 
restricted only for the sake of liberty itself.”245  What this means is that we can only 
curtail a basic liberty if only to safeguard the “fully adequate scheme” of liberties that 
can be guaranteed for all.246 However, at later stages—at the constitutional, legislative, 
and administrative (judges and citizens) stages—more precise applications can be sorted 
out which will require legal interpretation and information about the particular society 
we live in.  Importantly, Rawls acknowledges that these stages are “often indeterminate:  
                                                          
243 Sen (2006): 224:  “We may acknowledge the possibility that liberties of different persons may, to some 
extent, conflict with each other (so that any fine-tuning of the demands of equal liberty may be hard to 
work out), and yet strongly agree that torturing accused people would be an unjust violation of liberty 
and that this injustice calls for an urgent rectification.” 
244 Ibid., 223-224. 
245 TJ, 214. 
246 JF, 42. 
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it is not always clear which of several constitutions, or economic and social 
arrangements would be chosen.”247  Continuing, Rawls says that  
We must fall back upon a notion of quasi-pure procedural justice: laws 
and policies are just provided that they lie within the allowed range….This 
indeterminacy in the theory of justice is not in itself a defect.  It is what 
we should expect.  Justice as fairness will prove a worthwhile theory if it 
defines the range of justice more in accordance with our considered 
judgments than do existing theories, and if it singles out with greater 
sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid.248 
 
Rawls’s notion of “procedural justice” is important here, for it means that, precisely how 
we weigh and apply the basic liberties in society will largely be procedural.  So long as 
our selection and application of policies abide by the priority of liberty rule, whatever 
results from the good faith implementation of the principles of justice will itself be just.  
What this means is the following:  At the level of ideal theory, we cannot give a direct 
weight to the basic liberties other than they cannot be restricted except for the sake of 
other liberties and that the resulting set of liberties is always a fully adequate scheme 
for all.  So long as this priority is followed and applied transparently to society, the 
resulting institutions, laws and policies will be just.  We cannot expect any more from 
ideal theory than this. 
 If we bring this back to Sen’s criticism, Rawls’s indeterminacy is not as 
objectionable as Sen makes it out to be, for Sen does not see justice as procedural.  
Utilizing Rawls’s method, we can expect to construct a justifiable position on the 
injustice of torture using the four-stage procedural sequence.  Given the unlikelihood 
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that torture is necessary to preserve the other basic liberties, we can safely assume that 
it will be condemned at the end of the sequence.  However, at no point in this 
deliberation must we decide, once and for all, what the precise weight the basic liberties 
must have in a consequentialist rank-ordering sense.  Given the procedural 
understanding of the four-stage sequence, it is unlikely that such a precise weighing will 
be possible or expected from Rawls’s theory.  All justice as fairness aims to accomplish is 
to “single out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid.”249  
Anything more than this sharper focus of the priority of liberty is outside the limits of 
ideal theory. 
We can now turn to the second problem with Sen’s criticism.  Sen’s approach is, 
in fact, more likely to lead to paralysis and indeterminacy in the negative sense than is 
Rawls’s.  Since Sen is a consequentialist, the problem of weighing considerations will be 
much more important for deciding what justice requires.  For, suppose we have a 
conflict between torture and security.  While Sen might argue that it is “obvious” that 
we condemn torture, it is difficult to see how it follows from his consequentialist 
reasoning without a clear account of how to weigh the deontological elements of his 
theory against one another.  This will prevent his theory from providing a solution to the 
problem.  In contrast, Rawls can assert that, so long as the reference to the priority of 
liberty is maintained and is publicly recognized to be a reasonable interpretation of it, 
the resulting outcome will be just.  Hence, given Sen’s complex account of 
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consequentialism, his approach, by a twist of fortune, ends up being the more 
indeterminate when compared to Rawls’s procedural approach. 
(e)   The Purpose of Ideal Theory 
 While the previous sections have attempted to defend Rawls’s ideal theory from 
Sen’s criticisms, it is important not to overstate our case.  There is no reason to think 
that Rawls believes that his conception of justice is all we need when attempting to 
improve justice in society.  We need to consult social and economic theory to aid us in 
implementing, for instance, the difference principle.  Nor does he think that, without an 
ideal theory of justice, improvements in society are literally impossible.  Instead, my 
argument is that it will be much more difficult and haphazard if we do not.  As such, 
strictly speaking, an ideal theory of justice is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
advancing justice in society.  However, this does not show that ideal theory is pointless 
or limited to a mere intellectual exercise.  To see why, consider the following example:  
Suppose we want to perform surgery on a patient.  It is strictly true that, using sterile 
gloves is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful outcome.  It is not necessary 
for it is quite possible to perform surgery on a patient without them, and it is not 
sufficient for you certainly require more than gloves to operate.  But what does this 
philosophical analysis tell us about the importance of sterile gloves?  Not much.  Hence, 
there is a certain limitation in using necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the 
usefulness or value of an undertaking.  By analogy, it is not clear what value there is to 
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be had in using necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of ideal theory. 
 There is, to be fair, a certain intuitive appeal to what Sen is highlighting as an 
apparent problem with our thinking about justice.  After all, if we can readily identify 
serious problems of injustice—malnutrition, famine, lack of access to health and 
education—why do we still need an ideal theory of justice?  Do we not have sufficient 
agreement upon the relevant values of fairness, rights, and well-being to devote our 
intellectual energy to provide solutions to these concrete problems? 
 I will make just two final remarks here.  First, as rehearsed earlier, some persons 
regard the cases of injustice that Sen highlights as humanitarian failings or as 
unfortunate conditions that persons face in life.  That is, they do not see them as 
uniquely problems of justice, but as other types of regrettable features of the world.  As 
such, it is one responsibility of the philosopher to systemize our normative judgments so 
as to provide justification and coherence to our conviction that something is an instance 
of injustice.  If this sounds like an idle proclamation from the ivory tower, one need only 
descend from it to find a cornucopia of different views and perspectives on what the 
appropriate response is to various failings in society.  It is the hope, albeit a distant hope, 
that a theory of justice might be able to provide a vision that organizes and gives force 
to our demands of society and its citizens in the most complete manner possible.  This is 
not to suggest that Sen has not done a great deal towards this goal. His work has been 
invaluable in addressing serious problems in nonideal theory and in the legislative 
124 
 
stages of achieving justice.250  Nevertheless, it is Rawls’s view that a concept of justice 
that is based on the social contract tradition will ultimately resonate with us far more 
than a consequentialist vision will.  I cannot, of course, provide a full argument in 
support of this here, but it is important to recognize that these visions do find their way, 
eventually, to the activists and reformers that change society from below. 
My second remark to Sen’s challenge is to perhaps present the role of ideal 
theory as similar to the work of mathematicians or theoretical physicists and to see the 
task of solving complex problems to be the result of a “division of labor” of sorts 
between various domains of inquiry.  The thought is, just as the work of 
mathematicians251 or physicists can seem “distant” to the task of constructing a bridge 
or building an airplane, it would be a mistake to deem them pointless, for they typically 
provide the impetus for further breakthroughs in development.  In the same way, our 
ideal theories of justice aim to provide the clearest expression of our deepest help 
convictions about how reasonable and rational citizens can live and cooperate with one 
another.  While this more abstract approach appears distant to the relief of widespread 
malnutrition and the subjection of women across the globe, it is the hope that Rawls’s 
principles become further entrenched in our thinking and can be called upon with 
greater regularity and firmness when reform is necessary—either by emphasizing the 
importance of the worst-off members of society, or by highlighting the importance of 
                                                          
250 For Sen’s groundbreaking work on famines, see Sen, Amartya.  Poverty and Famines.  Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1981.  In addition, Sen has greatly reformed economics and utilitarianism to move beyond mere 
preference satisfaction or welfare as the appropriate metric of justice. See Sen, Amartya.  Commodities 
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251 Though, as I shall argue in the final chapter, justice is nevertheless practical as opposed to theoretical. 
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equality of opportunity over concerns of increased GDP.  This shift in our thinking can 
take generations to fully be comprehended, and so it is premature to reject Rawls’s 
model as inert with respect to the demands for justice. 
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Chapter 5:  Justice and Empirical Facts 
I. Introduction 
The central purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between 
principles of justice on the one hand, and empirical facts about human nature and 
society on the other.  One reason to investigate this connection is because it is common 
to think that our normative principles should, in some way, be informed by facts about 
the world.  We might say that, for instance, the fact that human beings are only capable 
of limited altruism should affect our choice of principles to govern behavior and our 
institutions.  We might also think that facts about human psychology and human 
motivational capacities should set the limits for what normative principles can require 
from us.  For instance, as we have already seen in earlier chapters, Rawls regularly 
appeals to facts about our moral psychology and the stability of society to question the 
merits of utilitarianism and to advocate for his own principles.  Indeed, Rawls’s 
commitment to a realistic utopia depends upon on this methodology, as it ensures that 
our normative principles are suitably grounded in the world and establishes that justice 
is fundamentally achievable for creatures such as ourselves. 
However, the method of appealing to facts to argue for or against principles of 
justice has been left unchallenged thus far, despite its prima facie plausibility.  As such, 
it is still an open question whether this methodology for thinking about justice is 
acceptable.  And so, the question that confronts us is the following:  Should our political 
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principles be justified or constrained by empirical facts related to human beings and 
their social life? And, if so, which facts should be relevant, and in what way? 
Numerous philosophers have weighed in on this debate in strikingly diverse ways. 
To illustrate, consider the following claims: 
First, according to John Rawls: 
In justice as fairness the first principles of justice depend upon those 
general beliefs about human nature and how society works….First 
principles are not, in a constructivist view, independent of such beliefs, 
nor…true of all possible worlds.  In particular, they depend on the rather 
specific features and limitations of human life that give rise to the 
circumstances of justice.252 
 
In contrast, we have G.A. Cohen, who asserts the very opposite view: 
The thesis to be defended here contradicts...that our beliefs about 
principles should reflect facts about human nature, such as the fact that 
human beings are liable to pain, or the fact that they are capable of 
sympathy for each other, and also facts about human social organization, 
such as the tendency for people to encounter collective action problems, 
or for societies to be composed of individuals who have diverse interests 
and conflicting opinions.253 
 
Continuing, Cohen claims: 
Facts are irrelevant in the determination of fundamental principles of 
justice.  Facts of human nature and human society…make no difference 
to the very nature of justice itself.254 
 
This foundational disagreement between Rawls and Cohen about the role of facts in our 
conception of justice will serve as the primary focus of this chapter.  However, as the 
                                                          
252 Rawls, John.  “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman, 
Harvard University Press, 1999: 351. Quoted by Samuel Freeman in “Constructivism, Facts and Moral 
Justification,” in Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, eds. Thomas Christiano and John 
Christman, Blackwell Publishing, 2009: 41. 
253 Cohen, G.A. Rescuing Justice and Equality.  Harvard University Press, 2008: 231. 
254 Ibid., 285. 
128 
 
questions before us are quite broad, we would do best to specify more clearly the kinds 
of issues that are at stake in this disagreement. 
In the first section, I consider the question of whether Rawls’s two principles of 
justice are truly the fundamental principles of justice given their reliance on facts, or if, 
as Cohen charges, they are instead “rules of regulation” that depend upon a more 
ultimate principle that is “fact-free.”255  I argue that Cohen misunderstands what 
fundamental principles of justice are and that his charge that all fundamental principles 
must be independent of facts is incorrect.   
In the second section, I discuss a set of facts—limited beneficence and moderate 
scarcity—called the “circumstances of justice,” which are said to be the preconditions 
for the emergence of justice itself.256  Cohen and others have challenged this view, 
arguing that justice does not depend upon factual circumstances at all and that justice 
applies everywhere.   In response, I defend Rawls (and Hume) who assert the 
importance of these facts for determining when justice arises. 
In the third section, I provide a general account of what kinds of facts are 
permitted in the original position when deliberating about principles of justice.  I argue 
that the selection of facts that are relevant are based on several criteria:  stability, 
publicity, generating fair terms of agreement, and even making agreement possible.  
The facts that are included will be general facts about human nature, our higher order 
interests, human psychology, and our empirical understanding of the world and social 
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life.  In addition, I discuss the importance of the veil of ignorance in determining which 
facts are irrelevant for justice.  I argue that our conception of ourselves as free and 
equal requires us to hide certain facts from ourselves and our society to determine what 
justice requires. 
Next, I turn to several criticisms of this account of the importance of facts by G.A. 
Cohen and David Estlund.  Cohen rejects the relevance of facts, arguing that we have a 
concept of justice that is independent of them, and that concerns for notions such as 
stability are “absurd.”257  I reply on behalf of Rawls and emphasize that justice must be, 
at its core, practical for us and that stability must be directly relevant.  David Estlund 
argues that facts about human nature that are permitted in the original position are 
objectionable on the grounds that not all features of human nature are morally 
acceptable and that we should be able to condemn them when they interfere with the 
demands of justice.  I argue that the objectionable elements of human nature are not 
likely to occur in the well-ordered society, and that they are properly regarded as 
contingent features of ourselves, or “special psychologies.”  As such, they would not 
pose problems for stability. 
II.  Are Fundamental Principles of Justice “Fact-Free?” 
 Rawls believes that his two principles of justice—the guarantee of the equal 
basic liberties and the difference principle—are fundamental principles of justice.258  
                                                          
257 Cohen (2008): 327. 
258 Rawls himself does not explicitly use the term “fundamental” to describe his principles in any of his 
texts.  When I apply that term for Rawls, I am merely conveying the underlying idea that they are the 
most important regulating principle for justice.  The term “fundamental” has been imposed on him by G.A. 
130 
 
They are regarded as having the highest authority and providing the final answer as to 
how we should arrange the basic structure of society, which includes the major legal, 
political, and economic institutions of society.259  Rawls’s principles are the consequence 
of a constructed decision procedure, called the original position, which organizes and 
systemizes our considered convictions about justice into one “coherent view.”260  Within 
the original position, we are allowed access to a set of facts about human psychology 
and human nature, as well as general facts about the natural and social sciences to aid 
us in our selection of principles.  After utilizing this procedure to combine our 
considered convictions and our assessment of facts, we are then able to clearly arrive at 
and agree upon the most reasonable principles of justice for us--Rawls’s two ordered 
principles—to regulate the conduct of institutions. 
According to a series of criticisms by G.A. Cohen, however, Rawls has not actually 
described fundamental principles of justice at all.  Because of his reliance on the original 
position and his appeal to a great number of facts inside the procedure, he has only 
found “rules of regulation” or applied principles of justice.261  A truly fundamental 
principle of justice, for Cohen, cannot rely on any other facts or procedures.  The reason 
for this is because, once we understand the justification for why these procedures and 
facts are relevant, we will be able to discover other more basic principles in our 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Cohen and I will employ the term for the purposes of this dialectic with him.  My own view is that we 
should regard Rawls’s two principles of justice as the most reasonable principles of justice.  I believe Rawls 
deliberately avoided the term “fundamental” as it would indicate that he believed his principles were 
“foundationalist” or “self-evident,” neither of which is true. 
259 TJ, 6-7. 
260 TJ, 19. 
261 Cohen (2008): 253. 
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normative architecture.  It is these principles which are genuinely fundamental 
principles of justice, not Rawls’s two principles of justice. 
 Let us provide an example to illustrate Cohen’s thesis and outline his basic 
method.  For instance, let us examine the following common-sense normative principle:  
“One ought to arrive on-time to one’s appointments.”  We might then wonder, is this 
principle a fundamental principle?  Cohen’s basic test for this is to ask what our 
justification for it is.  Suppose I answered with the following reply:  “If we arrive late to 
our appointments, other people will be inconvenienced and their plans will be 
disrupted.”262  Notice that my justification invoked a fact—the fact that people will be 
inconvenienced or that their plans would be disrupted.  Why is this important?  Because, 
whenever our justification for a principle requires a fact to support it, there must always 
be a further principle that explains why the fact is relevant.  To put it in Cohen’s 
language:   
Whenever a fact F confers support on a principle P, there is an 
explanation why F supports P, an explanation of how, that is, F represents 
a reason to endorse P.263   
  
If Cohen is right, then we should be able to discover another more basic principle that 
explains why the fact of inconvenience is important.  What might this principle be?  
Naturally, the following:  “One ought not disrupt the plans of others or cause them 
inconveniences.”  And so, the complete argument and each of its premises would look 
like this: 
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263 Ibid., 236. 
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(1) One ought not disrupt the plans of others or cause them inconveniences. 
(2) If we arrive late to our appointments, other people will be 
inconvenienced and their plans will be disrupted. 
Therefore, 
(3) One ought to arrive on-time to one’s appointments. 
With the argument presented in this way, we can more clearly see that our original 
principle is really the conclusion to an argument that requires support from a fact and a 
more fundamental principle.  And so, our original principle cannot be a fundamental 
principle.  
But now we may then ask, is our new principle a fundamental principle, or is it 
justified by yet another fact and a further principle that explains the relevance of that 
fact?  Let us examine our justification for why we ought not disrupt the plans of others 
or cause them inconveniences.  Suppose I say:  “Disrupting plans and inconveniencing 
others causes harm to people.”264  Notice again that my justification invokes a fact—
that disrupting plans harms people.  Using Cohen’s method, we should be able to invoke 
a prior principle that explains why harm is relevant to the disruption of plans.  This 
further principle might be, for instance, “one ought not harm others.”  With this, we can 
complete our original argument in the same manner as above.  And so on, and so forth. 
We can continue this process only for so long, however.265  Eventually, Cohen 
believes that we will reach a point at which we can no longer appeal to facts to justify 
our principles.  For Cohen, these points lie at the “summit of our convictions” and 
                                                          
264 Again, we may disagree with this justification.  We might argue that it involves the violation of 
promises, etc. 
265 “It is just implausible that a credible interrogation of that form might go on indefinitely: if you disagree, 
try to construct one, one that goes beyond citation of, say, five principles,” Cohen (2008): 237. 
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represent genuine fundamental principles.266 Moreover, these principles must always be 
fact-free, for if ever we invoked a fact for their justification, it would always entail the 
existence of a further principle to explain that fact’s relevance.  Cohen states his 
conclusion as follows: 
A principle can respond to (that is, be grounded in) a fact only because it 
is also a response to a more ultimate principle that is not a response to a 
fact:  accordingly, if principles respond to facts, then the principles at the 
summit of our conviction are grounded in no facts whatsoever.267 
 
Whether or not we believe that the principle “do not harm others” is truly the final 
resting point of our convictions is, of course, up for further investigation which I have 
not tried to recreate here.  Nevertheless, the important lesson is that Cohen’s toolkit 
can be applied to any principle that we proffer as a fundamental principle, including 
principles of justice.  If, in our justification for it, we state a fact, then we can reiterate 
Cohen’s methodology any number of times until we reach the pinnacle of our beliefs—
the top of which will necessarily contain a fact-free fundamental principle.  And so, 
according to Cohen, “every-fact sensitive principle reflects a fact-insensitive 
principle.”268 
 With this argumentative strategy at hand, Cohen then argues that Rawls’s two 
principles of justice cannot possibly be the fundamental principles of justice, for Rawls 
justifies these principles by invoking a plethora of facts to do so.  For instance, let us 
examine some of the arguments that Rawls marshals for the difference principle (DP), 
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according to which inequalities are permitted only if they benefit the least advantaged 
members of society.269   
First, we might justify the DP based on a notion of reciprocity.270  The underlying 
idea would be that persons would not accept a principle, such as the principle of utility, 
in which inequalities might be allowed that required the worst-off members to sacrifice 
their interests for the sake of the majority.  Such a principle would go against the fair 
terms of social cooperation in which citizens work together to produce the goods and 
services of society on terms that are acceptable to all fully cooperative members.  The 
difference principle, in contrast, expresses a commitment to reciprocal relations 
between persons by guaranteeing that any inequalities are for the sake of those who 
are least well-off and that their interests are never merely sacrificed for the greater 
good of others.  As Freeman notes: 
The main argument in favor of the difference principle depends on a 
strong idea of reciprocity (JF §36). In a society structured by the 
difference principle gains to those more advantaged are never made at 
the expense of those less advantaged; instead, any gains to the more 
advantaged always benefit also the least advantaged, and do so more 
than any other alternative measure.271 
 
Second, we may also justify the difference principle as necessary to preserve a 
sense of self-respect among persons, which, according to Rawls, is “the most important 
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271 Freeman, Samuel.  “The Original Position,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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primary good.”272  Self-respect is “a psychological attitude that includes a sense that our 
individual lives matter and are worth living.”273  In a society governed by a principle that 
permits the worst-off members to sacrifice the goods and opportunities necessary to 
pursue a rational life plan, their sense of self-respect in society would be damaged for 
they would not view their contributions as worthwhile or valuable.  The implicit 
message in society for these members would be that they are expendable and that the 
fruits of their labor are not important for society.  It is difficult for citizens subject to 
these outcomes to view their lives as being socially valued.274 
 Returning to Cohen’s argument, we can use his methodology to examine the 
justification of Rawls’s commitment to the difference principle.275  Since the difference 
principle relies upon facts about reciprocity and psychological attitudes about self-
respect, we would be compelled to make the following argument: 
(1) The difference principle best promotes self-respect between persons and 
establishes a relationship of reciprocity. 
(2) We ought to promote self-respect and encourage relationships based on 
reciprocity. 
Therefore, 
(3) We ought to endorse the DP. 
With the argument spelled out in this form, Cohen would argue that premise (2) is the 
more fundamental principle of justice, namely, the principle that “we ought to promote 
                                                          
272 TJ, 386. 
273 Freeman (2009): 46. 
274 Hence, Rawls highlights how self-respect has a social basis: “Self-respect depends upon and is 
encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions, how they work and how people who 
accept these arrangements are expected to (and normally do) regard and treat one another,” PL, 319. 
275 There are, of course other justifications for the difference principle, such as the importance of maximin, 
but I am using the concern for reciprocity and self-respect as examples to illustrate Cohen’s thesis. 
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self-respect and encourage relationships based on reciprocity.”  This would serve to 
show that the DP is not, in fact, the fundamental principle of justice. 
Now, we can investigate this principle further if we think that we must appeal to 
another fact to affirm it.  We might think the following fact is necessary for its 
justification:  “By promoting self-respect and reciprocal relationships between persons, 
we express a commitment to their freedom and equality.”276  And, as such, the fact-free 
principle that justifies this fact would be the following:  “respect the freedom and 
equality of persons.” The summit of our convictions has thus been reached.277 
 Does Cohen’s strategy succeed?  Must Rawls affirm the fact-free principle 
“respect the freedom and equality of persons” as the fundamental principle of justice?  
Are Rawls’s two principles of justice merely applied principles of these more 
fundamental types given their reliance on facts?   
There are at least two ways to respond to this conclusion.  First, I will challenge 
the notion that a fundamental principle of justice must be identical with the summit of 
our normative convictions.  Second, I will argue that our most basic normative 
convictions stand in need of interpretation and cannot stand alone as principles of 
justice. 
                                                          
276 There are other elements related to the importance of self-respect, such as a discussion of the 
importance of stability.  However, for the purposes of this section, I have chosen the commitment to 
freedom and equality as one possibility. 
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following thoughts: “One ought not to cause too much inequality,” and “promote the condition of the 
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468.  Similarly, we promote the condition of the worst-off members not because of a detached concern 
for the poor, but because it would unreasonable to ask the worst-off members to sacrifice gains for 
themselves for the greater gains of others. This would violate our respect for them. 
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(a) Fundamental Principles are Domain Specific 
 To begin, I will attempt to show that our most basic normative convictions do 
not necessarily equate to a fundamental principle within the same domain of inquiry.   
Let me illustrate with an example from the empirical sciences to demonstrate 
this thesis.  Suppose I state Newton’s third law of motion as a fundamental principle of 
classical mechanics.  The third law is as follows:    
When one body exerts a force on a second body, the second body 
simultaneously exerts a force equal in magnitude and opposite in 
direction on the first body.278 
 
Now, using Cohen’s methodology, suppose I demand a justification for the law.  We will 
presumably need to appeal to another fact to do so, such as the following:   
F1: Our observations and measurements of the world corroborate 
Newton’s Third Law of Motion. 
 
And, continuing, implicit in this justification is the further fact: 
 F2:  Our empirical observations represent the reality of the world. 
We can certainly continue this line of inquiry for several more steps, but suppose 
that we have reached the summit of our convictions after probing the justification of 
our physical laws in this manner.279   The important point here is to notice what type of 
claim we have arrived at.  This certainly does not look like a fundamental principle of 
motion, or of physics.  After all, what would it mean to say that “our empirical 
                                                          
278 Wikipedia contributors. "Newton’s Laws of Motion." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web. 12 April 
2017 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_laws_of_motion>. 
279 Further steps will inevitably involve claims about induction, or, in the case of Hume, a claim about the 
relevance of custom.  Nevertheless, it is not necessary to resolve the problem of induction for the 
purposes of my argument here, which is simply to demonstrate that, wherever we end up, the principle 
will be nothing like a fundamental principle of physics. 
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observations represent the reality of the world” is a fundamental principle of physics?  
Instead, it looks like a principle of justification that we must implicitly endorse in our 
commitments to fundamental physical laws.   
In other words, just because we have a principle—like a fundamental principle of 
physics—that requires further principles to establish it, such as an epistemological or 
justificatory principle, it does not mean that the status of those principles is no longer 
fundamental.   
If this is true, then what would it mean for something to be classified as a 
fundamental principle, then?  Put simply, it must be the most basic principle within a 
particular domain of inquiry.  For physics, a fundamental principle should be the 
ultimate principle or principles that describe the interactions of matter.  The claim that 
“our empirical observations represent the reality of the world” offers no such 
description, and so is not a fundamental principle of physics, even though it is needed to 
justify those principles. 
 Let us apply this conclusion to Cohen’s criticism of Rawls.  By parity of reasoning, 
we should be able to defend Rawls by arguing that the “difference principle” and the 
commitment to “respect the freedom and equality of persons” are not the same type of 
principle.  Even though the latter is required in our justification for the former, it does 
not follow that “respect the freedom and equality of persons” is a fundamental principle 
of justice.   
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According to Rawls, justice is about what principles we should adopt to regulate 
our institutions that determine the distribution of resources and the assignment of 
rights and liberties given that persons see themselves as free and equal and understand 
society as a fair system of social cooperation.280  The principle “respect the freedom and 
equality of persons” is not a principle that, on its own, can settle the central problem of 
justice.  The freedom and equality of persons is instead a normative conception that we 
start with and must then be interpreted and reflected in our principles of justice and the 
selection procedure for determining them.   
Rawls’s two principles of justice, by contrast, do address the central problem of 
justice, and should be interpreted as the most basic and fundamental principles we can 
appeal to in that domain.281  As such, these different principles operate at separate 
levels and should therefore not be compared against one another as suitable candidates 
for a fundamental principle of justice.282   
One objection we might make here is that “respect the freedom and equality of 
persons” is within the same domain as the difference principle—after all, they are both 
normative.  However, one consequence of this reply is that we must then deny that 
justice is a separate domain of inquiry from the domain of the normative in general.  
                                                          
280 JF, 7-8.  
281 Freeman (2009) notes:  “What makes a substantive principle of conduct fundamental is not that it is 
self-evident or otherwise without normative justification, but that it is the ultimate standard for 
determining conduct and there are no more basic principles of which it is an application,” p. 44.    
282 For a related discussion of this distinction, see Freeman (2009): 42-46. 
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Rawls certainly believes that justice involves a distinct form of practical reasoning, one 
that is not simply the result of direct deductive reasoning from basic moral principles.283   
Let me illustrate this disagreement with another analogy with the sciences.  We 
might think that physics and biology, despite being in the same category of the 
“empirical,” may still be separate domains of inquiry and subject to different principles.  
That is, just as there are fundamental principles of biology, there are also distinct 
fundamental principles of physics, even if we admit that biological principles depend 
upon principles of physics.  Of course, this is controversial and involves debates within 
the philosophy of science about the problem of reductionism and the ontological status 
of laws of nature.284  Nevertheless, insofar as we are inclined to see the independence 
of the political from the moral, or the independence of the different subjects of the 
sciences, we should not accept Cohen’s demonstration as a successful refutation of 
Rawls’s fundamental principles of justice. 
(b) Our Basic Normative Convictions Must be Interpreted 
 I now wish to examine the second reply to Cohen’s argument which involves 
Rawls’s own stated understanding of how the justification for his principles of justice is 
                                                          
283 Cohen’s methodology may perhaps unearth the fundamental principle of justice within a 
consequentialist moral framework more perspicuously, but Rawls would reject that understanding of 
justice.  I will defend this in the next section. 
284 For a general discussion of these problems see McShea, Daniel and Alex Rosenberg.  Philosophy of 
Biology. Routledge, 2008: 32-64.  For a discussion of how all scientific disciplines face the same problems 
of finding truly generalizable laws see Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University 
Press, 1983.  And for a defense of the reality of biology “laws” in the form of stable generalizations see 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter.  Philosophy of Biology.  Princeton University Press, 2014: 11-28.  If we dislike the 
example with biology, we may perhaps use chemistry instead. 
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supposed to work. Let me begin with two quotes from Rawls near the final pages of A 
Theory of Justice. 285   Rawls says: 
The principles of justice are not derived from the notion of respect for 
persons….it is precisely these ideas that call for interpretation.286 
   
Rawls continues:   
 
Once the conception of justice is at hand, however, the ideas of respect 
and human dignity can be given a more definite meaning.  Among other 
things, respect for persons is shown by treating them in ways that they 
can see to be justified….The theory of justice provides a rendering of 
these ideas but we cannot start out from them.  There is no way to avoid 
the complications of the original position, or of similar construction, if our 
notions of respect and the natural basis of equality are to be 
systematically presented.287   
 
There are several points that are important in these passages.  First, Rawls does 
not view the principles of justice as being “derived” from notions of respect or 
equality.288  Instead, Rawls requires that these concepts be “interpreted” and 
represented in some way.  Otherwise, we are left without a clear meaning of these 
concepts and little can be deduced from them on their own.  To illustrate, many 
conceptions of justice—utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian—assert the importance of 
respecting the freedom and equality of persons as foundational for their normative 
frameworks.  However, it would be somewhat bizarre to claim that all utilitarians, 
libertarians and egalitarians therefore agree on the fundamental principles of justice 
simply because they all recognize their endorsement of the fact-free normative 
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286 TJ, 513.  
287 TJ, 513, emphasis added. 
288 We should expect that the same would hold for freedom as well. 
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commitment to respect the freedom and equality of persons.   After all, if everyone 
already agrees, then what is everyone debating about, exactly?289 
 Instead, we should investigate how each conception of justice interprets these 
more basic normative judgments and represents them.  For instance, many utilitarians 
represent the commitment to equality by imagining an impartial spectator as 
encompassing everyone’s desires and acting upon them as one unified legislator.290  
This procedure reflects the commitment that each person’s desires should be counted 
for equally.  Hobbes, on the other hand, represents the freedom and equality of persons 
by describing each person as equally capable of destroying one another in a state of 
nature in which there are no laws or rules in place to constrain behavior.  Rawls, in 
contrast, reflects these concepts through the veil of ignorance in the original position.  
The OP represents the freedom of persons by assuming that all persons have an interest 
in developing their capacity to pursue and, upon reflection, refine their conception of 
the good.  It expresses their equality by having each person represented in the choice 
situation “symmetrically,” by concealing morally arbitrary factors about themselves, in 
addition to assuming that each person has an equal voice in the formulation of a public 
conception of justice that each person can endorse.291 
                                                          
289 Cohen’s answer here is that everyone is debating about how to apply principles of justice to the world.  
But would we say that physicists agree on the fundamental principles of physics and merely disagree 
about how to apply the principle, “our empirical observations mirror the world?”  Perhaps, but it is 
difficult to see what is gained by this argumentative strategy. 
290 Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford University 
Press, 1976. 
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Given these diverse ways in which freedom and equality are represented in 
different methodological devices, we can see how each perspective highlights different 
fundamental features of persons: Hobbes believes the core of who we are is best 
represented by our self-interested behavior in the absence of a sovereign authority; 
utilitarians believe that the person is fundamentally defined by their desires whatever 
they turn out to be; and Rawls believes that we are persons endowed with “two 
fundamental powers” to (1) pursue a rational plan of life and (2) develop and act upon a 
sense of justice in which we recognize our responsibility for our own ends and endorse 
the necessity to govern our socially cooperative activity on terms that are reasonable to 
all.292 
 This is, of course, not the place for a full argument about the merits of these 
different approaches.  Our main task here is to demonstrate how the commitment to 
the freedom and equality of persons, on its own, cannot settle the question of justice by 
means of a kind of “derivation,” as Rawls says.  These ideas must be interpreted and 
represented into the most appropriate model and tested against numerous other 
considered convictions that we have.  How we select which decision procedure to use—
the original position or the impartial spectator—will rely upon these other judgments 
that we have, including input from other facts about our moral architecture.  It does not 
make sense to regard any of these elements as the most fundamental aspect of justice, 
for they all operate at various levels of our judgment.  Rawls believes that it is the 
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conclusion to this “reflective equilibrium” between all the elements that determines 
what the principles of justice ultimately will be.293 
In reply, Cohen rejects Rawls’s holistic approach to justice,294 and he believes 
that, despite Rawls’s insistence on the importance of reflective equilibrium, if we probe 
his architectonic theory deeply enough, a fundamental principle will emerge that 
ultimately informs us how to justify all the parts.  To illustrate, Cohen first presses us to 
articulate the basis upon which we select the original position.  He states:   
We have to reckon not only with the principles justified by the original 
position procedure, but also with the principles that justify that procedure.  
Procedure is not ultimate: as Rawls says, not everything is constructed.  
And the reason why the constructive procedure is judged appropriate is, 
to put the matter simply, that it reflects the ‘conception’ of persons as 
free and equal.  But that way of conceiving them either embodies or 
presupposes a fact-insensitive principle.295 
 
It is clear that Cohen acknowledges that a conception of free and equal persons will 
serve as the baseline in our determination of the original position.  Indeed, he argues 
that it “embodies” and “presupposes” this “fact-insensitive principle.”  So far so good.  
We have already addressed this concern.  However, he then argues that “it is not 
obvious” what justifies the conception of free and equal persons and how this 
conception yields our judgements about the original position, and ultimately our 
principles of justice.296  Presumably, Cohen believes that there may be yet another fact-
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free principle that answers these questions, and that, once unearthed, we will be able to 
fully justify Rawls’s methodology. 
 In order to buttress the reply to Cohen’s challenge that I have already provided 
above, I will attempt to show, in two parts, that Cohen’s pressings will not yield fruitful 
results, and that fundamental principles of justice are not of the foundationalist nature 
that Cohen asserts them to be.  First, I will attempt to briefly unearth the importance of 
our conception of ourselves as free and equal according to Rawls’s “Kantian 
Interpretation” in his Theory of Justice. 297  Second, I will turn to Rawls’s more limited 
approach to the conception of the person that is political in nature, as developed in 
Political Liberalism.298  Whichever approach we use, the fundamental principle that lies 
at Cohen’s “summit” will not be a fundamental principle of justice. 
 (c) The Kantian Argument 
According to Rawls, the selection of the original position is “based upon Kant’s 
notion of autonomy,”299 and that “a person is acting autonomously when the principles 
of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature 
as a free and equal rational being.”300  When we enter the original position, the veil of 
ignorance hides the contingent features of ourselves, such as our particular ends or 
desires, so that when we rationally choose principles, we are not acting heteronomously.  
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That is, we are not selecting principles based on our contingent ends.301  Instead, we are 
selecting principles based upon our fundamental capacity to pursue a rational plan of 
life, whatever it happens to be.302  As such, in the original position, we are all equals, 
blinded by our particular ends, and we are acting freely, as we are not bound by them in 
our selection of principles.303   
Finally, in addition to having the fundamental capacity to pursue a rational plan 
of life, we have the desire to act upon a sense of justice.  For Rawls, this desire “derives 
from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely free and equal 
rational beings with a liberty to choose.”304  In this sense, our sense of justice is based 
upon our desire to express who we fundamentally are when we select and employ our 
principles of justice.  We do not want our principles to reflect who we might 
contingently be, constrained by our particular aims or desires.305  We aim for principles 
that express our fundamental nature.306 
We may then present the entire argument as follows: 
 
                                                          
301 Rawls says:  “The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of…the specific things that he 
happens to want, ” TJ, 222. 
302 This is how Rawls derives the concern for the primary goods—as they are the goods that anyone would 
rationally want, whichever final ends we select for ourselves. TJ, 223. 
303 Rawls says:  “Thus men exhibit their freedom, their independence from the contingencies of nature 
and society, by acting in ways they would acknowledge in the original position,” TJ, 225. 
304 TJ, 225. 
305 When we act unjustly, Rawls says:  “We have acted as though we belonged to a lower order, as though 
we were a creature whose first principles are decided by natural contingencies,” TJ, 225. 
306 We can contrast this approach with the utilitarian conception of the person which decides principles of 
justice, at its core, heteronomously.  Even though the impartial spectator represents a kind of equality 
between persons, it does not represent their freedom, for the persons are selecting principles based upon 
everyone’s particular aims or desires.  For Rawls, the move from a single person’s desires to all persons’ 
desires does not solve the problem.  It then just describes a “kingdom of ends” that is heteronomous. 
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(1) We are fundamentally autonomous beings who are free and equal. 
(2) We desire to select principles of justice that represent our essential 
aims, not our contingent ones. 
(3) The Original Position utilizes the veil of ignorance to represent 
everyone equally and allows us to select principles in accordance with 
our freedom. 
Therefore, 
(4) The Original Position is the best methodological device for 
determining principles of justice. 
(5) The Difference Principle is the only principle that persons would agree 
to in the Original Position to regulate the distribution of resources.307 
Therefore, 
(6) The Difference Principle is a fundamental principle of justice. 
 
This is, of course, a long and complex argument, with still yet more premises to be filled 
in.308  Nevertheless, the important stages of the argument have been filled in for our 
purposes of answering Cohen’s objection.   
Returning to Cohen and his fact-finding mission, what would the fundamental, 
fact-free principle of justice be in this long chain of argument?  I believe Cohen must 
claim that the fundamental principle required to justify the entire string of premises 
would be as follows:   
                                                          
307 This argument requires arguments that we have already outlined earlier about the importance of 
reciprocity and self-respect. 
308 There are still the “circumstances of justice” and other facts about human nature and society that are 
needed to determine what the primary goods will be.  I will address the circumstances of justice and 
claims about human nature later.  In addition, because of Rawls’s commitment to “holism,” it will 
generally be very difficult to list all the reasons and considerations that go into the justification for his 
principles of justice.  I have aimed only to focus on the most central aspects for the purposes of Cohen’s 
argument, leaving other elements to be filled in.  This should also serve to demonstrate why Rawls does 
not generally regard his principles of justice to be based strictly on a deductive proof.  Instead, Rawls 
thinks we can at most provide “the balance of reasons” in favor of a particular conception, JF, 133-134.  
However, Rawls does aim to be able to “present the parties’ reasoning” as “fully deductive, a kind of 
moral geometry,” though he admits nevertheless that “our reasoning is highly intuitive and falls far short 
of that ideal,” JF, 133. 
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P:  We ought to represent ourselves as we essentially are and select principles 
of justice that reflect our fundamental nature. 
 
Why is this the fundamental fact-free principle?  Because when we ask what justifies the 
claim that we ought to select principles based upon our autonomy, we must reply with 
the claim that we “desire to express most fully what we are.”309  And so, we arrive at the 
pinnacle of our normative judgements to represent ourselves as who we fundamentally 
are.310 
It should be apparent that, from the previous arguments outlined before, the 
same kinds of objections will be relevant here, so Cohen’s instance that we probe the 
depths of our normative judgments will still yield principles that stand in need of 
interpretation.  For in what sense is the principle “we must represent ourselves as we 
essentially are” a fundamental principle of justice?  Does it adequately serve as a public 
criterion with which to organize our institutions?  Can it be appealed to as having final 
authority in the distribution of resources?  Or is it simply too vague and indeterminate 
on its own?  These considerations should give us pause with respect to whether our 
most basic normative convictions are identical with fundamental principles of justice. 
                                                          
309 TJ, 225.  Rawls says:  “The parties…have a desire to express their nature as rational and equal 
members…with precisely this liberty to choose.” 
310 Of course, we may object that this makes Rawls’s entire project heteronomous after all, as it is based 
on a desire.  But this desire is really the sense of justice.  Without it, we could not be the kinds of rational 
and moral beings that we are.  To be clear, these arguments are notoriously complex, and relate to 
whether Kant’s own demonstration of why freedom is valuable can be made without an appeal to human 
desires.  For a discussion of these problems see Guyer, Paul.  Kant.  Routledge, 2006.  For a different 
criticism of Rawls’s Kantian interpretation as being heteronomous, see Johnson, Oliver.  “The Kantian 
Interpretation,” Ethics vol. 85, no. 1 (1974): 58-66.  The central argument here is that Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance does not accurately reflect the freedom of persons because they are still selecting principles 
based on desires and wants—namely, the desire to attain primary goods and pursue a conception of the 
good. 
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It may be objected here that Kant was surely able to derive fundamental 
normative principles from the autonomy of human beings.  After all, the categorical 
imperative is supposed to be the supreme principle of morality and is implicit in our 
fundamental nature as free and rational creatures.  From it, we are able to derive both 
our moral duties and the doctrine of Right.  However, Rawls parts ways with Kant in this 
regard: 
The freedom of pure intelligences…are outside the range of the theory.  
Kant may have meant his doctrine to apply to all rational beings as such 
and therefore that men’s social situation in the world is to have no role in 
determining the first principles of justice.  If so, this is another difference 
between justice as fairness and Kant’s theory.311 
 
Rawls, instead, attempts to “recast” Kant’s theory “within the scope of an empirical 
theory.”312  This is perhaps because Rawls must have rejected Kant’s account of justice 
as being simply an application of the categorical imperative to the empirical world.  Or, 
he may not have believed that synthetic a priori judgments were possible, or that Kant 
could not sufficiently demonstrate that the value of freedom was not based on human 
desire.  Whatever his reasons, if Rawls rejected these elements, then it would make 
sense that he believed that the fundamental nature of justice would have to be 
empirical.  There would be no other way to proceed.  And if this is true, then Cohen’s 
                                                          
311 TJ, 226. 
312 TJ, 227. 
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strategy to unearth fact-free principles will eventually lead to a dead end that will 
require the input from facts to allow us to proceed any further.313   
(d) The Argument from Political Liberalism 
 I mentioned that there were two forks we might take in addressing Cohen’s 
challenge—to either explore the full Kantian strategy, or to reject it and aim for a more 
modest approach based on the arguments from Political Liberalism.  Let us examine that 
second fork now. 
 There are numerous problems with the more ambitious approach to justify 
Rawls’s conception of justice in an ideal of autonomy and practical agency,314 the most 
important of which that it was not sustainable to premise the conception of the person 
on a comprehensive doctrine.315  Rawls believed that there would not be legitimate 
grounds for agreement in an overlapping consensus if his conception of justice required 
the adoption of a singular account of practical agency as part of the fundamental nature 
of persons.  Rawls realized this, and, as Paul Guyer points out:  “Rawls may have been 
wise to eschew any attempt to demonstrate that actual human beings must adopt the 
conception of themselves from which his constructivist justification of the principles of 
                                                          
313 Cohen may argue that it is good to know where our dead-ends are (which is really another name for 
the summit of our judgments), but these won’t be fundamental principles of justice; they will be the 
starting points from which to build a theory of justice.   
314 However, for a contemporary attempt to rescue Kant (and Rawls) from these difficulties, see Korsgaard, 
Christine.  Self-Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2009. 
315 Rawls says:  “Kant’s doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy has a 
regulative role for all of life.  This makes it incompatible with the political liberalism of justice as fairness.” 
PL, 99. 
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justice begins.”316  Instead, Rawls addresses his conception of justice only to people who 
already conceive themselves in this way. Guyer continues:  “Rawls’s entire argument for 
the principles of justice is analytical, beginning with a concept that may or may not be 
accepted by any actual human being or beings,”317 and is “aimed only at making clear to 
such people what principles of justice they need to adopt in order to be able to live a 
social life that conforms to the conception of a person that each person in a group of 
such people wishes be realized for all.”318 
In other words, Rawls’s constructivism is limited to the arguments that follow 
from a conception of the person. The conception of the person is simply taken as 
given—which for Rawls means in Political Liberalism, contained within the liberal 
democratic political culture.319  As such, it is true that, insofar as people reject this 
conception of the person, they will not be inclined to see Rawls’s methodology as 
particularly gripping or applicable to them.  This does not mean, of course, that we 
cannot provide arguments in its favor, or “present it in a very attractive light.”320  Rather, 
it merely means that it “cannot be derived from any non-controvertible premise that 
any human being must accept.”321   
                                                          
316 Guyer, Paul.  “Constructivism and Self-Constitution,” in Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive 
Essays, ed. by Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu. Oxford University Press, 2013: 178-179. 
317 Ibid., 178. 
318 Ibid., 176. 
319 “The basis of this view lie in fundamental ideas of the public political culture,” PL, 97. 
320 Guyer (2013): 180. 
321 Ibid., 180.  This will provide even more problems for Cohen, as it means that the attempt to derive 
principles from non-controvertible or self-evident premises will not be possible. 
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For Rawls, the reasons that we usher in its favor will be based on a variety of 
implicit considered convictions and judgements that citizens make in liberal democratic 
societies about the centrality of their conception of the good, their capacity to act upon 
a sense of justice, and their conception of society as based on fair terms of 
cooperation.322  In addition, there will be the recognition of reasonable pluralism and 
the burdens of judgment that characterize democratic life, coupled with the realization 
that one cannot live in a political society unified by a single conception of the good 
without unacceptable state coercion.323  Importantly, these considerations do not rely 
upon a particular conception of the good, and can be endorsed in an overlapping 
consensus among members within society.324  When we put all the arguments and 
considerations together, we should arrive at a political conception of the person, which 
should be seen as the most feasible way to provide coherence to our judgements as 
citizens in liberal democratic societies.   
What implications does this more modest method of justification have for 
Cohen’s strategy against Rawls?  Framed in this way, the fact-free fundamental principle 
of justice would then have to be a complex multitude of considerations all taken 
together that mutually reinforce each other.  Perhaps something of the following: 
P2: We ought to conceive of ourselves in the most reasonable way—as 
one that provides coherence to our judgements within a liberal 
democratic society and as one that can serve as the basis for an 
overlapping consensus. 
                                                          
322 PL, 93. 
323 Rawls says:  “The burdens of judgement set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others…It is 
unreasonable for us to use political power to repress comprehensive views.” PL, 61. 
324 PL, 101. 
153 
 
To test whether this is truly fundamental, we may again ask if there are any facts that 
are required to affirm it.  However, as we test the different elements—the limitation on 
liberal democratic societies, the concern for coherence, or the desire for an overlapping 
consensus—we will find that there will be an interconnecting web of considerations, 
none of which is alone at the pinnacle of our convictions.  Instead, we will uncover the 
importance of justification to others and securing the basis for rational and reasonable 
agreement; or, on my own view, a view of justice as realistically utopian.325   
However, these are distinct considered convictions that we have, and it would be 
a mischaracterization of them to consider them fundamental principles of justice.  We 
can return to an illustration with the sciences to conclude this section.  If we ask, “What 
is the aim of physics?,” we are not asking for the fundamental principles of physics, such 
as the Principles of String Theory or Einstein’s Principles of Relativity.  We would answer 
that physics is about discovering the laws that underlie physical reality.  We may also 
ask, “What are the methodological constraints on physics?”  We may answer that we 
should utilize the scientific method to devise principles that are capable of being tested 
through observation.  And finally, we may ask, “What are some virtues of fundamental 
principles of physics?”  And we could say that principles ought to be subject to 
Ockham’s Razor and should be parsimonious and simplistic.  As we can see, none of 
                                                          
325 At some level, however, Rawls will not see the importance of finding a single conviction that justifies all 
the others downstream, for Rawls does not see foundationalism as the appropriate method of normative 
theorizing and instead relies on reflective equilibrium and a coherentism about justification.  See JF, 29-32.      
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these claims should be confused with fundamental principles of physics which are those 
that ultimately describe reality. 
  Similarly, when we ask, “What is the aim of justice?,” we could answer that it is 
to devise principles to regulate the institutions of society that are justifiable to others.  If 
we ask, “What are the methodological constrains on justice?”  We might say that we 
should utilize ideal theory to construct a choice-model to test theories of justice against 
one another.  And finally, if we ask, “What are some virtues of fundamental principles of 
justice?”  We might say that there are many, and include:  the “formal constraints on 
the principles of right,”326 the idea that principles should generate agreement, and that 
they should be realistically utopian and feasible for us.327 
 As we can see, none of these answers are properly “fundamental principles of 
justice,” even if some might be fact-free and sit at the summit of our normative 
convictions.  To be sure, we might disagree about these more basic elements of justice, 
just as there is disagreement about whether simplicity is a true virtue of scientific 
theories.  But we should not confuse disagreement about virtues or methodology with 
disagreement about fundamental principles of justice.  As such, Cohen’s argumentative 
strategy fails to dethrone Rawls’s principles of justice from their status as fundamental 
                                                          
326 These are: generality, universality, publicity, capability of ordering claims, and finality.  See TJ, 112-118. 
327 We may compare this approach with Rawls’s own description in Justice as Fairness where he describes 
the “Four Roles of Political Philosophy,” which are:  (1) to formulate the moral basis for agreement to 
resolve deep conflicts, (2) to “orient” ourselves within society and understand ourselves as having a 
“certain political status,” (3) to reconcile ourselves to the world and “accept and affirm” society positively, 
and (4) to provide a basis for hope through developing the idea of a realistic utopia.  See JF, 1-5.  
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principles.  It merely serves to highlight all the different justificatory elements and 
reasons that underlie them. 
Leaving Cohen’s more grand strategy behind, we can now consider other 
arguments that challenge Rawls’s use of facts to determine his principles of justice.  
Briefly though, it is important to emphasize the limited scope of the arguments 
presented against Cohen thus far.  I have not demonstrated yet that facts should be 
included in our determination of principles of justice.  I have only shown that Cohen’s 
Socratic method of questioning fails to unearth the true fundamental principles of 
justice.  In other words, the current section addressed the following objection:  If you 
rely upon a fact to justify a principle of justice, you must also acknowledge a fact-free 
principle that is a more fundamental principle of justice.  I resisted that conditional 
argument.  In contrast, the next sections will address a different criticism:  Why is Rawls 
even relying on certain facts in the first place to justify principles of justice?  And so, the 
following discussion will be devoted to addressing specific challenges to Rawls’s use of 
facts, including the “circumstances of justice,” facts about human nature, and facts 
related to the stability requirement on our conception of justice. 
III.  Rawls and the Relevance of Facts 
 Empirical facts play a diverse role in the overall structure of Rawls’s work and in 
his justification of his principles of justice.  They are generally appealed to in three 
separate domains:  first, facts play a role in determining when concerns of justice even 
arise in society--called the circumstances of justice; second, facts appear in the Original 
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Position (and ‘disappear’ behind the veil of ignorance) in order to justify the principles of 
justice over alternative conceptions; and third, facts appear in the final stage of 
argument when Rawls tests his principles of justice for stability.  I will begin with a 
discussion of the circumstances of justice before considering the other stages of Rawls’s 
arguments for the principles of justice in which facts play a role. 
(a) The Circumstances of Justice 
According to Rawls, “the first principles of justice depend…on the rather specific 
features and limitations of human life that give rise to the circumstances of justice.”328  
The circumstances of justice are those features that are preconditions for the problem 
of justice to arise in a society.  These are not features that determine what the content 
of the principles of justice are, but rather, features that determine when justice itself 
emerges.   
Rawls states that his understanding of the circumstances of justice does not 
depart much from David Hume’s treatment of the idea in his Treatise of Human Nature 
and the Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, so it is natural to begin with Hume’s 
discussion. 329    
                                                          
328 KC, 351. 
329 However, Rawls does expand upon the idea to include the fact of reasonable pluralism and the 
burdens of judgment.  See TJ, 110 and JF, 84.  Rawls also divides his discussion into the “objective” and 
“subjective” circumstances of judgment, TJ, 109-110.  With respect to Hume, there are also two points of 
difference worth mentioning.  First, Hume regards justice as a virtue of persons rather than of institutions.  
Second, for Hume, justice is fundamentally about respect for the rules of property and for promise-
keeping.   However, for Rawls, justice is fundamentally about setting the rules for institutions that are 
necessary for social cooperation.  Hence, the circumstances of justice are those preconditions that make 
social cooperation possible.  See Hume, David.  An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L.A. 
Selby-Bigge, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975.  Hume, David.  A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-
Bigge, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1978. 
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(i) Limited Resources and Moderate Scarcity 
 
The first feature among the circumstances of justice is the existence of limited 
resources, or moderate scarcity.   Before justice can arise, there must be sufficient 
resources to meet the needs of persons.  However, resources cannot be so plentiful 
such that there are no genuine conflicts of interests between people.  For instance, if 
resources poured from the sky like manna from heaven, or if persons could merely 
extend their hands into an infinite wellspring of nectar and ambrosia to satisfy their 
thirst and appetite, there would be no need for principles of justice to determine the 
rules of property.  People would simply take what they required without the need to 
assert ownership to one another.  As Hume asks: “Why call this object mine, when upon 
the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is 
equally valuable?”330   
One might object that certain things like Shakespearean Sonnets would require 
rules to protect them even in a state of abundance, since one could not acquire 
something of ‘equal value’ in nature.  Hence, we might still require rules to govern 
resources generated through “artifice,” even if we did not require rules to govern purely 
natural resources such as food, water and shelter.  A possible reply could be that either 
that nature was so abundant as to naturally produce objects of wonder that satiated our 
artistic needs, or that the value of taking a Sonnet from another person would be close 
                                                          
330 Hume (1975): 184. 
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to zero, for one would have no reason not to share the sonnet with you, assuming it is 
infinitely reproducible.331 
Instead of an absolute abundance of resources in society, we many next consider 
whether justice would apply if there was an extreme dearth of resources.  In this 
scenario, we are to imagine “such want of all common necessities, that the utmost 
frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the 
whole from extreme misery.”332 Here, neither nature nor the fruits of cooperative 
activity would sufficiently provide for the necessities of life.  In this scenario, the rules of 
property would appear to be fruitless, for there would be no disposition to follow them.  
Whatever it was that people needed in this state of scarcity would simply be taken.  For 
instance, in a shipwreck, people are generally regarded as entitled to take whatever 
property that was left behind in order to ensure their survival.333 
Some philosophers, such as Brian Barry, have criticized Hume’s circumstances of 
justice as improperly setting the preconditions of justice with respect to scarcity.334  
Barry argues that, even within a condition of extreme scarcity where resources could 
                                                          
331 Some lingering problems might persist when dealing with resources such as time, which, even in a 
state of pure abundance would be a cost placed upon us if we had to take the time to extend our hands to 
reclaim more food if someone took it from you.  And we may care about time because we suffer from 
eventual bodily death that even a great abundance could not counteract.  A strategy here would either be 
to stipulate that time was also in great abundance (we are immortal), or that the time required to replace 
any lost resource would be close to zero. 
332 Ibid., 186. 
333 See Hope, Simon. “The Circumstances of Justice,” Hume Studies vol. 35, no. 2 (2010): 130.  
334 See Hope (2010): 129, for a deeper exploration of these issues.  See Barry, Brian.  Theories of Justice.  
Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989.  Also see Nussbaum, Marta.  Frontiers of Justice. Belknap Press, 2006: 157.  
Nussbaum argues that justice arises “whenever human beings are around,” and that the need to realize 
human capacities is always important, irrespective of whether scarcity exists.  See Hope (2010): 131 for a 
fuller account of this objection. 
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not satisfy the basic needs of persons, there could still be principles of rationing.335  For 
instance, if society were facing a famine or a drought, there could still be restrictive 
principles that prevented people from simply taking whatever it was that they needed.  
This is because people recognize that maintaining the rule of law would outweigh the 
chaos that would ensue if societal rules governing property broke down. 
Another analogy one could make to illustrate this point is to examine the 
problem that hospitals face when allocating scarce resources to persons who need 
organs.  Patients recognize that there are insufficient organs to meet the needs of all; 
and yet, we do not generally see patients attempting to steal organs from others or 
jump the queue when their time runs out.  Rather, patients themselves recognize that 
there are binding social rules to determine who gets treatment first, even in conditions 
where patients stand to suffer or die.  Using these examples, one could argue that 
Hume’s circumstances of justice are incorrect, for there are, in fact, problems of justice 
that arise even within conditions of extreme scarcity. 
Simon Hope’s reply to this worry is to state that these examples are simply 
“special cases” that arise in society, and are not genuine examples of scarcity that Hume 
had in mind. Hope argues: “to make Hume’s point clear, we must imagine the entire 
domain of agents facing potential death.”336  So, instead of a local or temporary scarcity, 
we should imagine that the entire world was impoverished such that no social 
                                                          
335 Barry (1989): 155-56.  See also Hubin, Clayton D. “The Scope of Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
19 (1979): 3–24, 9–10. As quoted in Hope (2010): 129. 
336 Hope (2010): 129. 
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cooperation or efficient distribution could forestall the immediate threat of death. It is 
in this scenario where no rules governing the institution of property would arise.  People 
would simply take whatever they could find, wherever they could find it. 
Some may still be unconvinced by this line of reasoning.  Utilitarians, for instance, 
may argue that, despite the extreme scarcity, there can still be an inequality of pain that 
members can suffer in this cruel state of affairs.  We might think, for example, that an 
adult should nonetheless distribute and prioritize resources to children or others who 
were sick or injured.  On this view, while it might be true that everyone stands to suffer 
and die, it does not follow that anything goes.  There would still be constraints on our 
behavior that relate to the distribution of pain and suffering. 
In reply, we should note that neither Hume nor Rawls believes that justice is the 
only constraint on our behavior.  Hume, for instance, holds that persons still have 
natural virtues such as benevolence that may constrain what people do to one another, 
even during times of scarcity.  For example, if I notice someone at a dried-up river 
securing one final cup of water to quench his thirst, I may naturally be unwilling to pry 
the cup from his hands, even if I needed water myself.  This unwillingness would be 
explained by natural virtues, rather than by considerations of justice, and would be the 
only limiting constraint on my behavior.  
To provide another example, Rawls may argue that we have duties of rescue if 
we happen to find ourselves in favorable circumstances to help another.  Rawls says we 
have “the duty of helping another when he is in need or jeopardy,” so if we see that 
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someone is trapped underneath a tree, and will die unless we help her out, we may be 
obligated to do so, even if we need to continue hunting for food.337  And, by parity of 
reasoning, this would not be required out of respect for justice, but because of the 
existence of natural duties. 
(ii) G.A. Cohen’s Challenge 
Despite this division between natural duties and justice, G.A. Cohen still objects 
to Rawls and rejects that justice would fail to apply or emerge in cases of extreme 
scarcity.338  In fact, Cohen does not believe that the circumstances of justice have any 
meaning whatsoever with respect to what justice requires.  Cohen employs two tactics 
in his challenge to Rawls.  First, he attempts to describe a situation under extreme 
scarcity where justice would nevertheless apply.  Second, Cohen argues that it is always 
possible to describe the requirements of justice, independent of any factual 
circumstances that make it impossible or unlikely to be realized.  
First, let us examine Cohen’s example.  According to Cohen:   
There is a rule that respects the general conception [of justice] under 
extreme scarcity, to wit, some sort of (deliberatively contrived) lottery.  It 
may be that most people would be unwilling to introduce that rule or 
sustain it or submit to it under scarcity, but that does not make the rule 
impossible.  Consider what Rawls might say of that rare and powerful 
someone who could have seized the only life preserver but who instead 
rolled dice to determine who would get it, and who had the power to 
enforce his will, which is to say to impose a just, because equal-chances, 
                                                          
337 TJ, 98.  Rawls also adds a caveat:  “provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to 
oneself.”  It is debatable whether conditions of extreme scarcity would always invalidate the natural duty, 
but I do not see that it would be the case in all circumstances.  My inability to hunt for a brief period of 
time, even though it is necessary for my survival does not seem to be severe enough to prevent me from 
helping someone in need. 
338 See Cohen (2008): 331-336. 
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structure.  Would Rawls say only that he was amazingly generous? Would 
he not also say, should he not also say:  what a just man he was, to 
impose an egalitarian structure to his own detriment, under those 
conditions?339 
Cohen’s strategy here is to argue that extreme scarcity does not make it impossible for 
someone to realize a duty of justice, which, for Cohen, means to ensure an “equal-
chances” distribution.  If someone were to stumble upon some food and decide to cast 
lots for it to ensure that everyone had an equal chance to eat it, what should we say of 
that person?  Cohen believes that this person is realizing justice in the world—he is not 
just expressing the natural virtue of beneficence.  In fact, the truly beneficent thing to 
do would be as follows:  Suppose, after the lots were cast, this person decided to give 
the life jacket away to someone else.  In this scenario, justice would have already been 
fulfilled, and so any further action would be supererogatory. 
There are various responses we can make to Cohen here.  First, by arguing that 
justice is simply the requirement to realize an “equal-chances” distribution of resources, 
Cohen is adopting a view of justice that departs from Rawls’s understanding of the idea.  
Through his example, we find that Cohen believes that justice applies whenever a 
distribution of resources is at stake.  And since there are still resources that some people 
get and others do not in conditions of extreme scarcity, justice will enact a judgment 
upon how those resources are distributed. 
                                                          
339 Cohen (2008): 333, emphasis added. 
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Rawls, in contrast, does not share this “allocative” view of justice.340  Rawls 
believes that “a distribution cannot be judged in isolation,” and that we must know the 
relevant background structure by which resources are produced.341  For instance, we 
will need to know of “any existing cooperative relations” that determined the 
production of goods.342  Otherwise, “there is simply no answer to this question” 
regarding what the just distribution of resources is.343  Merely appealing to the needs 
and desires of the individuals is not sufficient for determining the requirements of 
justice.  Other principles might be appealed to in order to address meeting the needs of 
others absent any social cooperation, but justice is not one of them. 
Rawls’s resistance to an allocative view of justice is connected to his view that 
“justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” and that “the primary subject of justice” 
is “the basic structure of society.”344  On this view, principles of justice are to apply to 
institutional structures and not to the individual choices of persons.  One of the primary 
reasons for this insistence is that justice is about the social relations that exist between 
persons within a set of economic, political, and social institutions.  Justice does not 
concern our relations to human beings as such, or to all persons in the world.  The 
natural duties cover our relations with other persons, and the principles of mutual aid 
and assistance apply to societies across the world.  As such, principles of justice will only 
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apply in cases where those special cooperative relationships exist that are mediated 
through institutions. 
Given these two considerations about justice—that it is not allocative (it is 
relational), and that it primarily applies to institutions—what can we say about that 
“rare and powerful someone” who decides to cast lots for the last life preserver in 
Cohen’s example?  On Rawls’s view, it does not make sense to call that remarkable 
person a just person on the grounds that he realized the principle of “equal-chances” in 
the world.  Instead, one option might be to argue that what the person did was 
supererogatory since he is benefitting others at great cost to himself.345  However, a 
more plausible response is possible.  I believe that Rawls would argue that the principle 
of casting lots could be a valid principle to adopt, but it would not count as a principle of 
justice, and instead would fall under a moral or ethical category.346  As such, we may call 
the person a moral or ethical person, as his behavior would respond to the moral 
demands of how we treat others independent of our institutional relationships.  We 
cannot, however, deem his behavior as “what justice demands,” as there is no special 
relationship of social cooperation that can exist without institutions in conditions of 
extreme scarcity.347 
                                                          
345 See Rawls’s brief discussion of supererogation at TJ, 100:  “Supererogatory acts are not required, 
though normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself.” 
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 Now, Cohen, aware of the “basic structure objection,” tries to preempt it by 
building into his example the fact that the person has “the power to enforce his will” 
and impose a just “structure” on society.348  Hence, we are to understand the example 
as one in which a person could forcibly generate institutional structures that would 
require the casting of lots for all resources.  But this is a poor attempt at satisfying the 
core of Rawls’s objection.  If I, for example, had the absolute power to impose an 
institutional structure on society that complied with the difference principle, this would 
not be justice-serving.  Justice is not about enforcing one’s will on others to comply with 
the difference principle, even if that principle were the correct principle that should 
apply to the institutional framework of society.  The institutional structures that are in 
place must also be “stable for the right reasons,” and must be justifiable to others on 
terms they can accept.349  One person usurping power to impose one’s will on others 
through the creation of institutions, even if benevolent, would fail these requirements. 
It would be difficult to see how these institutions would be deserving of our support and 
allegiance if they did not arise politically and with reinforcing support from citizens.  
They would most likely deteriorate shortly after being imposed, rendering the exercise 
of one’s powerful will fruitless. 
  We can now move to Cohen’s second objection to the relevance of extreme 
scarcity for the circumstances of justice.  Recall that Cohen uses his life-preserver 
example to provide a counterexample to Rawls’s insistence that, in conditions of 
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extreme scarcity, justice would not emerge.  However, Cohen’s second tactic is to argue 
that, even if justice could never be satisfied due to extreme scarcity, our knowledge of 
justice would still be the same—and it would still rightfully “apply” and condemn unjust 
circumstances.  Cohen states the following two claims:  “It will always be possible to 
characterize a situation as either just or unjust:  it’s false that the question will 
sometimes fail to apply.”350  Continuing, he argues:   
Even if, and contrary to what I have argued, there could not be Rawlsian 
justice under extreme scarcity, it would not follow that Rawlsian just 
rules for such circumstances could not be described, and it therefore 
would not follow that we could not describe such circumstances as 
productive of injustice.351 
 
Cohen’s claim here is that, even if extreme scarcity makes it impossible for Rawlsian 
justice to be realized, justice would still condemn any distributions that failed to realize 
the difference principle.  In other words, even if there could not be any remarkable 
person who had the will to enforce a just distribution, it would not change the fact that 
justice still requires a particular distribution to be realized.  It may be unfortunate, on 
Cohen’s view, that no one is able to realize justice, but we can still conceptually label the 
resulting state of affairs as “productive of injustice.”   
 Cohen is essentially implying that justice is like any other conceptual label we 
might utilize.  Consider, for instance, the label “green.”  If I am describing the clouds, the 
fact that clouds can’t be green does not prevent us from being able to say that “green is 
not being realized in the clouds.”  In other words, the fact that something cannot be 
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green does not inhibit our ability to label something as failing to achieve greenness.  And 
likewise, with justice, we can describe a state of affairs as “failing to realize justice,” 
even if that state of affairs cannot realize it, especially in conditions of extreme scarcity. 
Only a brief reply is in order here, as I will discuss a version of this objection at a 
later stage.  Cohen is again viewing justice as simply a property of distributions that can 
be applied anywhere and in all circumstances, rather than as a relational concept that 
arises within certain institutional parameters that form the basis for social cooperation.  
In the case of extreme scarcity where institutional rules are impossible, Rawls says that 
there is simply no answer to the question of what justice requires in terms of 
distributional requirements.  Rawls will not say, pace Cohen, that the difference 
principle ought to be the distribution of resources across society in conditions of 
extreme scarcity, but it is unfortunate that it cannot occur.  Instead, Rawls will say that 
our behavior will now be subject only to moral or ethical constraints as the conditions 
are now substantially different—there is no possibility for regulative institutions.  If the 
distribution of resources happened to match by mere chance what the difference 
principle would have required if institutions were in place, Rawls would have nothing 
whatsoever to say about it.  Distributions in and of themselves are simply not relevant 
to the requirements of justice and the difference principle would not prescribe 
distributional outcomes on society in the absence of the relevant institutions. 
Continuing, I will now leave our discussion of the relevance of scarcity and 
continue to develop our account of the other feature of the circumstances of justice. 
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(iii) Limited Altruism 
The second feature of the circumstances of justice is the existence of limited 
altruism.  If humans were constructed to be perfect altruists, such that each person’s 
good was contained within everyone else’s, there would be no need for an institution of 
property to demarcate one’s possessions from another’s; whatever it was that someone 
needed for his good, another would happily extend it to him if he possessed it, for it 
would be equally part of his good.  As Hume states:   
Suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same 
as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship 
and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, 
and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows; 
it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended 
by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of 
property and obligation have ever been thought of.352 
 
The central idea is that, since there would be no genuine conflicts of interests in a 
society composed of perfect altruists, justice would never need to be “thought of” to 
resolve them. 
On the other hand, if persons were so selfish such that they lived in a “society of 
ruffians” who exhibited such “a disregard to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid 
blindness to future consequences” that social cooperation would be impossible, people 
would simply take whatever it was they needed to pursue their own aims.353  Persons in 
such an unfortunate state of affairs would only “consult the dictates of self-preservation 
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alone.”354  In such conditions, justice would fail to constrain the choices of individuals as 
they would be unable to see social cooperation and property ownership as possible or 
available to them.  There would be no disposition to follow any of the rules to govern 
them. 
(iv) An Ambiguity About Justice 
Cohen raises objections to the condition of limited altruism that are similar to 
the ones presented in our discussion of moderate scarcity, so we will not rehearse them 
here.355  Instead, I wish to draw attention to an important ambiguity in Rawls about the 
relationship between justice and altruism and whether or not justice would truly fail to 
apply in a society composed of perfect altruists.  
Recall earlier in our discussion of ideal theory that Rawls argues that the 
principle of utility would more accurately be a principle applicable to “perfect 
altruists.”356  We discussed the hypothetical scenario in which humans were constructed 
like bees or ants, and were prosocial to the point of regarding the good of oneself to be 
equivalent to the good of all.  In such a scenario, Rawls argues that the most appropriate 
principle to guide institutions and behavior would be the principle of utility, as it would 
best fit their motivational structures.   
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However, we are now faced with the following dilemma:  if society were 
composed of perfect altruists, and humans were akin to bees or ants357, we must either 
say that (a) the principle of utility is the correct principle of justice for them, or that (b) 
justice does not apply.  According to the circumstances of justice argument, justice 
should not apply at all; however, according to Rawls’s rejection of utilitarianism, justice 
would apply in such a scenario, but it would be the principle of utility.  How shall we 
resolve this ambiguity? 
I believe the correct response to this problem requires us to formulate an 
answer to the following questions:  (1) Would citizens in this society view it as a system 
of social cooperation?  and, (2) Would there be a relevant distinction between the 
“Right” and the “Good?”358  The answer to (1) seems to be yes.  Bee and ant-like 
persons would view society as a system of social cooperation, except that the society 
would be organized around a single dominant end—the greatest good of all—rather 
than a multiplicity of different ends.  Because of this, the political community would be 
similar to a communitarian or perfectionistic one in which the cohesion of the group 
would be contingent upon a shared conception of the good. 
However, we might also think that a society of perfect altruists could support 
persons with a multitude of different ends to pursue.  The idea would be that, while 
pluralism would be accepted, everyone would always be ready and willing to sacrifice 
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their own good to enable others to pursue their projects.  However, it is difficult to see 
how it could be genuinely possible for persons to pursue a conception of their own good 
if it is constantly threatened by the needs of others.359  The perpetual disruptions would 
make it particularly difficult to have one’s own plan of life, and so the society may agree 
that the best thing for them would be to organize around a dominant end.  The 
possibility of pursuing one’s own rational plan of life would therefore drop out 
altogether. 
Regardless of how we interpret the way in which perfect altruism would be 
realized, it seems clear that citizens would regard their interactions with others as part 
of a socially cooperative endeavor to maximize the good.  This, however, means that the 
answer to question (2) seems to be no; there would be no relevant distinction between 
the Right and the Good.  They would be synonymous.  And given that justice is primarily 
conceived of as a matter of right, there would be no reason to think that matters of 
justice would arise in a society of perfect altruists.   
If justice is not possible, then how should we make sense of Rawls’s claim that 
the principle of utility would apply to them?  The best way to interpret Rawls here is 
that the principle of utility would not be a principle of justice, but an ethical or moral 
principle that governs their relations.  It would be part of their natural duties toward 
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others.  This interpretation would also explain why Rawls also says that the principle of 
utility is the “ethic of perfect altruists.”360   
Our discussion here has important implications for how we should interpret the 
circumstances of justice.  While most interpretations see them as depicting the 
necessary conditions for social cooperation (Rawls) or the necessary conditions to 
develop the disposition to obey rules of property (Hume), we should also add the 
further justification—namely, to provide the necessary conditions for persons to 
recognize a distinction between the Right and the Good itself. 
(v) Recap of Circumstances of Justice 
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the two circumstances of justice—
limited altruism and moderate scarcity—rule out the existence of justice in either 
strongly utopian or dystopian societies.361 In societies where people are blessed with a 
limitless abundance of resources or exhibit boundless generosity, or in societies where 
there exists a paucity of goods and a preponderance of hostile feelings that render 
cooperation impossible, the “cautious, jealous virtue”362 of justice would not arise.  In 
this regard, justice itself lies within the domain of a realistic utopia.  If we are dealing 
with a utopian society—justice will have no purpose—and if we have a brutally realistic 
society in which people must largely fend for themselves, justice will be in vain. 
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Put in the context of ideal theory, the circumstances of justice describe “features 
of the world no plausible conception of justice can idealize away.”363  To attempt to find 
a basis for agreement in such idealized conditions would be without purpose and would 
not solve the particular problem of how to devise principles of justice to dictate fair 
terms of cooperation among free and equal citizens who have an interest in pursuing a 
rational plan of life and developing a sense of justice.  In either utopian or dystopian 
societies, people will not identify with these stated purposes of justice and will instead 
employ other normative principles to guide and regulate their behavior, if possible. 
(b) Facts in the Original Position 
Now that we have discussed the importance of facts which precondition the 
emergence of justice itself, we can now move on to describe the general facts that are 
invoked in the Original Position to argue for the principles of justice.  The way in which 
this section is organized is as follows:  first, I describe a general account of the facts that 
are permitted and the rationale behind their inclusion or exclusion; and second, I 
describe facts about human nature and their importance for understanding Rawls’s 
project.  I conclude by responding to objections by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund. 
(i) Justification for Inclusion and Exclusion of Facts in the OP 
One of the most prominent places where facts are discussed with respect to the 
justification of principles of justice occurs within Rawls’s discussion of the original 
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position and the veil of ignorance. 364   The original position is a model, or hypothetical 
standpoint, that represents the appropriate conditions in which representatives of free 
and equal persons rationally deliberate about the principles of justice for society.  The 
“appropriate conditions” under which this deliberation should occur are, in part, 
stipulated by our conception of ourselves as free and equal, and is reflected in the veil 
of ignorance. 
The veil of ignorance notoriously shields parties from significant information 
about the persons they represent—such as facts about their conception of the good, 
their class and level of wealth, their talents and personality, and the special 
circumstances of their society.  While we recognize that these facts are important to us, 
we recognize that this information may bias and distort the selection of the principles of 
justice.  Rawls says:  “Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies 
which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to 
their own advantage…In order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a 
veil of ignorance.”365 
Hence, the central idea is that such information, if it were not hidden, would give 
individuals powerful bargaining power and leverage over other members by enabling 
them to exploit their natural talents, wealth, and social standing to negotiate better 
principles for themselves.  In this sense, the veil of ignorance is a tool to ensure that the 
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outcome of the deliberations in the original position is fair and not affected by morally 
arbitrary features. 
In addition, the OP and the veil of ignorance is said to mirror our conception of 
ourselves as free and equal.366   It reflects our freedom in the sense that it represents—
as one of our higher order interests—our freedom to pursue and revise a conception of 
the good.  It also reflects our equality by representing each person in the same way—as 
having the two moral powers and having a fundamental interest in developing them.  As 
such, by imposing a veil of ignorance on the parties, the principles of justice that would 
result would truly reflect reasons that stem from our fundamental conception of 
ourselves as free and equal—and not contingent features of our society or situation. 
 From this analysis, we can see that Rawls is primarily concerned with at least two 
features when determining which facts to include or exclude in our deliberations:  (1) 
achieving fair terms of deliberation, and (2) representing ourselves as free and equal.  
However, this now presents us with a question:  Do we need to consult any other facts? 
Can’t parties in the original position determine the correct principles of justice simply 
from the fact that we are free and equal persons, endowed with two moral powers to 
pursue a conception of the good and develop a sense of justice?  Wouldn’t the 
consideration of other facts be “morally arbitrary” as they would not reflect our 
fundamental and higher order interests? 
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Rawls’s answer to this question is no, and there are two reasons for this.  First, 
Rawls does not believe that we will have a sufficient basis for agreement on principles 
without additional facts available to the parties.  Rawls says:  if we abstract too much, 
“the conception [of the original position] would cease to be a natural guide to intuition 
and would lack a clear sense.”367  For example, if we did not know that humans required 
energy to navigate the world and pursue their conception of the good, it is not clear that 
parties would agree that income and wealth would be part of the bundle of primary 
goods in need of distribution in society.  After all, what would they agree upon instead if 
they did not know this fact?  Or, to provide an example from Kant, our conception of 
property and the principles that govern it are wholly dependent upon the fact that 
human beings live on a finite globe in which we must share physical spaces with other 
beings.368  Absent this fact about the earth, our conception of property itself would be 
radically different.  As these examples illustrate, Rawls believes that we must consult 
additional facts in order to provide a sufficient basis for agreement in the original 
position.  Otherwise, our deliberations would be indeterminate. 
Second, as we have discussed in our discussion on ideal theory, Rawls believes 
that the principles of justice selected in the original position must be stable.  Rawls says: 
An important feature of a conception of justice is that it should generate 
its own support.  Its principles should be such that when they are 
embodied in the basic structure of society men tend to acquire the 
corresponding sense of justice and develop a desire to act in accordance 
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with its principles.  In this case, a conception of justice is stable.  This kind 
of general information is admissible in the original position.369 
 
According to Rawls then, if we do not have facts available to us to test for stability, the 
hypothetical exercise in the original position would be futile, as it would not solve a 
central problem of justice, which is to find principles that citizens can endorse and affirm.  
It is a pointless task to derive principles of justice based solely on a conception of 
freedom and equality alone without any knowledge as to whether such a conception of 
justice would be able to gain the support of persons.  Hence, we need to consult 
additional facts to make the stability test determinate. 
 What kinds of facts are needed to generate a sufficient basis for agreement and 
to test for stability?  Rawls says: 
As far as possible, then, the only particular facts which the parties know is 
that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever 
this implies.  It is taken for granted, however, that they know the general 
facts about human society.  They understand political affairs and the 
principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization 
and the laws of human psychology.370 
We can see clearly from this statement that there are three categories of facts that 
Rawls believes are permitted in the original position:  (1) facts that “give rise to the 
circumstances of justice,” which we have already discussed, (2) facts produced by the 
empirical sciences about the world and the workings of society, and (3) facts about 
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human nature and human psychology.371  It is these facts about human psychology and 
human nature that are the most important for the stability test. 
However, it is important to note that these facts must be general facts, and not 
particular facts about specific human beings or societies.  We do not test the principles 
of justice based on each person’s unique psychology or personality.372  Instead, the 
original position only contains general facts about human beings and societies as such.  
This is to ensure that parties in the original position do not exploit these facts for their 
own advantage when selecting principles.  To illustrate, if I know, for instance, that I 
have a cunning personality, I will attempt to use this information as leverage when it 
comes to debating which liberties I should afforded, or how resources should be 
distributed.  I might argue, for example, that the difference principle is unnecessary for 
me since my cunning nature would allow me to deceive others into attaining higher 
positions of power in society.  As a result, Rawls denies particular psychological facts 
about persons in the original position, but allows general facts. 
In contrast, we do not typically think that knowledge of general empirical laws 
generates objectionable biases in our reasoning about what fair terms of social 
cooperation are, or what rights and liberties we think people should be afforded.  This is 
because these laws apply to everyone equally.  Of course, we know that scientific laws 
may lead to eventual harm or misfortune to specific persons—say, lightning striking a 
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tree and falling on you, or the genetic lottery dealing you a deleterious mutation that 
causes significant disease—but the point is that we do not know who will be harmed or 
benefitted from these general laws; the veil of ignorance shields this information from 
us.  It is in this sense that the general facts are tolerable in the original position—their 
effects upon us are unknown, and so we cannot use them for our particular benefit. 373 
 A further restriction imposed on the general facts available to persons in the 
original position is that they must be publicly accessible.  According to this “publicity 
condition,” the principles of justice and their full justification must be transparent to all 
persons in society.374  All persons must be able to discern the reasons upon which the 
principles of justice are based, and they must understand and have access to the facts 
that determine the selection of these principles. 
 The explanation for the publicity condition is threefold for Rawls.  First, if citizens 
are to be coerced through sanctions imposed by the basic institutions of society, then 
the principles that organize them should be publicly available as a way of justifying that 
coercion.  Otherwise, people will challenge and reject those principles, leading to 
instability.  Second, social institutions have a significant role in determining how citizens 
shape their wants, desires and aspirations.  In order for people to adequately plan and 
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take responsibility for their conception of the good, people must have the ability to 
assess and evaluate the principles that regulate their institutions that have a significant 
impact on their plan of life; and third, Rawls believes that it is a “precondition of 
freedom” to have knowledge about the rules and principles that govern social life.375  
What Rawls means by this is that, if the justification of principles were not sufficiently 
public, then the maintenance of society would depend upon “delusions” or an “ideology” 
of “false consciousness” to support them.376  This would be an unacceptable basis for 
our principles and would not yield a suitably stable conception of justice.  To summarize, 
Rawls says:   
If institutions rely on coercive sanctions…and influence people’s deepest 
aspirations, the grounds and tendency of these institutions should stand 
up to public scrutiny….Publicity ensures…that free and equal persons are 
in a position to know and to accept the background social influences that 
shape their conception of themselves as persons, as well as their 
character and conception of their good.377 
 
 Putting all these conditions together, we can now claim that the facts that are 
permitted in the original position are the following:  (1) facts that express our 
commitment to freedom and equality, (2) facts that do not create unfair bargaining 
power between citizens, (3) facts that are relevant for the stability test regarding the 
principles of justice, (4) facts that are publicly accessible, and (5) general facts about 
human nature, the empirical sciences, and human societies.   
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With these conditions, Rawls believes that he will be able to provide a sufficient 
basis for agreement on principles of justice that reflect his commitment to a realistic 
utopia.  It is realistic in the sense that he allows facts to constrain our principles based 
upon human nature and the empirical world; however, it is utopian in the sense that he 
employs a moral conception of the person as free and equal as a starting point, and 
aims to show how principles of justice can be chosen that reflect this normative ideal.  It 
is realistically utopian in the sense that these principles of justice and the moral ideal on 
which they are based are compatible and feasible for us given facts about who we are 
and the world in which we live. 
 In the following sections, I will now answer a series of objections by various 
philosophers who have rejected Rawls’s reliance upon facts to argue for principles of 
justice, including objections by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund. 
(ii) G.A. Cohen’s and David Estlund’s Challenge to the Stability Condition 
According to G.A. Cohen, Rawls’s concern with stability is misguided and is 
irrelevant for our understanding of justice.  Cohen states:   
To treat the evident desideratum of stability as a constraint on what 
justice might be thought to be, to judge that principles qualify as 
principles of justice only if, once instituted, their rule has a propensity to 
last, is absurd.378 
 
Cohen provides two central arguments for this claim. First, Cohen does not believe that 
the stability requirement allows us to make sense of the fragility of justice, and that the 
following utterance would be nonsensical:  “’This society is at the moment just, but it is 
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likely to lose that feature very soon: justice is such a fragile achievement.’”379  He thinks 
this is true because stability is built into the very idea of justice itself: “it is true by 
definition that there is no danger that justice won’t last.  And that is absurd.”380 
 In order to reply to Cohen’s criticism, we need to separate two different states of 
affairs: the well-ordered society, and the non-ideal world.  In the well-ordered society, it 
is true that justice is stable.  This is part of its appeal to us.  However, this does not 
mean that there will not be threats to it—partial tendencies to injustice will inevitably 
occur due to the burdens of judgment, and other limitations of human nature.   For 
instance, Rawls recognizes the real possibility that “an intolerant sect comes to exist 
within a well-ordered society.”381  However, Rawls believes that there will be internal 
mechanisms in society that will aid in the conversion of the intolerant sect to becoming 
a tolerant one.  Rawls says:  “This persuasion works on the psychological principle that 
those whose liberties are protect by and who benefit from a just constitution will, other 
things equal, acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time.”382   
In other words, the intolerant sect will come to see, through time, the benefits of liberty 
and will eventually come to acknowledge it as a principle of justice.  Hence, what makes 
a well-ordered society stable, for Rawls, is the following:  “Stability means that when 
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tendencies to injustice arise, other forces will be called into play that work to preserve 
the justice of the whole arrangement.”383   
Despite these equilibrium forces, Rawls would certainly recognize that the well-
ordered society is not immune from dissolution.  Significantly unfavorable circumstances 
may make it simply impossible for it to survive.  For example, a series of natural 
disasters may disrupt the workings of institutions, weakening their effects on the 
psychologies of the future generations of children who may not grow up to see the 
benefits of them.  Since a society depends upon its future generations to witness and 
experience the reasonableness of just institutions, if this is made impossible for a long 
enough period of time, the future generations will likely be set back and unjust 
institutions may arise.  As such, it is quite possible for citizens in the well-ordered 
society to proclaim that “justice is such a fragile achievement.”  It is not, pace Cohen, 
“true by definition that there is no danger that justice won’t last.”  Citizens would 
recognize that well-ordered does not mean that it is guaranteed to remain so, and that 
the uncertainties of the world may conspire against its persistence. 
Despite some fragility to the well-ordered society, the power and force of 
Rawls’s conception of justice derives from the fact that it is not so fragile that it ceases 
to motivate us or provide us with genuine and reasonable hope in the non-ideal world.  
When a society is thrown into disarray and chaos, we can know that, when the dust 
settles, and nature’s forces finally wane, the well-ordered society will still stand as a 
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beacon of hope that can unshakably serve to motivate and ease our frustrations with 
the unpredictability of the world.  This is because we recognize that it is, at its core, 
compatible with our fundamental interests and our moral conception of ourselves.  In 
the right favorable circumstances, and with enough perseverance, it is fundamentally 
achievable for us. 
As such, the citizens in the non-ideal world recognize the difficulty of achieving 
justice, and would assert the following claim:  injustice is very robust.  They recognize 
that the steps required to achieve justice will be met with numerous false starts and 
disappointments.  However, they would simultaneously assert that justice is also very 
robust.  If it were not, and if it was viewed as fundamentally fragile as to be essentially 
brittle, it would lose its value and importance for us.  We would see no reason to aim for 
it or strive to realize it. 
We can now turn to Cohen’s second criticism of the stability condition.  Cohen 
states the following:   
To reject a presumptive principle of justice precisely and solely because it 
is unworkable (as a rule of regulation) is to endorse it as a principle of 
justice…Why does Rawls assign a defect to that conception of 
justice…rather than to people’s moral capacities?  Is it an axiom that 
human beings are capable of justice? Is ‘original sin’ a contradiction in 
terms?”384 
 
Here Cohen asserts that, if we recognize a principle of justice to adequately reflect all of 
our considered convictions about justice, but only fails the stability test, we should 
thereby conclude that we have found the true principle of justice and that it is our 
                                                          
384 Cohen (2008): 330. 
185 
 
human nature that is flawed.  After all, if such a principle adequately gives shape to our 
moral conception of ourselves, why would we reject it simply because it was 
incompatible with human nature?  Why isn’t the correct response to condemn our 
nature and bemoan its frailty? 
Recall that one main reason for the rejection of utilitarianism was that it failed 
the stability test—it was shown to be incompatible with our moral motivations in that 
we could not expect citizens to adhere to its mandates over time.  The implication of 
Cohen’s view would then be the opposite conclusion:  Instead of condemning the 
principle, we ought to condemn the human race for failing to be a society of bees with a 
hive-mind psychology. 
David Estlund voices a similar criticism of Rawls’s reluctance to criticize human 
nature’s imperfections.385  Estlund argues that it is part of our normative framework to 
condemn features of ourselves that we find abhorrent and that Rawls’s reliance upon 
human nature to influence our stability judgments is mistaken.  Estlund argues: 
“Rawls’s doctrine…silences concerns about whether some motivational 
structures—however much they might be part of our natures—might be 
justice-tainting rather than justice-shaping.”386    
 
To illustrate his point, Estlund argues that Rawls’s method forces us to make the  
following absurd argument:   
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People tend to a certain degree of cruelty, and this is part of what they 
are motivationally like as a matter of human nature. (Suppose this is so.) 
Therefore, requirements to be otherwise are specious and false.387 
 
On Estlund’s view, Rawls must allow the parties in the original position to have access to 
this information when they test the principles for stability.  As such, we might find the 
requirement to secure the equal basic liberties for all persons to be utterly infeasible for 
human beings because their cruelty would make it motivationally difficult for them to 
endorse it.  They would recognize their desire to dominate and subjugate others, and so 
they would not accept a principle that required them to deny their basic human nature. 
As a final blow to Rawls, Estlund then asks us to consider a hypothetical problem 
of envy and its potential “justice-tainting” properties.388  Estlund says: 
Suppose that it is part of human nature that people who recognize their 
own superior talents will tend to resent and envy people who are, owing 
to the operation of social institutions, as well-off as they are but without 
as much talent and ability.389 
 
Estlund believes that, if this were true, the difference principle would generate too 
much envy among the talented and gifted, and so it would be rejected.  In such a 
hypothetical case, Estlund believes that Rawls’s methodology would instead 
recommend principles of justice that “apportion the distribution of social goods 
according to levels of talent and ability” and that this would then “constitute perfect 
social justice.”390 
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 Given these problems, Estlund concludes that “it is never a feature’s status as 
characteristic of humans by nature that constrains the concept of justice,”391 and that 
“the rules and institutions that should be constructed given what is known about 
everyone’s likely compliance are hardly guaranteed to be rules and institutions that 
qualify a society as just.”392  As such, Estlund believes we should reject the stability test 
if it permits us to illegitimately smuggle in objectionable features of human nature into 
our determination of principles of justice.  Estlund believes we have independent moral 
reasons for criticizing or affirming these motivational features of human nature.  We can, 
for instance, condemn the selfishness or the narrow-mindedness of human psychology 
rather than resign oneself to it at the level of fundamental normative principles.  While 
the application of these principles must take these features into consideration, the 
utmost peak of our normative framework should steer clear from them. 
 Cohen corroborates Estlund’s position in his final pithy remark: 
The flesh may be weak, but one should not make a principle out of that.393 
(iii) Rawls’s Reply to Cohen and Estlund 
My reply to these criticisms will be separated into two parts.  First, I will argue 
that the features of human nature that we find most problematic—our tendency toward 
cruelty, envy, or our desire for power and domination over others—are actually “special 
psychologies” that we do not have good reasons to believe would exist in dangerous 
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levels in the well-ordered society.394  As such, we would not permit them in the original 
position as a basis for the selection of our principles of justice.  In the second part, I will 
argue that Rawls does have the tools to criticize features of human nature if it turns out 
that humans would be so disfigured as to be truly unfit for justice in Rawls’s sense. 
Let us begin with the first claim, that the special psychologies will not exist to a 
large extent in the well-ordered society, and that they should also not be included in the 
original position.  According to Rawls, “a rational individual is not subject to envy, at 
least when the differences between himself and others are not thought to be the result 
of injustice and do not exceed certain limits.”395  Rawls also says that the “various 
tendencies to dominate or to submit” will also be mitigated for similar reasons.396  The 
central argument for this conclusion is that many of our beliefs about our basic 
psychological attitudes are actually the result of injustice in the world, and are likely to 
fade away under just institutions.397   
To illustrate, Rawls argues that a well-ordered society governed by the 
difference principle would not largely consist of individuals with strong desires to 
accumulate more wealth.  Rawls states that the desire for wealth typically results “from 
insecurity and anxiety,” and that “to the extent that just institutions alleviate these 
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psychological conditions, they reduce the strength of the quest for wealth and 
position.”398  As such, we do not have reasons to believe that these desires are general 
features of human beings, or even if they were, they would not be so pronounced as to 
pose a threat to the stability of our institutions.  Hence, Rawls argues that we should not 
allow the parties in the original position to be affected by them. 
However, even if we challenged Rawls on this point, Rawls also argues that 
including the special psychologies in the original position would pose a further problem 
for the deliberators.  At the very least, there would be great uncertainty as to how much 
persons would be affected by them.  Rawls says, “without rather definite information 
about which configuration of attitudes existed, one might not be able to say what 
agreement if any would be reached.”399  Given this problem, we must “avoid the 
complications in the bargaining process that would result.”400  And so, “for reasons both 
of simplicity and moral theory, I have assumed an absence of envy and a lack of 
knowledge of the special psychologies.”401 
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We can also frame Rawls’s point in another way.  Recall that one of the 
limitations on the facts allowed in the original position is that they must satisfy the 
publicity criterion.  If there would be no consensus on the general facts about our 
liability to envy or other special psychologies, we cannot appeal to them. As such, it 
would be preferable to withhold them from the parties, for otherwise the full 
justification for the principles of justice would not be available to all persons. 
However, one worry for Rawls’s strategy here might be that our criteria for what 
should be included as a special psychology is now too stringent.  Could we not argue 
that all claims about human nature are controversial and liable to be part of a special 
psychology?  And if so, how could we justify relying upon any claims about human 
nature at all?  To provide some plausibility to this, consider the range of views from 
prominent biologists as well as philosophers of science about the matter. 
According to Michael Ghiselin:   
What does evolution teach us about human nature?  It tells us that 
human nature is a superstition.402 
 
And David Buller argues:   
The idea of a universal human nature is deeply antithetical to a truly 
evolutionary view of our species…A truly evolutionary psychology should 
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abandon the quest for human nature and with it any attempt to discover 
universal laws of human psychology.403 
 
And finally, Tim Lewens argues: 
 
Many philosophers of biology today think about human nature in the 
same way that they think about race.  Race is commonly regarded as 
having no basis in biological reality, and the same, it is sometimes said, 
goes for human nature.404 
 
This is, of course, not the place to engage in these extensive debates.  However, I 
believe Rawls can largely deflect these more skeptical views about human nature when 
we consider what Rawls actually includes when he discusses the general facts about 
human nature. 
 Let us examine, for instance, the sense of justice which is perhaps the most 
central psychological capacity that human beings have, as it includes the capacity for 
reciprocity, which entails tit-for-tat motivations and “a tendency to answer in kind.”405  
According to Rawls: 
A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind would 
appear to be a condition of human sociability….Beings with a different 
psychology either have never existed or must soon have disappeared in 
the course of evolution.406   
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In other words, Rawls argues that the very foundation for social cooperation as we 
know it rests upon human beings having a capacity for reciprocity.  Otherwise, 
coordination would not be possible for us and societies as we know them would not 
exist.  Rawls also invokes the theory of evolution to explain how persons who 
cooperated with a sense of justice were more likely to form stable unions that persisted 
over time than those groups who did not.407  He even argues that social groups that had 
more utilitarian psychologies could not be stable for “its members would risk 
domination” by other social groups that would emerge to take advantage of their 
universal benevolence.408 
 Of course, Rawls merely stating these features of human psychology does not 
make them true, as they are largely empirical conjectures.409  However, the level of 
skepticism about human nature in general should not be understood to apply to these 
more basic elements that are viewed as preconditions for our capacity to view society as 
a system of social cooperation based on reciprocity.  If this turned out to be false, the 
entire conception of justice would need to be entirely recast.  As Rawls states: 
A person who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes 
and capacities included under the notion of humanity….there is no way 
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for us to avoid a liability to them [moral feelings] without disfiguring 
ourselves.410 
 
As such, we cannot plausibly suspend judgement upon these features of human nature, 
as they are intricately connected with our moral conception of ourselves as being 
fundamentally reasonable creatures capable of restraining our behavior based on 
considerations of reciprocity.  To deny this about ourselves would be to say that humans 
are not, in fact, capable of justice as we know it at all.  Hence, Rawls argues: 
It is hard to imagine realistically any new knowledge that should convince 
us that these ideals are not feasible, given what we know about the 
general nature of the world.411 
 
Consequently, for Rawls, there is little reason to be skeptical of these more general 
features of human nature.412 
 This completes the first stage of my reply to Cohen and Estlund.  The central idea 
is that we should not expect the special psychologies of envy or the desire to dominate 
others to be destabilizing forces in the well-ordered society, and that there are certain 
empirical generalizations of human nature that are plausible for Rawls to appeal to in 
the original position to argue for the stability of principles of justice. 
 We must now turn to the second stage of my reply, for Cohen and Estlund are 
also making a much deeper criticism of Rawls’s reliance upon facts related to stability, 
human nature and feasibility to argue for his principles of justice.  Their argument is not 
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simply that envy or cruelty might taint the principles of justice in our world.  Rather, it is 
the stronger claim that we would not be able to condemn it as a flaw of human nature if 
it turned out to be endemic to human life in some other possible world.  As Estlund 
argues, if, hypothetically, human beings were so envious of others that they could not 
tolerate the difference principle, we should not acquiesce to the frailty of human nature 
and revise our conception of justice.  We should instead condemn it as an utmost 
affront to justice.  It is this more radical claim that I must reply to now. 
 Implicit in both Estlund’s and Cohen’s criticism is that our conception of justice 
can be “hopelessly” unattainable if it turns out that human nature is not up to the 
challenge to meet its demands.413  However, Rawls makes the opposite conclusion.  
Rawls does not believe that a conception of justice must always be a slave to our more 
demanding moral ideals about what kinds of creatures we ought to be.  Rawls says: 
A political conception must be practicable, fall under the art of the 
possible.  This contrasts with a moral conception that is not political: a 
moral conception may condemn the world and human nature as too 
corrupt to be moved by its precepts and ideals.414 
 
So, Rawls does acknowledge that human nature may be judged to be fundamentally 
corrupt or morally bankrupt.  However, these pronouncements must be a part of our 
conception of the good and cannot be a part of the political realm.  The reason for this is 
because a conception of justice must be fundamentally achievable for us.  It is part of 
Rawls’s vision of a realistic utopia that our conception of justice is possible and capable 
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of generating agreement among reasonable and rational persons.  If our conception of 
justice itself condemned human nature, it would not be possible for persons to 
rationally agree upon it.  After all, what purpose would it serve other than to make it 
impossible to “reconcile” ourselves with the world?415  How could we expect persons to 
develop the requisite motives to affirm it without trouncing upon the freedom of 
others?416 
 And so, to answer Estlund’s claim about envy, if it were hypothetically possible 
that human beings were too envious of others to endorse the difference principle, the 
principles of justice would have to be recast.  Again, Rawls vehemently denies this 
possibility417, and it would only be a theoretical exercise.418  And, since it is only a 
theoretical point, it should have no bearing on the thoroughly practical components of 
justice. 
However, there is one caveat to Rawls’s claim here, and Cohen and Estlund may 
take solace in his words:   
If a reasonably just society…is not possible, and human beings are largely 
amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with 
Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth.419 
 
                                                          
415 JF, 1-5. 
416 I am thinking here of the doctrine of original sin.  Many societies, of course, have attempted to base 
social relations upon it.  However, the only method by which one could do so would be through an 
unreasonable limitation on the freedom of thought and the liberties of others who might not share such a 
view.  Hence, reasonable agreement would not be possible. 
417 See my fn. 150 for a further defense of this claim. 
418 Rawls admits that his Kantian Constructivism allows for the theoretical possibility for his principles of 
justice to change if the general facts about human nature were to be radically different.  However, Rawls 
only “regard[s] this as a mere possibility noted in order to explain the nature of a constructivist view.”  
See KC, 566. 
419 LP, 128. 
196 
 
It might seem as if Rawls is contradicting himself in these two statements.  After all, 
shouldn’t Rawls concede that, if human beings were entirely selfish that different 
principles of justice should apply to them?  Principles that, in a sense, “fit their nature?” 
 Rawls’s answer here is that, if human nature does not even afford the basic 
materials to allow humans to be governed by the reasonable, it would be pointless to 
attempt to constrain their behavior by justice.  The sense of justice would not exist in 
these persons, and it would therefore be impossible for all persons to be able to pursue 
their conception of the good in this world with any degree of security.  Such persons 
would forever live in fear of others and would likely die alone and in misery.  Such a 
world would be akin to Hobbes’s state of war, in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.”420  In this world, Rawls would join the chorus of Cohen and Estlund, 
condemning the miserable fate of humanity, for it would turn out that the higher-order 
interests of all persons would be permanently left unfulfilled and no principles of justice 
could ever be affirmed to secure them. 
However, if Rawls’s empirical musings and conjectures are at all accurate, our 
worry about whether such humans would be fit for the earth would quickly be 
answered—Rawls believes such beings would quickly die out as their capacity for social 
life would be impossible.  The forces of evolution would eliminate them from the earth, 
sparing us the thought of such unfortunate creatures. 
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To answer Cohen’s claim then, if the flesh is weak, our conception of justice will 
likely mitigate those weaknesses; if the flesh is still weak, we may need to revise our 
principles of justice; but if the flesh is too weak, then such creatures would not be fit for 
justice and would not be long for this world. 
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Chapter 6:  Embracing a Hopeful Ideal 
I.  Resisting Hopeless Ideals 
David Miller, in the conclusion to his book, Justice for Earthlings, urges us not to 
succumb to the idea of “political philosophy as lamentation,” according to which the 
task of political philosophy is to cling to hopeless ideals in defiance against the world.421  
Miller’s target is the political philosophy of the late G.A. Cohen, as well as David Estlund, 
who both assert in differing degrees that the demands of justice are independent of our 
flawed human nature, our corrupted society, and the circumstances of the world which 
make justice fundamentally infeasible for us.  According to this philosophical orientation, 
all facts about human nature and society are contingent and morally arbitrary 
distractions that prevent us from fully grasping the true essence of justice which resides 
in a “Heavenly City,” never to be reached by mere mortals such as ourselves.422  In 
contrast, the “Earthly City,” where imperfect human creatures reside, should be 
lamented and condemned for failing to realize the high demands of justice from above, 
perpetually reminding us of our frailty and fundamental weaknesses.  
According to Miller, such a view of the world is a “pathological” response to our 
shaken and defeated moral aspirations when confronted with the realization that there 
is no place on earth in which such aspirations can be fulfilled.423  Instead of relinquishing 
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these ideals, we project them, unscathed, onto a distant utopia.  By placing these ideals 
forever out of reach, we, in a final effort to forestall defeat, “rescue justice and equality” 
by enshrining them in a timeless and sacrosanct city, never to be ransacked or 
destroyed again. 
Miller believes that this escape now turns political philosophy into a “purely 
speculative activity,”424 detached with concerns of feasibility and achievability, and 
tainted with undertones of resignation, lamentation, and perhaps even resentment.  
Consider the almost iconic statement from Cohen: 
The question for political philosophy is not what we should do but what 
we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical 
difference.425 
 
And so, we think, contemplate, and muse on perfect justice. If our penetrating thoughts 
reveal that justice condemns the world and humanity, that is to be our fate; we are 
forever bound to its demands.  Here is Cohen, again: 
In believing that justice must be so crafted as to be bottom-line feasible, 
they believe that it is possible to achieve justice, and I am not so sanguine.  
It follows from my position that justice is an unachievable (although a 
nevertheless governing) ideal.426 
 
David Estlund supports Cohen’s outlook and defends an approach to political philosophy 
which he calls “hopeless aspirational theory,” according to which justice “defends 
standards even though they will not be met, and even if we knew this for sure.”427  
Continuing, Estlund argues that truth is the governing ideal for justice, just as it is in 
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“pure mathematics,” and that its practical value is of secondary importance.428  While 
Estlund does believe that hopeless theories can have practical value, justice, 
nevertheless, is a theoretical exercise that is grounded in “curiosity,”429 and if it turns 
out to have absolutely no practical value, justice remains what it is, unaffected by its 
impossibility and inapplicability for us. Estlund states: 
Even if (as I doubt) understanding justice would have no practical value, 
and even if (as I doubt) for that reason, not the kind of thing a person 
should spend a lot of time on, and even if (as I doubt) such understanding 
has little or no value of any kind, none of this would show that the truth 
about justice is bound to have practical value.  Whether there is any 
value in knowing about it or not, I have argued that a standard of justice 
is not automatically shaped so as to guarantee that we ought, given what 
we know about how we and others will behave in the future, to set out 
toward achieving it.  Looked at the other way around, just because it is 
not something we ought to set out for does not mean it is not the 
genuine standard of social justice.430 
 
According to Estlund and Cohen, then, we have a standard of justice that is only 
tangentially related to the practical, and is primarily considered an exercise in 
theoretical thought at the highest level of abstraction, unadulterated with factual 
constraints about feasibility.  If these pure concepts of justice end up fundamentally 
unachievable for us, or provide us with no action-guiding potential, it is no fault of the 
conception of justice.  Instead, it would just be a fact about justice that humans are 
unable to achieve it and act upon its demands. 
                                                          
428 Estlund (2014): 133-134. 
429 Ibid., 133. 
430 Ibid., 134. 
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In order to assess Cohen’s and Estlund’s radical approach to justice, I will 
investigate two questions:  first, in what sense can a hopeless theory of justice, 
according to Cohen, serve as a “governing ideal,” or, according to Estlund, potentially 
have any practical value (even though it does not necessarily have to); and second, is 
justice fundamentally a theoretical or a practical endeavor?  To answer these two 
questions, I must first outline what I believe to be Cohen’s political methodology that is 
implicit in much of his work.  After doing so, we will see that the action-guiding potential 
of a purely speculative discipline will not ultimately be fruitful, and that justice should 
be conceived of as a primarily practical discipline. 
(a) Cohen’s Method:  Intuitionism and Radical Pluralism 
G.A. Cohen adheres to a normative philosophical method that he calls, “radical 
pluralism,” or what Rawls would call “intuitionism,” which is a method of political 
philosophizing that consists of identifying a set of irreducibly moral concepts that lie at 
the foundation of our normative thought.431  These might be, for instance, Justice, 
Beauty, Happiness, Prudence, etc.432  The role of the philosopher, according to this 
method, is to engage in a thorough-going dialectic to eventually discover what these 
concepts are, eventually leading to a pinnacle or summit at which no further explication 
is possible.  After discovering what each consists of, we then attempt to apply them to 
the empirical world to guide our actions and direct our institutions in particular cases.   
                                                          
431 Cohen (2008): 4; TJ, 30-36. 
432 Cohen (2008) pays homage to Plato and Socrates for this approach, p. 291.  Rawls cites Moore, G.E. 
Principia Ethica Cambridge University Press, 1903, and Ross, W.D. The Foundations of Ethics, Oxford 
Clarendon, 1939. 
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However, what is crucial about the intuitionist method is that there is no 
“higher-order” court of appeals that we can summon in order to weigh these 
fundamental concepts against one another other should they conflict.  Instead, we must 
rely upon pure “intuition” and clarity of thought.433  So, when justice and other values 
conflict, such as efficiency or prudence, it is up to us to determine what best course of 
action best balances these different demands. 
One consequence of this view is that certain moral concepts, like justice, will lack 
a certain primacy over our other values.434  As such, Cohen reminds us that justice must 
give way to efficiency or other considerations when we must design the institutions to 
regulate society.435  It is doubtful, then, that justice could ever be fully realized in the 
world.  There are simply too many other valuable considerations that must be 
accommodated, and it is not possible to simultaneously realize them all at once.  So, 
when Cohen asserts that justice may not be feasible for us, he means that its demands 
are fundamentally incompatible with other values that must be realized in the world 
once we are presented with all the facts, which include facts about human beings and 
social life.   
                                                          
433 TJ, 30.  For a longer discussion of Cohen’s method, see Vrousalis, Nicholas. The Political Philosophy of 
G.A. Cohen: Back to Socialist Basics.  Bloomsbury Academic, 2015: 4. 
434 For a defense of the primacy of justice over our personal pursuits, see Tan, Kok-Chor.  Justice, 
Institutions, and Luck.  Oxford University Press, 2012: 26-32.  Also Tan, Kok-Chor.  “Justice and Personal 
Pursuits,” The Journal of Philosophy vol. 101, no. 7 (2004): 331-362. 
435 Cohen (2008): 302:  “I don’t see how anyone, whatever she thinks justice is, can deny the possibility 
that certain facts, or other values, might make it inappropriate, or too difficult, or too costly, to produce 
justice. 
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To illustrate, suppose that, upon reflection, we discern that justice demands 
equality or the neutralization of luck on all distributive outcomes.436  Cohen absolutely 
recognizes that this value cannot be fully realized or instantiated in the world—human 
imperfections and limitations, including our inability to settle the free will problem, all 
inhibit our understanding and implementation of it.  Moreover, the level of state 
interference in our own personal lives required to realize it will vehemently count 
against the demands of justice.437  However, this does not bother Cohen, for he never 
claims that we ought to actually implement justice and nothing else.438  Instead, we 
must always be engaged in a balancing act of sorts, weighing and considering on a case 
by case basis which trade-offs of our values will be best.  It is in this sense that Cohen’s 
philosophical method is both radically pluralist and intuitionist:  there are numerous 
values that exist that do not trump the other, and the only way to determine the best 
course of action is to think about it, test it, and subject it to numerous critical inquiry.  
The goal is that, at the end of the process, we will end up with a greater clarity with 
respect to the ultimate question as to what we should do. 
We can now answer the two questions that framed our discussion.  With respect 
to the question in what sense hopeless theories can have practical value, the answer is 
                                                          
436 See Cohen, G.A.  “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4 (1989): 906-944. 
437 For a critique of luck egalitarianism on the grounds of institutional infeasibility, among other serious 
problems, see Anderson, Elizabeth.  “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics vol. 109, no. 2 (1999):  287-337. 
438 Cohen (2008) says:  “Difficulties of implementation, just as such, do not defeat luck egalitarianism as a 
conception of justice, since it is not a constraint on a sound conception of justice that it should always be 
sensible to strive to implement it, whatever the factual circumstances may be.  Justice is not the only 
value that calls for (appropriately balanced) implementation: other principles, sometimes competing with 
justice, must also be variously pursued and honored,” p. 271-272.  
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that they figure indirectly in our ultimate normative calculus when deciding the “all-
things-considered” best course of action.439  While the institutions we build in society 
may fail to fully implement justice, they are still directed and shaped in some way by its 
mandates.  Regarding the second question, the search for justice is primarily theoretical 
in the sense that it aims to provide a clear understanding of the concept of justice first, 
independent of the contexts in which it is to be applied, before turning to the question 
of how we should act practically.  These two inquiries are distinct, and one concerns 
purely matters of belief and thought, and the other, norms for action.440 
(b) Rawls’s Criticism of Intuitionism 
 Rawls views his contributions in A Theory of Justice as a response to the kind of 
intuitionist theorizing endorsed by Cohen.441  Rawls is primarily unsatisfied with the 
radical uncertainty regarding the weighing of different values and principles when they 
conflict with one another.  According to Rawls, “Intuitionism holds that in our judgments 
of social justice we must eventually reach a pluralism of first principles in regard to 
which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather 
than that.”442 To illustrate, for a luck egalitarian, they must find a way to balance the 
claims to neutralize luck and to promote efficiency.  The hope, is, for intuitionist, that 
“men will in fact balance them more or less similarly.”443  
                                                          
439 Cohen (2008): 275. 
440 See Wallace, R.J.  “Practical Reason,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ (2014, March 26th). 
441 TJ, 30-36. 
442 TJ, 34. 
443 TJ, 34. 
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However, Rawls believes that the open-endedness and the limitless number of 
cases to which these principles must be applied makes this convergence unlikely, and 
that different conceptions of justice will likely emerge.  The result of this is deeply 
problematic for Rawls, as he says that “the assignment of weights is an essential and not 
a minor part of a conception of justice.  If we cannot explain how these weights are to 
be determined by reasonable ethical criteria, the means of rational discussion have 
come to an end.”444  In this sense, agreement on principles of justice would not be likely, 
and the problem of justice will then not be adequately solved. 
Rawls seeks to solve this problem by limiting the role of intuition and allowing it 
to operate in a more confined and restricted domain.  He does not believe that we can 
eliminate altogether the role of intuition in our normative judgments.  Indeed, Rawls 
says that the goal of justice as fairness is “reducing and not of eliminating entirely the 
reliance on intuitive judgments.  There is no reason to suppose that we can avoid all 
appeals to intuition.”445  Instead, the goal should be to determine a method by which 
we can more clearly and fruitfully appeal to our intuitions and generate a basis for 
agreement.446  Rawls accomplishes this task in three ways. 
First, Rawls constructs the original position to provide greater clarity and 
impartiality to our intuitions.  The veil of ignorance, more specifically, prevents our own 
circumstances from clouding and biasing our intuitive judgments.  One major source of 
                                                          
444 TJ, 37. 
445 TJ, 39. 
446 TJ, 39:  “The practical aim is to reach a reasonably reliable agreement in judgment in order to provide a 
common conception of justice.” 
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disagreement in how to apply our intuitions is due to the disparate effects 
circumstantial facts have on our intuition.  Rawls eliminates this source of disagreement 
through the imposition of the veil of ignorance. In addition, Rawls allows parties 
knowledge of general basic facts to shape our intuitive judgments.  If we did not supply 
reasoners with the general circumstances of justice and basic facts about human beings 
as such, including an account of their fundamental and higher-order interests, the task 
of finding principles that could generate agreement would be near impossible.  Rawls 
states his case against intuitionism in the following powerful paragraph:  
Some philosophers have thought that ethical first principles should be 
independent of all contingent assumptions, that they should take for 
granted no truths except those of logic and others that follow from these 
by an analysis of concepts.  Moral conceptions should hold for all possible 
worlds.  Now this view makes moral philosophy the study of creation: an 
examination of the reflections an omnipotent deity might entertain in 
determining which is the best of all possible worlds.  Even the general 
facts of nature are to be chosen.  Certainly we have a natural religious 
interest in the ethics of creation.  But it would appear to outrun human 
comprehension.  From the point of view of contract theory it amounts to 
supposing that the persons in the original position know nothing at all 
about themselves or their world.  How, then, can they possibly make a 
decision?  A problem of choice is well defined only if the alternatives are 
suitably restricted by natural laws and other constraints…Without a 
definite structure of this kind the question posed is indeterminate….If 
these assumptions are true and suitably general, everything is in order, 
for without these elements, the whole scheme would be pointless and 
empty.447 
Rawls’s statement here expresses the importance of establishing the materials 
necessary for agreement.  If we are to merely concern ourselves with our intuitive 
                                                          
447 TJ, 137-8. 
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concepts in isolation, our musings will be indeterminate and may not yield conclusive 
judgments about what we ought to do.448   
Interestingly, and perhaps to Cohen’s relief, Rawls says that “there is nothing 
intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. Indeed, it may be true.”449  
However, Rawls does not regard “truth” to be the goal for justice.  Instead, justice is 
about finding reasonable principles that are capable of being agreed upon to govern our 
institutions and determine how rights and resources are to be assigned and 
distributed.450  As such, our intuitive judgements must be restricted and clarified in 
order to produce the basis for public agreement.  Otherwise, we will not have solved the 
problem of justice. 
For this reason, Rawls does not regard the principles of justice to be “self-evident” 
or foundationalist in our thinking in the same way that our pure intuitions might be.451  
Because the principles of justice are the result of a choice-situation in which our 
intuitive judgments are considered against one another in a limited fashion, it is difficult 
to see in what sense justice might be self-evidently true.  In fact, it would be quite 
                                                          
448 Thomas Pogge expresses a similar criticism of Cohen’s methodology when he says, “I can say that I find 
it absurd, and morally offensive to extend my moral principles to beings and life contexts that I have not 
experienced and do not really understand,” and that “Cohen does not explore, let alone engage, the 
reasons there might be for modesty about the range of one’s moral principles.”  See Pogge, Thomas.  
“Cohen to the Rescue!” Ratio 21, no. 4 (2008): 467, 469. 
449 TJ, 35. 
450 To be clear, that justice is about finding principles capable of agreement to govern the assignment and 
distribution of rights and social goods is supposed to be a truth about the “concept of justice.”  The 
principles of justice, however, are not to be regarded as theoretical truths, and form the “conception of 
justice.”  See TJ, 5 and TJ, 9. 
451 TJ, 37:  “In justice as fairness the principles of justice are not thought of as self-evident.” However, 
Rawls also thinks that these intuitions may change in reflective equilibrium.  Rawls says, “even the 
judgements we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision,” TJ, 18. 
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difficult to arrive at the principles of justice without the original position procedure, for 
otherwise our convictions would be muddled and indeterminate.452   
In addition to allowing general facts and imposing a veil of ignorance in the 
original position, Rawls also limits the choice-situation in the original position by 
“substituting prudential for moral judgment.”453  By stipulating that the parties in the 
original position are to be governed by the principles of rational choice,454 we further 
limit the role of our intuitive moral judgements about how we should distribute 
resources and assign rights and liberties.  By stipulating an account of the primary goods 
that any rational person can be seen to want, and describing persons as having two 
fundamental capacities—an interest in pursuing and revising a conception of the good 
and developing a sense of justice—we can adopt prudential reasoning to determine 
which principles would be selected to best safeguard these interests.  If we allow other 
forms of reasoning into the deliberation, such as moral reasons that stem from a 
conception of the good, our agreement will again be indeterminate.455 
Finally, Rawls limits the role of intuition in our determination of principles of 
justice by providing a list of conceptions of justice to select from that have been 
developed in our philosophical legacy.  Of course, Rawls admits that, “ideally one would 
                                                          
452 For a disagreement about the necessity of the original position procedure to arrive at Rawls’s 
principles of justice, see Scanlon, Thomas. “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,’ in Amartya Sen and B. 
Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1982: 103–128. 
453 TJ, 39. 
454 These include, taking “the most effective means to one’s ends,” and to prefer more of a good than less, 
etc., JF, 85, and TJ, 123—130.  
455 For instance, Rawls imagines someone who is religious or an ascetic who may, for moral reasons, not 
desire to have more primary goods at all.  See, TJ, 123. 
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like to say that they are to choose among all possible conceptions of justice.”456  
However, it is simply not available to us to know with any clarity what these full 
conceptions of justice would look like without them first being developed into a 
concrete framework.  In the future, if other conceptions are fully articulated, they may 
be considered as alternatives, but it makes no sense to consider partial or undeveloped 
accounts.457 
Taking all these conditions into account, (1) the construction of the original 
position, (2) the description of the parties as rational,458 and (3) the limited selection of 
conceptions of the justice, we are now able to build a “framework designed to focus our 
moral sensibilities and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited and 
manageable questions for judgement.”459  It is Rawls’s belief that, only in such a 
confined choice situation can we determine principles of justice and assign the 
appropriate weights to our different intuitions—such as deriving the priority of liberty 
over the desire for an increased number of primary goods.460   
With Rawls’s methodology outlined, we can now return to the two questions 
posed to Cohen and Estlund and offer a criticism of their answers.  First, with respect to 
the question of what practical value a conception of justice would have if it were part of 
                                                          
456 TJ, 105. 
457 Rawls does allow mixed conceptions, which are different for they have been more fully developed in 
our political and economic relations with others.  However, Rawls does acknowledge that these are much 
more difficult to evaluate.  See, TJ, 277-285.  
458 We may also add that the parties are “mutually disinterested” in order to avoid problems of 
representatives wanting to be altruistic towards others.  See, TJ, 125. 
459 TJ, 46. 
460 I do not have the space here to produce the entire argument for the principles of justice and their 
priority.  However, this section suffices to demonstrate how Rawls believes that we must limit our 
reliance on intuition to make judgments about the ultimate requirements of justice. 
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a pure intuitive judgment that was independent of all facts and limiting conditions, 
Rawls’s answer would be that it would have very little practical value, for there would 
be no way to determine what its recommendations would be for how we should 
fundamentally regulate our basic institutions.  This is because an intuitionist account of 
what we should “all-things-considered” do would unlikely generate agreement about 
how best to balance and weigh the various values and principles against one another.  
For, according to what metric would these disputes be resolved?  The intuitionist 
methodology has no other answer than to recommend a retreat further and further into 
a theoretical cocoon with the hope that a more definite answer can be provided.  As 
such, the prospects for practical proposals to be reached to guide the design of our 
institutions becomes much more challenging and haphazard.  To be sure, it can be done 
in the sense that some decision can be made by some particular person—but whether 
or not that decision can be justified to all members and agreed upon is another matter 
altogether and should be the ultimate goal of justice. 
Rawls’s solution, alternatively, is to condense the space in which these 
judgments may be pursued, preventing the unending retreat into the limitless 
theoretical space in which these Forms of Justice and other values operate.  In doing so, 
we open the possibility for agreement on practical principles to govern our institutions. 
Regarding the second question, to what extent political philosophy is a 
theoretical or a practical exercise, Rawls would reiterate that the primary concern for 
justice is to find reasonable principles that persons can agree upon.  The question of 
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truth is either inapplicable to justice, or, more modestly, best left to a conception of the 
good.  Given the impossibility of an agreement on these more controversial and limitless 
interpretations of our intuitive judgments, they cannot serve as a public criterion by 
which to navigate and frame our social relations with others.  While there may be some 
“truth” to the matter to be found in the deep speculative libraries of the Heavenly City, 
it is not likely to be an ideal to which citizens can endorse for all.  It is, after all, unlikely 
that each person would engage in the “ethics of creation” in the same manner. 
With these criticisms in place, we may now return to Miller’s diagnosis of 
Cohen’s outlook on political philosophy.  Despite Cohen’s “rescue” of justice and 
equality and the attempt to enshrine these concepts in a pristine and flawless city, this 
rescue of justice is really an imprisonment, a Trojan Horse designed to sabotage and 
hijack our normative outlook.  For now, instead of inspiring us and motivating us to 
rectify the wrongs of the earth, we are left with an account of justice that can only be 
contemplated and eternally refined.  When we try to act upon it, we are left with an 
indeterminate muddle of conflicting claims that can only serve to paralyze and frustrate 
our aims and aspirations.  Without any possibility for agreement, we can only retreat 
into the greater confines in our minds, clinging onto our ideals of justice and remaining 
in a permanent state of aporia, wondering if the world will ever live up to its demands. 
It is perhaps Miller’s psychological thesis that this aporia leads to condemnation 
and lamentation of the world.461  The idea would be that a permanent inability for 
                                                          
461 The exposition here is my own and I only mean to suggest that it is in the spirit of Miller’s analysis. 
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humans to realize justice in the world must have some connection with our moral 
psychology and our attitudes.  If our conception of justice is such that it remains forever 
out of reach—that luck can never ultimately be neutralized, or that we can never live in 
a perfectly socialist society462—our psychological reaction to this perpetual failure of 
justice must be devastating for us and a source of unrelenting sorrow.  There would be 
truly no hope for us, no matter our best efforts; the Earthly City would forever be a 
mere shadow of true Justice and should be mourned, and ultimately condemned.  Such 
an assault on our moral psychology is bound to leave us disfigured and debilitated. 
Cohen has three possible responses to this line of thought.  First, he could reject 
the connection between violations of justice and the changes in our moral attitudes and 
emotions.  After all, if justice is, as Estlund and Cohen claim, purely a theoretical concept 
akin to the “curiosity” of “pure mathematics,”463 why should it have any relationship to 
our moral emotions whatsoever?   
However, this would only serve to highlight the strangeness of Cohen’s view.  By 
relying upon a theoretical concept of justice, he now cannot provide us with an account 
of any moral emotions at all.  For, while mathematical truths may invoke a sense of 
wonder or amazement, or may even generate frustration when we are unable to unfold 
                                                          
462 Cohen, in his book Why not Socialism? argues that the feasibility of socialism should be a separate 
question from the desirability of socialism itself as an ideal of justice.  Cohen himself admits ambivalence 
about the feasibility of socialism for us, but he asserts that this fact should not deter us from stating that 
the ideally just society is one that is purely socialist in nature.  Cohen, G.A.  Why not Socialism? Princeton 
University Press, 2009. 
463 Estlund (2014): 133.  Adam Swift makes a similar argument in Swift, Adam. “The Value of Philosophy in 
Nonideal Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 34, no. 3 (2008): 363-387. 
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their deepest mysteries, these are not moral emotions.464  Consequently, if justice is 
purely a theoretical concept that does not necessarily connect with moral attitudes, 
then it is difficult to see why we should care that much about justice outside of its 
theoretical interests.  It would be just one among many other values that compete in a 
timeless and unending struggle with other ideals in the realm of theoretical reason.   
This reply should also serve as a sufficient answer to Estlund’s attempt to save 
hopeless theories of justice by claiming that they can still have value in the way that 
pure mathematics can.  While it is true that theoretical justice in this sense could still 
provide value, it is not the right kind of value that we require from a concept of justice.  
We need a concept that allows for the relevant engagement with the moral emotions—
not one that is limited to theoretical wonder and puzzlement.  Our failings of justice 
must evoke resentment.465  If they did not, we would doubt that we genuinely regarded 
them as unjust in the first place.  As such, the study of justice as a purely mathematical 
or theoretical exercise cannot generate the relevant emotions necessarily connected 
with injustice. 
Hence, if one endorses a hopeless conception of justice as Cohen and Estlund do, 
then one is faced with a dilemma:  either you cannot provide an adequate account of 
the moral emotions associated with justice, or, even if you could, our moral attitudes 
                                                          
464 This claim is reminiscent, though not perfectly analogous, of Hume’s argument that violations of 
reason cannot be the source of moral principles for they cannot generate the relevant moral emotions.  
See Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Norton and Mary Norton. Oxford University 
Press, 2000: 2.3.3, 265-270. 
465 Rawls argues that resentment is an appropriate response to injustice: “Resentment is a moral feeling.  
If we resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being better off is the 
result of unjust institutions, or wrongful conduct on their part,” TJ, 467.   
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would be so overwhelmed by the persistent impossibility of achieving justice that they 
would morph into unhindered resentment and lamentation.466  Either of these 
outcomes should be unacceptable to us, for it would entail that our response to the 
world in the face of injustice should either resemble the attitude of a coolly distant 
mathematician who discovers a mathematical proof—“Eureka! I have discovered the 
true nature of injustice!”—or, it should drive us downright mad, our emotions flooded 
with such melancholy and eventual contempt for the world and its inhabitants that we 
are left with no choice but to retreat to the citadels of the Heavenly City to achieve 
some semblance of calm as we contemplate the peace and happiness that are 
ultimately possible there. 
Faced with this dilemma, I believe that Cohen would assert that our conception 
of justice should, in some sense, drive us to the brink of insanity.467  He would insist that 
the injustices of the world are what they are and anyone with enough clarity of mind 
should be in a state of perpetual sorrow, dejection, and dissatisfaction.  While we may 
certainly attempt to correct it, we can never fully purge its corruption. This is simply the 
reality of our condition.  Anyone who attempts to deny this essential fact is under the 
grip of a weak and corrupted ideology that seeks to drag down justice into the dirt of 
humanity.  It would be the ultimate delusion to think that justice must somehow answer 
                                                          
466 This dilemma is interestingly similar in one regard to the criticism of utilitarian theories of justice in 
that they require moral demands upon us that are incompatible with our moral psychology. 
467 In other words, I deny that Cohen would adopt the purely mathematical stance in which judgments of 
justice should be met with a sense of discovery or notion of eureka. 
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to the facts of humanity and our world.  Instead, justice condemns it and tells us that 
our reality is fundamentally a reality of unmet ideals and shattered dreams. 
However, is such a moral outlook possible for us?  Where is our hope, our relief? 
Can we be truly and deeply motivated to fix the world if it is ultimately impossible for us 
to do so?  Cohen’s vision bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of original sin and 
the psychological responses to it.468  When faced with the judgment that man’s nature is 
fundamentally fallen, many are driven to the religious promise of heaven.  It is how 
many people tolerate a world endlessly marred by injustice and human corruption.  Our 
moral psychology demands some respite from such a wretched judgment and so, it is no 
surprise that people turn to God and the Heavenly City to provide that salvation for us.  
And while many are motivated to do God’s work on the earth to improve it, ultimate 
peace and relief are found in heaven, far beyond the capabilities of this world.  This is 
how we achieve some semblance of moral psychological stability. 
However, Cohen does not allow for the promise of salvation in Heaven, and nor 
does he recommend a belief in God to reconcile our fate.  And so, we must seek relief 
elsewhere—our moral psychology demands it.  While we might think that we would 
now have more motivation to fight for a better world without the distraction of Heaven, 
this does not occur.  Now, without the relief from the divine, Cohen instead creates it in 
our own minds.  The Heavenly City now exists in the deep crevices of theoretical and 
abstract human reason, unspoiled by the rotting prison of the empirical world.  Pure 
                                                          
468 Indeed, Cohen questions:  “Is original sin a contradiction in terms?” Cohen (2008): 330. 
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reason then is our new version of God—it is timeless, limitless, and is the only fortress 
left to provide us with respite in the face of perpetual injustices that cannot end. 
And so, Cohen’s vision is as follows:  We are fundamentally unfit for justice, 
though we can at least take solace in our discovery and contemplation of the timeless 
theoretical truth of The Just Society.  The clarity of mind that is reached in this discovery 
is its own version of tranquility.  As we contemplate the perfect socialist society in which 
equality reigns and the brute forces of luck are extinguished, we find peace.  And while 
we may be motivated to make the world a better place, as many religious individuals 
strive to do, ultimate peace is only found in the workings of the mind and not through 
our actions to improve the earth.  And there is the fatal flaw of Cohen’s approach.  Our 
vision of utopia is not possible for us, and so our motivation to create it on this earth will 
be motivationally stunted and frustrated.  While it is certainly not impossible to be 
motivated to work towards achieving justice, it will be weak and extraordinarily difficult 
for us to translate those theoretical recommendations into practice.  This is because 
there is no genuine clarity of vision as to how to enact justice in this world.  As Estlund 
reminds us, “actions in pursuit of what will never be achieved [even if it is what justice 
requires] can be wasteful or even disastrous.”469  And so, what shall we do with our 
thoughts about justice when we cannot satisfactorily combine them with our other 
values and the factual constrains of the world?  We retreat into our mind and 
contemplate them once again.   
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While Cohen may think that criticizing the wealthy470 and condemning the 
economic incentives necessary to work hard will produce more justice in the world, this 
only serves to demonstrate the weakness of his mathematical understanding of justice 
and its detached pronouncements from the Heavenly City of pure reason.  For without a 
hopeful and possible vision of a just society to offer people, these criticisms will fall flat 
and fail to reliably motivate such persons to relinquish their privileges and accept 
change.  No amount of prophetic demonization of their injustice will create genuine 
change, for there is no way to connect those criticisms into a vision that people can see 
enacted in their world. 
It is the ultimate irony of ironies that Marx, who condemned religion for its 
creation of passive individuals with a diminished interest in correcting the injustices on 
Earth, has now produced an acolyte whose vision of justice creates a similar psychology.  
It is also surprising that Cohen failed to heed one of Marx’s most important dictates, 
that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, 
however, is to change it.”471  Cohen’s utopia and his purely theoretical account of justice 
is antithetical to Marx’s vision and cannot produce the required conditions necessary to 
produce genuine and lasting change in the world. 
 
 
                                                          
470 Cohen, G.A.  If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Oxford University Press, 2000. 
471 Marx, Karl.  Theses On Feuerbach, XI. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm (2005, February) 
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II.  A Realistic Utopia Defended 
I believe that Rawls’s vision can do better.  However, he must now answer to the 
criticisms of those on the other side of the spectrum who subject his vision of a realistic 
utopia to an intense scrutiny of the same rigor that I have presented against Cohen.  
According to these critics, Rawls’s vision of the just society is simply another inert ideal, 
incapable of generating real change in the world.  Indeed, even if we acknowledge that 
Rawls’s conception of justice is not so far into heaven as Cohen’s vision, might it not still 
be somewhere out of reach for us?  It is this criticism to which I must now provide an 
answer. 
At the core of the realist criticism is a great skepticism about the possibility for 
genuine agreement between persons on a conception of justice.  In this regard, realists 
share a similarity with intuitionists, for both recognize the impossibility of persons to 
converge on ultimate principles.  Intuitionists assert that the world is simply too 
complex and our judgments too disparate to ever produce agreement on all the 
fundamental normative values.  Rawls says:  “The intuitionist believes…that the 
complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments 
and necessitates a plurality of competing principles,”472 and that intuitionists remind us 
to “recognize the possibility that there is no way to get beyond a plurality of 
principles.”473 I have already attempted to respond to this criticism by showing how 
                                                          
472 TJ, 35. 
473 TJ, 36. 
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agreement is nevertheless possible when we subject our intuitions to the constrains 
outlined in the original position. 
Realists, in contrast, highlight an alternative source of disagreement and 
skepticism: a less sanguine account of human nature and our psychological motivations.  
Realists emphasize the deep and perpetual conflicts of interests that are inherent to 
social and political life, and they do not believe that persons possess the requisite 
psychological materials to ultimately be guided by Rawls’s methodology and vision.  For 
instance, what actual motivations do people have to enter into the perspective of the 
original position?  Why would they deny information about their conception of the good 
when it is fundamental to their identity?474   
At the core of these criticisms is that people will simply be unwilling to endorse a 
conception of justice that does not serve their current interests.  It is simply too much to 
ask of people to bracket what is most important to them just for the purposes of 
agreement—they will seek agreement in other ways that are more temporary and 
short-lived if it means protecting their current interests.   
Hence, the original position, while an interesting model for what hypothetical 
persons might agree upon, is not appealing to actual persons who are too entrenched 
by their own conceptions of the good and cannot, in good faith, be asked to set them 
aside for purposes of fairness.  As such, justice must always be a compromise between 
                                                          
474 This is the criticism of Michael Sandel (admittedly not a realist, but a communitarian, though I would 
argue that he shares a similar skepticism of Rawls as realists do). Sandel, Michael.  Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
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particular and “contingent” interests people have.  Contra Rawls, people do not see a 
distinction between their fundamental or higher-order interests and their actual 
interests.  Persons believe that their actual conception of the good is fundamental to 
them, not their capacity to pursue their conception of the good.   
And so, justice must retreat from the domain of universal agreement, and 
descend to the level of bargaining and compromise.  This capacity—our capacity to 
strike agreements and bargain with our interests—defines our sense of justice.  Rawls’s 
insistence that there is some “deep reciprocity” at the heart of social relations is just 
another myth and a fiction.475  Instead, this notion of reciprocity is what Rawls aspires 
there to be in persons—it is, in other words, an ideal of reciprocity, not actual 
reciprocity as it is realized in the actual world.  While some persons may possess it and 
develop it, it is really akin to the distribution of benevolence and altruism in society—it 
is quite limited and scarce among humanity. 
These are deep criticisms of Rawls’s vision regarding what human beings can 
strive to achieve in this world, and they challenge the limits of what persons can be 
expected to do in the name of fairness. However, I believe that this objection can be 
answered.   
Let me begin with the following uncontroversial claim, and deduce from it what I 
believe to be the strongest case for Rawls’s belief in the possibility of a realistic utopia.  
That claim is this:  The existence of injustice in the world has truly devastating 
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consequences for us all—not only for those who suffer directly from it, but also for 
those who benefit from it and do not incur its most severe costs.  The psychological 
disfigurement that results in persons who benefit from injustice can, however, be 
internally felt and acknowledged—it is not something that is imposed on them from a 
religious ideology or other external doctrine.  It may, perhaps, begin that way, but it is 
Rawls’s belief that people can come to internally recognize their own aversion to 
benefiting from injustice, and that the cognitive dissonance that results from it will be 
deeply disconcerting for them.  As such, they will be motivated to eliminate it. 
If this were not the case, it would be remarkable that any great advancement of 
justice by persecuted minorities could ever have transpired within liberal democracies.  
For, without the ability to appeal to the sense of justice of the broader community, their 
clamors for change would be entirely in vain. This is the lesson of Rawls’s account of civil 
disobedience.  We must convince others—particularly those who are in power and are 
already benefitting from injustice—that living with injustice is intolerable and 
unacceptable.  However, Rawls again believes that our capacity to convince these 
persons that injustice cannot be experienced as a good for them can ultimately come 
from within, by appeal to our considered convictions that the original position can more 
clearly manifest for us.  And, importantly, the original position is not an external 
demonstration, but a heuristic engagement with our own considered convictions and 
our moral sensibilities to allow us to see for ourselves that we are benefiting from 
injustice and that this should cause us deep distress. 
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One consequence of this approach is that, in societies in which there is no 
common sense of justice to appeal to, especially in those that are not liberal 
democracies by any measure, Rawls’s conception of justice will have limited application, 
and an entirely different theory will be required.476  For in such societies, the need for 
revolution, violent resistance, or succession may be the best course of action in 
response to injustice. 
However, I must now pause and address a deep objection put forth by those 
who might find my defense of Rawls’s theory of justice to be perverse.  For the 
implication of my defense is the following idea:  A theory of justice is not fundamentally 
addressed to those who are the victims of injustice, but is instead an appeal to the 
already powerful and privileged group, in order to get them to acknowledge that living 
with injustice is a great harm to them.  Doesn’t this make the whole idea of justice a 
concept limited to the privileged?477  Is this not a deeply offensive notion that a 
conception of justice must be fundamentally addressed to those who do not suffer from 
injustice? 
This is, however, only partly true.  To be sure, it does speak to Sen’s criticism of 
ideal theories of justice as being oddly disconnected with the actual injustices of the 
world.  Sen’s question is essentially the following:  What use is a theory of justice 
anyway?  People already know they are suffering from injustice.  We do not need to 
                                                          
476 Rawls began this project in The Law of Peoples, but it is inadequate to address these other kinds of 
deeper problems.  But this is not a fault of Rawls, but is only due to the limited time he had on this earth. 
477 See Mills, Charles.  “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 (2005): 165-184. 
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construct an ideal theory of justice to demonstrate that to them.  We should start 
working now towards eliminating it. 
My response to this objection is the following:  Rawls’s theory of justice is for 
everyone in the sense that it can serve as the legitimate public criterion of justice that 
each and every person can endorse and accept in society, no matter what their position 
or circumstance. However, in terms of the impact of Rawls’s theory of justice, it is to 
some extent a redundancy for those who are already suffering.  They already know their 
fundamental interests are not taken seriously, and they are deeply aware of the utter 
damage that has been done to their sense of self-respect and standing in society.  Their 
hurt is real and palpable, and they stand ready to be motivated to act for change.  In this 
sense, a theory of justice will perhaps not motivate them any further.  Nevertheless, it 
will still answer and resonate with their deepest aims and voiced frustrations.  In fact, it 
may even serve to demolish any false illusions that persons have constructed about 
themselves who are victims of injustice without acknowledging it.  They may have tried 
to deny the horrible treatment to them in order to save their own sense of psychological 
integrity and self-respect.  A theory of justice may serve to liberate these persons from 
the psychological damage of self-deception and malformed adaptive preferences. 
However, for the powerful and the privileged, Rawls’s theory of justice must be 
utterly transformative if it is to be deemed successful.  And on that front, I believe Rawls 
will be shown to have succeeded, for the basic ingredients of Rawls’s theory are within 
the framework of liberal democratic political life, and are represented in the considered 
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convictions of all persons who regard themselves as free and equal—the powerful 
included.  His vision will eventually work to shape the attitudes of those persons who 
have the power to reconstruct the basic institutions of society, and it will also influence 
the powerful to rally behind and speak up for those who have no voice in society.  They 
are already well aware of their grievances, they simply need the influence to make them 
heard by the entirety of society. 
And so, I conclude with two final thoughts:  First, realists may respond by arguing 
that, fundamentally, Rawls’s project will fail for human psychology is simply too weak to 
overcome our natural biases, and that humans will never relinquish their power and 
resources once they have them secured.  The reason for this pessimism is that realists 
have seen the subjugation, the domination, the brutal and bloodied political arena, and 
the adamant refusal by the powerful to rectify egregious wrongs.  They do not believe 
that it is any stretch to conclude that these domineering elements of human nature will 
ever be controlled or eliminated. 
However, maybe, just maybe, those who benefit from injustice are not at root 
too devilish to give up their benefits, but are perhaps simply fearful that, in the absence 
of a realistic utopia, when they relinquish control, they themselves will be the ones who 
end up being subjected and victimized.  While those who are currently suffering from 
injustice may clamor for this kind of divine retribution against the privileged—it is their 
turn now—this is not the kind of change Rawls believes is at the heart of justice.  By 
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constructing a realistic utopia, all persons can endorse and be motivated to work 
towards the establishment of just institutions. 
  And so, the hesitation by the powerful to vote for policies that divert powers, 
opportunities, and resources from themselves is actually quite a natural human 
response to the desire for a realistic utopia that can be achieved for us.  The reluctance is 
not due to a devilish desire grounded in selfishness and hatred.478  Persons mostly 
desire assurance that their sacrifices are not in vain and merely squandered by society 
and corrupt politicians with no grand vision for how to transform society.    Without 
some ideal of a well-ordered society that can be shown to be possible for us, no one can 
be expected to relinquish their opportunities and sacrifice their resources to pursue any 
haphazard desire to simply do good.  Persons are owed a reasonable expectation that 
their labor be used for purposes that have a deep possibility of lasting success.   
The idea of a realistic utopia can provide that vision for us all.  A pure or hopeless 
utopia, in contrast, cannot provide this vision.  Persons cannot be expected to comply 
with judgments from the high citadel that offer no hope whatsoever for us.  The 
theoretical pronouncements from pure reason are insufficient and cannot form the 
basis for a public conception of justice for all reasonable persons.  They will invariably 
fall on deaf ears, for there is no deep connection within it to our moral motivations that 
desire to see lasting change in the world that is not ultimately in vain. 
                                                          
478 Though for some persons it may appear this way on the surface.  However, I would argue that hatred is 
the result of a long history of failures rather than some innate orientation that persons with power must, 
by definition, have. 
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And now a final concluding thought.  While a theory of justice shares some 
similarities with mathematics in its higher abstractions, political philosophy is a 
humanistic discipline that must answer to our deepest and most fundamental interests 
that form the conception of ourselves as free and equal human beings.  If political 
philosophy ever diverts from this main focus, its relevance and importance for us will be 
diluted and its potential to inspire us will vanish.  
And so I will leave us with an answer to our initial question of how ideal and 
utopian we should view Rawls’s theory.  Is it in the Heavenly City, or does it reside 
elsewhere?  I shall say that the vision of a realistic utopia should reside in the stars.  For 
the stars are somewhere we can go, and they are inspiring to us.  We acknowledge that 
they are deeply difficult to reach, but they are real enough to keep our motivations 
intact and steady.  Humanity depends on the belief that justice is within reach in order 
to have a chance at peace—not the kind of peace that is defined by the absence of war, 
but a kind of internal peace that derives from the recognition that “each person 
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole 
cannot override.”479  I believe that Rawls would have endorsed this vision for his world. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
479 TJ, 3. 
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